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THE COOPERATIVE SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION

Holger Mölder

This paper examines a clash between modern and post-modern security systems, which may generate cooperative security dilemmas. Cooperative security dilemmas are not state-centric concepts as traditional security dilemmas but apply to international systems. The variations of cooperative security dilemmas are tested in the context of Baltic Sea regional security complex, particularly the integration dilemma in the Nordic countries and the identity dilemma with Russia. The security and defense postures of some regional actors tend to follow modern security understandings that may produce cooperative security dilemmas in the post-modern security environment.

Keywords: security dilemma; security communities; European security; regional security; Baltic Sea region

Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War, the Hobbesian arrangement of international relations, marked by fear and competition, began to lose its position to a Kantian conception premised on trust and cooperation. In the 1990s, Europe introduced a post-modern security system, closely related to a Kantian security culture, which encouraged a cooperative relationship of mutual interdependence between actors and moved away from a bi- or multipolar system (see also Cooper 2000, 2003). Cooper (2000, pp. 19–20) claims that security in the post-modern society is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence, and mutual vulnerability. The post-modern system does not rely on balance, nor does it emphasize sovereignty. Domestic and foreign affairs are not separated from each other, and the legitimate monopoly on use of force is the subject of self-imposed international constraints.

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German philosopher Immanuel Kant developed the principles of a Kantian security culture in his 1795 essay 'Perpetual Peace' (Kant 1795; Wendt 1999; Frederking 2003).

Today, with Eastern European countries integrated into the system of Western security institutions (NATO, EU), Turkey moving towards the European Union, Ukraine and Georgia engaged in democratization, and the Balkans stabilizing, there are four outstanding security issues driving the push to consolidate the Kantian security community of post-Cold War Europe. First, the competitiveness between the United States and the European Union has the potential to destabilize the relationship between two emerging pluralistic security communities, the European Union and NATO. Second, persistent instability in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region requires a stable, cooperative relationship with Europe. Third, problems related to the adoption of liberal democratic values and the Kantian principles of security by Russia have the potential to hinder its cooperation with the West. Fourth, social instability in Africa poses a considerable security concern to the stability of European security environment. Resolution of these pressing security concerns depends in large part on the development of a polarity-free security architecture in Europe. Yet there does not exist a global order predicated on Kantian ideals to resolve these dilemmas: the post-modern security system as we know it is confined only to Europe, and as a model of interstate relations, it remains disputed by the rest of the world. Moreover, the new system is, at times, contested within Europe itself.

This paper argues that a clash between modern and post-modern security systems generates a cooperative security dilemma, defined as a state of tension and mistrust between countries located in different frameworks of interstate relations. A cooperative security dilemma is a post-modern security phenomenon that indicates the presence of either an integration dilemma or an identity dilemma, which have diverse origins. The emergence of a cooperative security dilemma is caused by different security orientations (integration dilemma) or by different security identities (identity dilemma). The resolution of this dilemma requires an appropriate security architecture that meets security standards of the contemporary post-modern society.

This article examines different aspects of the security dilemma in the post-modern security environment. It addresses some fundamental questions of the post-modern security architecture in Europe as it relates particularly to the Baltic Sea region. The region presents a strong case of a cooperative security dilemma. The Baltic countries continue to define their relationship with Moscow on the basis of a 'balance of power', and the Nordic countries struggle with the security preferences originating in the Cold War's security concepts (e.g. the Nordic Balance). The study analyzes the presence of cooperative security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region and tests the influence of Cold War's security models on the present-day security environment. Can the security architecture influence the emergence of security dilemmas in the Baltic Sea security environment? How does the Baltic Sea regional security complex correspond to the needs of the post-modern security architecture in Europe? Do different institutional affiliations or cultural identities create a cooperative security dilemma within a regional security complex? Can structural transformation offer possibilities for transcending cooperative security dilemmas?

From Security Dilemma to Cooperative Security Dilemma

The notion of a 'security dilemma' has been discussed by Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler in a recent book, *The Security Dilemma. Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (2008). Indeed, it is a phenomenon that greatly influenced security-related academic discussion during the last 50 years since John Herz and Herbert Butterfield first used this term to describe a situation where two or more states may face a conflict because of their security concerns and perceptions of each other. Booth and Wheeler distinguish security dilemmas from 'security paradoxes'. The former requires a choice between different options, whereas the latter is an outcome of security dilemma; it refers to a situation in which actors provoke an increase of mutual tension when improving their own security (Booth & Wheeler 2008, p. 9).

A dilemma always involves a difficult choice between equally balanced alternatives (Booth & Wheeler 2008, pp. 4–6). The traditional concept of the security dilemma – an increase in one state's security decreases the security of others (Jervis 1978, p. 169) – is one of the most referenced security terms in international relations, especially within Realism. It reflects the perceptions that take place when states behave in the Hobbesian spirit, where countries in a 'state of nature' exist in a state of permanent war (Hobbes 1651). Thomas Hobbes stipulated that mistrust is a natural and inescapable feature of international society. In their assessment of the security dilemma, Realists stress the primacy of political-military competition between states. The basic argument takes the form of two general propositions: (1) States are rational, self-interested actors seeking power and security, and (2) international anarchy – the absence of an authority to regulate the use of violence among states – renders states fearful of one another because violence can be used against them at any time (Keohane 1995, p. 66). Therefore, Realists tend to stress the difficulty of finding lasting solutions to military conflict. In their view, the security dilemma is a natural phenomenon of international politics.

Likewise, constructivist thinkers have also used the security dilemma concept. Alexander Wendt presumes that the end of Cold War bipolarity does not necessarily entail an end to the security dilemma between states. He describes the security dilemma as 'a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other's intentions' (Wendt 1992, p. 396). Glaser (1997, p. 197) notes a fundamental difference between the Realist and the constructivist approach to the security dilemma. While Jervis and other Realists pay attention to international anarchy – a material condition – constructivists, like Wendt, define the security dilemma as rooted in a particular conception of the international 'social structure'.

The third major school of International Relations theory, Liberalism, has often omitted the study of the security dilemma. According to the proponents of Liberalism, institutionalization mitigates the manifestation of the security dilemmas. Keohane (1999, p. 94) explains that:

institutions meant to cope with security threats will have rules, norms and procedures to enable the members to identify threats and retaliate effectively against them; institutions meant cope with security risks will have rules, norms,

and procedures to enable the members to provide and obtain information and to manage disputes in order to avoid generating security dilemmas.

This might be true when considering actors within the stipulated institutional framework while disregarding those outside of the framework. Though institution-ization can create stability among participating states, it may, at the same time, create distrust among outsiders (Väyrynen 2000, p. 158). Thus, security institutions should seek to decrease distrust and misperceptions of threats between member and non-member states while creating mechanisms that facilitate peaceful resolution of potential disputes and conflicts.

The concept of the security dilemma is also of potential use in non-traditional issue-areas, such as economic, social (e.g. the war on drugs), environmental security, and ethnic conflicts (Huysmans 2002; Krause and Williams 2003; Posen 1993; Roe 2001). Differences in values have been a traditional source of distrust as they can cause conflicting understandings between different cultures. In the post-modern security system, the traditional security dilemma is fading, but it 'has not led to world dominated by peace and cooperation' (Sørensen 2007, p. 358). Georg Sørensen (2007) notes that instead of a security dilemma, international actors currently face an insecurity dilemma, where the security of the state is threatened by the demands of its subgroups. Insecurity is not solely a characteristic of interstate relations, but it also includes much larger societal spheres such as global society, civilizations, institutions and transnational bodies.

The emergence of a security dilemma suggests (1) a lack of interaction between actors in a security environment, (2) the emergence of mutual distrust, or (3) the malfunction of the system of dispute regulation. Barry Posen (1993) proposes distrust as a main source of encouraging competition and weakening cooperation. Cooperation among states aiming to mitigate competition can be difficult because 'someone else's cheating may leave one in a militarily weakened position and all fear betrayal' (Posen 1993, p. 28). Referring to Rousseau's concept that a state's defensive policies necessarily cause distrust among its neighbors, Kalevi Holsti (1996, p. 9) indicates sources of the security dilemma, where states create and deploy armaments to defend them against potential aggression, but they create suspicion among their neighbors in doing so.

Theorists discussing the characteristics of the security dilemma have paid less attention to the establishment of mechanisms reducing misperceptions among security dependents within the particular security environment. Stable international systems aid in the establishment of effective cooperative mechanisms that mitigate the possible emergence of security dilemmas. Complex interdependence is one of the most effective tools used against security dilemmas, which can be described by multiple channels connecting societies, absence of hierarchy among issues, and absence of use of military force against each other (Keohane & Nye 1977). International systems can regulate potential distrust by establishing regimes based on commonly accepted norms, values, and procedures. For instance, liberal democracies can be institutionalized into pluralistic security communities where member-states share similar values. In addition, zones of peace and interdependence can be extended into peripheral neighborhoods by establishing cooperative security arrangements.

Robert Jervis (1978) recognizes the positive outcome of cooperative international regimes in overcoming security dilemmas, claiming that states construct norms determining their behavior and thereby become less uncertain of each other's intentions (Booth & Wheeler 2008; Collins 2004; Jervis 1978). Cooperative regimes are able to establish stable interconnections between partners, which, in the long run, can mature into mutual interdependence. Indeed, the promotion of mutual interdependence and value-oriented institutionalization has prevented the emergence of a traditional security dilemma – for example, the case of interstate relations in western Europe after the Second World War. Sørensen (2007, p. 362) states that 'the classical security dilemma is either irrelevant among post-modern states or in sharp decline among modernizing and democratizing states'.

The security communities that encompass these post-modern states represent stable cooperative international regimes able to introduce zones of peace and stability. Buzan and Little (2000, p. 442) define a security community as a group of states or other actors whose members neither expect nor prepare for the use of force in their mutual relations. The idea of pluralistic security communities requires two general components: consolidated liberal democratic society and stable peaceful relationship between members of community (Deutsch *et al.* 1957). Karl Deutsch (1957), identifying pluralistic (between states) and amalgamated (within states) security communities, has constructed his concept on the basis of self-recognition of political units, though these units do not 'necessarily have to constitute a nation nor must their territory be that of a nation-state' (Möller 2007, p. 25). This brings the idea closer to Benedict Anderson's conception of an imagined community, a political community that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson 1983). The security community remains 'imagined' if it is not institutionalized and supported by an appropriate security architecture. The Western security community, as Karl Deutsch (1957) defined it in the middle of Cold War, is naturally an imagined community. It possesses doctrinal rather than normative characteristics that make its involvement in the establishment of international regimes fictional (see also Adler 2005, pp. 185–206; Mouritzen 2001).

Recently, several authors have expanded the concept of security communities (e.g. Adler 2005, 2008; Adler and Barnett 1998; Bellamy 2004; Williams 2001). In most cases, contemporary theorists continue to define a security community in Deutsch's traditional sense, as an imagined community of values rather than an institutionalized political body. At the same time, a security community need not necessarily be an imagined community if the members of the community have decided to reach a stable peace through practices (Adler 2008). In the context of the post-modern security architecture, security communities consist of institutionalized formations of countries that share common values, unified norms, and a similar identity and that exclude the use of force amongst each other (Mölder 2006, p. 10). The European Union and NATO should be defined as institutionalized security communities. Security communities differ, for instance, from alliances. Whereas the former are inclusive institutions, since they are designed to deal with threats among members, alliances are exclusive because they deter and defend against external

threats (Wallander & Keohane 1999, p. 92). Stephen Walt (1997, p. 158) notes, 'alliances are exclusive institutions that entail a commitment to support the other members against states outside the community'. In sum, security communities are inclusive value-centered international bodies, and alliances are exclusive interest-centered international subjects created against fixed opponents.

In the post-modern European security environment, pluralistic security communities have developed on the basis of the European Economic Community (later the European Union) and a Western military alliance (NATO). The end of the bipolar world order caused a diffusion of liberal-democratic values (Laursen *et al.* 2005, p. 44). This process can be characterized as an attempt to install a Kantian security culture in the Euro-Atlantic region. The Kantian security culture emphasizes cooperation instead of conflict and stipulates a war-free federation among liberal states that values human rights and perpetual peace. The institutionalization of Kantian security communities facilitates the consolidation of shared values and norms, strengthening the complex interdependence between its members.

Institutionalization, however, may well exclude certain actors. Given that a pluralistic security community must, by definition, rest on shared values, it seems unavoidable that those countries not embracing such normative criteria must remain beyond its reach. In this way, the development of a security community may lead to a situation such as the post-Cold War cooperative security dilemma. Even as some states cooperate to decrease their security fears, this decreases the security of other states should they be excluded from the cooperative security arrangement (Mölder 1998, p. 11). The first consequences of a cooperative security dilemma emerged in Europe with the enlargement of NATO and the European Union. Politicians feared that the expansion could create new divisions, with NATO members on one side, a humiliated, threatened Russia on the other side, and an insecure area in between (Booth & Wheeler 2008, p. 161; Goldgeier & McFaul 2003, p. 195).

The traditional security dilemma is a genuine state-centric concept that cannot always be used in connection with international systems. The cooperative security dilemma, however, applies to international systems, the post-modern security community being one such system. Robert Jervis (1997) defines systems through interconnections and emergent properties. He mentions:

in some cases the concepts we apply to a system (e.g. polarity) cannot be applied to the units that compose it, and in other cases the description of a unit, such as a state being non-aligned, an actor being centrally positioned, or a person playing multiple roles, only makes sense in systemic terms. (p. 15)

The establishment of stable and consolidated security communities manages the threatening perceptions arising within traditional anarchical system. Emanuel Adler (2008, p. 220) concludes that cooperative measures oriented towards international change (i.e. cooperative security, security communities, institutionalization) would replace security dilemmas and deterrence with security community practices. While institutionalization usually mitigates traditional security dilemmas, it requires the establishment of restraint mechanisms such as commonly accepted norms to alleviate cooperative security dilemmas.

Integration and Identity Dilemmas in the Post-Modern Security System

A cooperative security dilemma arises in a situation of mature anarchy, where it takes forms of an integration or identity dilemmas, depending on the origin of emerging security perceptions. The introduction of pluralistic security principles and high levels of institutionalization presents the current post-modern European security architecture as a system close to what Barry Buzan (1991) called a 'mature anarchy'. Though in the 1990s the Euro-Atlantic region started to establish pluralistic security communities, the anarchical international system is still present, the Kantian security culture is not overwhelmingly accepted, and cooperative security dilemmas endure. As Buzan (1991, p. 77) explains:

A mature anarchy would be a highly ordered and stable system in which states would enjoy a great deal of security deriving both from their own inner strength and maturity, and from the strength of the institutionalized norms regulating relations among them.

The reliability of the security architecture largely depends on the internal stability of the particular security environment. Differences in institutional affiliation or significant controversies in identities complicate cooperation among states in the same security environment. An integration dilemma arises when countries in the same security environment share similar values, norms, and identities but belong to different security institutions. An identity dilemma occurs when the countries in the same security environment share different values, norms and identities.

As previously discussed, security communities could provide prospective mechanisms to overcome mistrust and the sense of insecurity in the security environment. Adler and Barnett (1998, p. 4), following the idea of Karl Deutsch (1957), have maintained that a security community produces a stable peace when its members are willing to defend their values against external threats and are able to attract other states with progressive ideas offering security and welfare. In this perspective, the integration dilemma is easier to overcome because shared values, norms, and identities favor further integration. The identity dilemma, however, requires particular mechanisms that could facilitate mutual cooperation and enhance complex interdependence between distinct cultural environments.

There are at least two important cases that illustrate the presence of a cooperative security dilemma in the current European security environment: (1) the Euro-Atlantic security dilemma (integration dilemma) and (2) the neighborhood dilemma (identity dilemma). Referring to the four security concerns of Europe, mentioned in the introduction, the competition between the United States and Europe constitutes the integration dilemma, and the other three issues – the Middle-East, Africa and Russia – would be classified as identity dilemmas.

The integration dilemma is the mildest form of cooperative security dilemma because it is an organizational, not a value, dilemma. Anders Wivel (2000, p. 335) has defined the integration dilemma for the case where:

On the one hand, state autonomy is challenged by supranationality as a consequence of membership and the state may fear being entrapped in the

process, but on the other hand there is a risk of abandonment in the sense of forsaking the benefits of integration, such as increased economic prosperity and prestige.

For example, when France left NATO's military command in 1966, the values, norms and identities of France and the rest of NATO did not differ to the extent that they reinforced the break between France and NATO. There was simply a question about the increasing sovereignty of France, which emphasized its foreign policy independence and autonomous defense posture relying on its own nuclear deterrence (Menon 1995, p. 19). This action created mistrust and competition between France and other NATO nations, particularly the United States, and was an early indication of the rising integration dilemma in the West after the Second World War ended. Hans Mouritzen (2006) refers to the division between (trans)atlantic and continental (Euro-centric) approaches to European security. In post-Cold War Europe, a significant gap emerged between nations that recognized the United States as a world hegemon and those that saw it as an equal, though powerful, security partner (see also Mouritzen 2006, pp. 138–9).

An identity dilemma indicates the presence of fundamental, normative differences in security identities that make the creation of effective security communities impossible. Samuel Huntington (1997, p. 126) notices that people tend to distance themselves from those with different ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions. The Middle East and Europe, for example, practice different security cultures. While Europe has recognized the abuse of force in conflict resolution, the security environment in the Middle East still strongly relies on national interests that do not deny the use of military power in achieving their goals. Another potential security risk to Europe, socially unstable Africa, also involves numerous interstate conflicts that may produce instability in the European neighborhood. Emanuel Adler (2005, p. 230) notes the influence of 'primordial primitivism' focusing on the triumph of one ethnic tribe over the other tribes. Security cultures practiced in the Middle East and Africa are often deeply involved in such primordial primitivism, leading to ethnic or cultural conflicts and organized violence against other identities.¹

A typical indicator of an identity dilemma in an environment of 'mature anarchy' is, for example, the enlargement of security communities. The viable extent of enlargement has been an important consideration for both the European Union and NATO. In this case, countries wishing to join must demonstrate their ability to avoid the introduction of conflicting values. Sørensen (2007, p. 367) notes that some regimes endorsing liberal democratic values 'are autocratic and repressive; many countries are very far from respecting these values in their own domestic realms'. Enlargements should not influence basic values and regulation of security communities. Otherwise, the whole community might become unstable. Therefore, political decisions about enlargements can pose a serious threat to the effectiveness of a security community, especially if they introduce conflicting beliefs, norms, and identities. If a security community expands to areas with different identities or competing values, it may introduce a set of problems affecting its value-based foundations. This was the reason why, for example, collective security organizations instituted under Cold War circumstances, like the United Nations Organization and

OSCE, never developed into security communities. For the same reason, the League of Nations failed to act as a security community in the first half of the twentieth century.

It would be complicated to preserve the internal peace of the community if the surrounding neighborhood remains unstable and prone to conflicts. Buzan and Little (2000, p. 354) identify the creation of conflict-free zones as a central issue. Cooperative security arrangements serve as a model for security communities to interact with their neighborhood and to stabilize peace outside their borders. NATO has initiated such cooperative frameworks for neighboring countries by way of the North Atlantic Partnership Council (since 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). The Western European Union and the European Union subsequently created their own cooperative mechanisms with regard to neighboring countries. These experiences have proved largely successful; there is almost no evidence of armed conflicts between security partners since the establishment of a formal cooperative relationship. The Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008 might well be an exception, but the source of this conflict might be found precisely in the absence of a post-modern approach to security. It may also be explained by a move from a cooperative security dilemma to the traditional security dilemma. Such transformation may occur if the establishment of a Kantian security culture fails.

The Baltic Sea Region as a Regional Security Complex – Maintaining Modern Security Approaches Within a Post-Modern Society

Enduring cooperative security dilemmas make the Baltic Sea area a useful example for analyzing the adaptation of a post-modern security system to the regional security complex that is pitted against Cold War mentality. The case of the Baltic Sea region as a cooperative security dilemma is of special interest because it displays the integration dilemma as well as the identity dilemma. The Nordic countries, while generally accepting of the principles of post-modern society, are not enthusiastic about changing their security and defense postures and find themselves within an integration dilemma. Russia, a key security player in the region, prefers to retain an understanding of security that conflicts with several regional actors, thereby manifesting an identity dilemma in which national interests dominate over integrated cooperation.

While the post-modern security environment is associated with a more globalized and interdependent world, it does not entail the end of regional security. In the global security context, Europe is like an apartment in a big house with many rooms. Apartments and rooms are respectively regions and sub-regions in the big house called 'global security'. According to this analogy, the house manages a general security system, but every apartment contributes to the house's security, and every room again has its particular link to the apartment's security. Regions are not only geopolitical but also social constructions. Buzan and Waever (2003, p. 48) conclude, 'Regions are socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the security practice of the actors. Dependent on what and whom they securitize, the region might

reproduce or change.' Because a global security community seems to be unreachable in the near future, the institutionalization of regional security communities might nonetheless mitigate the effects of possible threats and polarities that could produce traditional security dilemmas.

The fact that the countries in the Baltic Sea region experience difficulties in adapting to a post-modern security architecture has been noted by several authors (e.g. Archer & Joenniemi 2003; Bengtsson 2000; Browning 2005, 2007; Browning & Joenniemi 2004; Galbreath *et al.* 2008; Knudsen 1999, 2007; Lehti & Smith 2003; Möller 2007; Mouritzen 2001; Mouritzen & Wivel 2005). At the same time, the scholarly mainstream avoids identifying the presence of a security dilemma in the region, partially because the region has been relatively stable and peaceful for a sustained period. Nordic and Baltic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – form the core of the Baltic Sea regional security complex as their security interests are overwhelmingly tied to that particular region. There are other influential countries in the region – Germany, Poland, and Russia – that certainly have their own security interests and concerns in the Baltic Rim. The Baltic Sea region as we know it today was reborn after the Cold War and displays the trend of European integration. It involves at least four different levels of regional security complexes with their specific security concerns that enable a multilevel security analysis of northern Europe:

1. Nordic security complex (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden);
2. Baltic security complex (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania);
3. Nordic-Baltic security complex (Nordic and Baltic security complexes);
4. Baltic Sea security complex (includes also Germany, Poland, and Russia).

The level of regional integration in the Baltic Rim is relatively well designed in many areas, which may bring about discussions concerning security community perspectives. Frank Möller (2007, p. 64) examines the roots of a security community at the domestic level and ties the development of security community with the multi-level cooperation between non-state actors, reducing the role of states in the community perspective. This approach follows a tradition where the Nordic area corresponds to being a security community *par excellence* though security has never been an issue in the Nordic cooperation (Browning & Joenniemi 2004, p. 240). In expanding his approach to the Baltic Sea region, Möller (2007, p. 311) gives up on identifying a security community as a value-sharing entity and settles on an option where there might be a community without common identities, values, and norms. This community lives with difference rather than reduces it, uses a conflict as a path to social change, and recognizes different values as equally worthy.

However, states within a security community no longer fear the use of violence as a means of statecraft or dispute settlement (Adler & Barnett 1998, p. 32). According to Adler and Barnett (1998 p. 31), there are three general requirements for identifying pluralistic security communities: (1) shared identities, values, and meanings; (2) many-sided and direct relations; and (3) a reciprocity between members that expresses some degree of long-term interest and altruism. Currently, the Baltic Sea region does not correspond to these requirements because the cooperative security dilemmas limit options for comprehensive integration in

security matters. There is no evidence of an aspiration towards regional complex interdependence or regional peace. The identity dilemma with Russia keeps fear and distrust alive, especially in the Baltic states. Tensions between the Baltic countries and Russia disturb the stability of all players in the Baltic Sea region and still call for multilateral solutions. Therefore, the Baltic Sea region, while using normative categories, cannot be identified as an independent pluralistic security community, nor does it represent a distinct security culture. The concept of Möller (2007) is close to the concept of regional security complex, where the role of interdependence has been emphasized more than the role of shared values (see also Kaski 2001).

The concept of regional security complexes, introduced by Barry Buzan (1991), offers a more appropriate basis for analyzing the reliability of regional security options in the Baltic Sea region. According to Buzan (1991, p. 193), a regional security complex consists of a 'group of states whose primary security concerns link together that their national securities cannot be considered apart from one another'. Regional security, which applies to the security environment in the particular area, is influenced by security concerns of all regional players. This kind of interdependence characterizes all actors that form regional security. Therefore, I prefer to use the term 'security complex' with regard to regional units.

The Nordic identity could inspire the regional development of the Baltic Sea area (Browning & Joenniemi 2004, p. 248). Lagerspetz (2003, p. 57) defines the Nordic identity through geographical location, historical ties, linguistic affinity, Lutheran faith, the Nordic model of social development, range of cooperative organs, legal and administrative tradition, and gender equality. Although the Nordic countries have chosen different paths along European integration, their experience in mutual cooperation serves as a worthy exemplar for others. The Nordic Council, founded in 1952, filled the institutional vacuum for the Nordic states. There exists an intense and comprehensive network of cooperation over a large range of issues. The relationship among Nordic countries has become so close to include practically all levels of society (Lagerspetz 2003, pp. 57–8). At first glance, the Nordic area, with a long history of peace, appears to perfectly fit the post-modern security architecture. This area has been traditionally described as a region where stable peace has been successfully consolidated, and thus it becomes close to what has been defined as a security community even before the end of the Cold War.

However, the Nordic integration has been neither greatly institutionalized nor aimed at ensuring peace in the region (Browning & Joenniemi 2004, p. 240), and the Nordic Council accepted security as an acceptable issue for cooperation only after the end of the Cold War (Browning 2005, p. 189). A long-term stable peace in the region is unintentional, an empirical, rather than normative, phenomenon. Peacefulness in the area seems to be achieved incidentally without any need for enforcement or a powerful program for securing peace (Waever 1998, p. 76). In security terms, the Nordic countries have preferred to maintain separate orientations and have become accustomed to handling security issues carefully, ensuring strong policy independence.

According to Browning and Joenniemi (2004, p. 241), the Nordic area is 'an example of a non-security-driven community, including some regional cooperation'. The region continually remains an important player within the European Union and

seeks an alternative approach that de-emphasizes security issues. Referring to the Nordic experience, Browning and Joenniemi (2004) conclude that Baltic Sea region is an 'asecurity community', where de-securitization of the region would be a main impetus towards a regional community (p. 247). They explain that the Nordic area is developing towards a post-modern community in many fields except for security. There is a striking difference between the Nordic security complex and the Baltic one, where the latter is in many ways a security-driven entity, aiming to increase the national military capabilities of its members and approaching NATO through mutual cooperation (Möller 2007, p. 11).

Baltic Balance – the Integration Dilemma in a 'Mature Anarchy'

In the global security context, the Baltic Sea region is an indivisible part of the larger Euro-Atlantic security environment, and its post-modernization closely relates with the overall European integration and with the development of EU and NATO. Far from being a 'core region', the Baltic Sea region rather constitutes a European sub-region (Bergman 2006, p. 80; Hubel 2004, p. 283). The Euro-Atlantic security dilemma between the transatlantic and Euro-centric security approaches to European security has influenced the security preferences in the region. An integration dilemma emerges if the modern security environment interacts with a post-modern one. In this case, the modern concept of the Nordic Balance has caused the emergence of the post-modern Baltic Balance. The presence of this integration dilemma marginalizes the region, and potential regional security concerns remain outside of NATO's and the EU's spheres of interest.

Considering the Nordic region, its respective security complex has developed into three integration dilemmas, inherited from security understandings of modern society:

1. NATO members Iceland and Norway, though belonging to the European Economic Area, are not members of the EU. Norway twice refused to join the European Union. Nevertheless, Norwegians have developed cooperation with the EU in security and defense matters, including participation in the European Union's Nordic Battle Group.²
2. Denmark is a full member of the EU and NATO, but because it does not participate in CSDP (EU's Common Security and Defense Policy), the Danes reject the development of security and defense cooperation within the EU.
3. Finland and Sweden are members of the EU but not NATO. This seems to be connected to public opinion on foreign policy rather than their opposition to the new security architecture. Both countries actively participate in NATO's cooperative security arrangements, particularly the 'Partnership for Peace' program.

The roots of the integration dilemma in the Baltic Sea region come from the Cold War and are influenced by the concept of Nordic Balance, which follows the Realist tradition focusing on the reconciliation of northern Europe with the Cold War's bipolar international system. During the Cold War, Norwegian political scientists Nils

Ørvik, Arne Olav Brundtland, and Johan J. Holst elaborated the concept of 'Nordic Balance'. The security orientations of Denmark and Norway have been tied to the Western alliance, Finland's has been linked to the Soviet bloc, and Sweden has been standing in between these:

If the Soviet Union increased its pressure on Finland, the Nordic NATO members might be ready for a greater US/NATO military presence. . . On the other hand, such an increasing presence might lead to a Soviet call for closer cooperation with Finland. (Øberg 1992, p. 25)

The Nordic Balance was aimed at supporting a relatively stable peace under the Cold War's bipolarity. When entering into the post-modern system, the Nordic countries experienced difficulties in adapting to the new security architecture and in readjusting to a more comprehensive and cooperative approach to security as implemented by post-Cold War security institutions (Archer 2005, p. 19). In sum, the legacy of Nordic Balance did not disappear with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Mouritzen (2001) claims, but rather it has been transferred from one system to another (see also Mouritzen 2001, pp. 301–2). Analyzing trends in the Nordic-Baltic regional security complex, Dan Steinbock (2008, p. 199) notes that the region practices various security options and comprises the NATO members, and the no longer neutral, but militarily nonaligned, Sweden and Finland. He calls it a 'Northern Balance'.

A post-modern security environment revitalized the Baltic Sea region as a distinctive security complex; therefore, it would be more correct to employ the 'Baltic Balance' in this context. The term 'balance' indicates the presence of a security dilemma, as a security dilemma is a choice between balanced options (Booth & Wheeler 2008, p. 6). Therefore, both the Nordic Balance and the Baltic Balance definitely entail security dilemmas. The modern Nordic Balance represented a traditional security dilemma and was greatly influenced by the presence of the Soviet Union. The post-modern Baltic Balance applies not only to the Nordic countries but is a result of European integration and consequently also includes the entire Baltic Sea region excluding Russia because it remains outside the integration processes. In the case of the Nordic Balance, as with the Baltic Balance, countries of the region have divided into various groupings on the basis of their security orientations.

The data in Tables 1a and 1b indicate that the transatlantic pillar of the Nordic Balance maintained its orientation within the framework of the Baltic Balance. The neutral/Soviet-influenced pillar of the Nordic Balance has been transferred into the Euro-centric pillar of the Baltic Balance. The security mentality shaped by the Cold War excludes Finland and Sweden from NATO and Denmark from CSDP.

TABLE 1a Modern Nordic balance

Dominating orientation	Transatlantic orientation	Balanced (neutral) orientation	Soviet orientation
Modern Nordic Balance	Denmark, Norway	Sweden	Finland

TABLE 1b Post-modern Baltic balance

Dominating orientation	Transatlantic orientation	Transatlantic-balanced orientation	Balanced orientation	European orientation
Post-modern Baltic Balance	Denmark, Iceland, Norway	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland	Germany	Finland, Sweden

Denmark, Iceland, and Norway prefer to connect their security guarantees with military assistance from the United States rather than developing security and defense cooperation in the EU framework, attempting to balance the ‘Franco-German Axis’ with Transatlanticism (see also Miles 2005, pp. 95–8). The remaining actors in the region – Germany, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – are members of NATO and the EU, and thus they are positioned in the middle of new Baltic Balance. Nevertheless, only Germany represents the western European tradition of full integration, because the ‘post-socialist burden’ of Poland and the three Baltic countries produces anti-integrationist attitudes (Hubel 2004, p. 288). Poland and the Baltic states represent a strong transatlantic link between NATO and the EU, and they trust the U.S. military capability more than the EU’s given their specific concern about Russia. This factor makes it difficult for them to become regional security balancers.

Fabrizio Tassinari analyzed the division between modern and post-modern security understandings in the region (2005, pp. 391–2). Tassinari, however, avoided considering a variety of security orientations concerning the Nordic countries. He described the presence of three diverse security identities in the Baltic Sea region. Germany and the Nordic countries are committed to the re-securitization of regional cooperation in non-military sectors. Poland and the Baltic countries have maintained a more modern view to security and remained skeptical towards regional prospects in containing Russia’s ambitions. Russia, however, is interested in stimulating regional cooperation as an alternative to NATO enlargement, which it identifies as a security threat.

The structures of the modern Nordic Balance and the post-modern Baltic Balance have some obvious similarities because they are both constructed on the basis of opposing orientations. While the Nordic Balance emerged from orientations towards different great powers (the Soviet Union and the West), the Baltic Balance emphasizes the difference between transatlantic and Euro-centric orientations in the current European security environment. The examples of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland indicate that these countries continue to follow the balanced policy in security and defense matters within the post-modern security environment. Denmark’s position concerning the current European security environment must strike a balance between giving up its sovereignty and maintaining its independence (Rye Olsen & Pillegaard 2005, p. 340). Denmark wishes to maintain an ‘apparent independence’ within the European security architecture and remains negative or keeps a low profile in relation to defense policy in the European Union. Consequently, Denmark plays no part in cooperation for the development of CSDP because of an opt-out option from

the Maastricht Treaty, which the Danish government was able to achieve at the European Council meeting in Edinburgh in December 1992 (Larsen 2000, p. 48; Rye Olsen & Pillegaard 2005, p. 340).

In this case, Denmark has fallen into a trap of the integration dilemma described above. Danish authors are concerned that the opt-out from CSDP will weaken Danish influence on regional security issues (Larsen 2000; Rye Olsen & Pillegaard 2000; Wivel 2000). Denmark's hesitancy towards involving itself with the EU's security dimension has implications for the Nordic dimension of the EU's security options. For example, concerning the EU's Nordic Battle Group, Denmark's choice to opt-out of CSDP excluded it from the project at the same time that Norway, though not an EU member, joined the project without any complications.

Countries that avoided NATO membership during the Cold War and implemented the non-alignment policy continue to follow similar patterns. Finland and Sweden accepted EU membership in the 1990s. These countries do not connect EU membership with their traditional non-alignment policy as practiced during the Cold War (Miles 2005, p. 102). Within the EU, Finland tends to have a more integrationist view than Sweden as the country is more open to the EU's initiatives (e.g. establishment of a single currency). Sweden, together with Denmark and the United Kingdom, forms a skeptical side of the EU. Lee Miles (2005, p. 103) explains that Sweden is in the position of contributor, whereas Finland is more of a receiver in the EU framework.

At the same time, Finland and Sweden are not ready to accept NATO's membership, although their cooperation with NATO is rather extensive. They are among the biggest security contributors in NATO-led crisis management operations. Despite the fact that discussions concerning their possible NATO membership have livened up lately, the Finnish and Swedish societies have met difficulties in leaving the Cold War security architecture and are generally very cautious towards membership in NATO (see also Knudsen 2007, pp. 49–51).

Sweden explains its conservative policy towards potential NATO membership on the basis of its tradition of neutrality, leading to the conclusion that Sweden has no military alignment needs (Karp 2007, p. 69). Mouritzen (2006, p. 147) notes that the Swedish neutrality tradition (which originated from polarized modern society) has delayed Swedish integration with the West as their EU membership was attained with a strong domestic opposition and their approach to NATO is limited to the participation in the Partnership for Peace program.

Tomas Ries (1999, p. 5) has disentangled Finland's cautiousness towards NATO membership, pointing out the following fears raised within Finnish security culture: a special relationship with Russia, dependence on Western powers, the wrong kind of defense introduced by NATO, costs, and recovery of Karelian territory. Finland's security culture still rests on a NATO-Russia opposition that Finland tries to avoid. Clive Archer (2005, p. 20) notes that Finland, which shares a long border with Russia, 'has been slowest in changing its defense posture'.

The slowly progressing defense postures of Finland and Sweden confirm that a modern Nordic Balance has been transformed into a new form rather than abandoned entirely. Finland and Sweden continually avoid membership in NATO in spite of their waning neutrality. Denmark, however, declines participation in the security and

defense dimension of the EU. This illustrates that the security policies of Nordic countries continue to follow a security pattern with NATO as a Western military alliance and the European Union as a non-security community.

From among the Baltic Sea nations, Germany has practiced a more balanced view towards both institutions, participating actively within NATO and CSDP. Security is the main factor that distinguishes between Nordic countries and Germany in accepting the post-modern society. The Nordic states experience some reluctance towards Western institutions (Hubel 2004, p. 288). For example, Sweden and Finland prefer to maintain a certain degree of independence in their security and defense policy. Germany, at the same time, is more open to cooperative security solutions as 'Germany has foregone having its own General Staff in favor of NATO staff' (Cooper 2003, p. 166). Consequently, Germany follows more cooperative criteria in arranging its security systems than Sweden and Finland.

States adhere to the norms of society not because of on-going self-interest calculation but because of self-identification with a particular society of states (Wendt 1999, p. 242). Keeping the Baltic Balance in the region reflects the conflict-oriented modern understandings of security. The Danish self-identification with the transatlantic security orientation and the Finnish/Swedish skepticism towards NATO impair the adoption of post-modern security environment. An alternative option suggests that the Danish involvement in the CSDP and the Finnish/Swedish membership in NATO would strengthen the transatlantic pillar within the CSDP and the Euro-centric pillar in NATO and would enable the mitigation of the Euro-Atlantic integration dilemma and the schism between two security orientations in Europe as well as in the Baltic Rim.

The Identity Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region – Russia and the Baltic States

The security dilemma between Russia and the Baltic states is currently the most vulnerable security issue in the region with the potential to be transferred into the interstate conflict. The Baltic countries and Russia follow similar approaches to post-Cold War security issues stemming from the Realist tradition of international relations where Russia and the West have been depicted as potential security threats (Browning & Joenniemi 2004, p. 238). The Baltic states perceive Russia as the main threat to their security, emphasizing that Russia has territorial interests in the region. This contrasts with the view that potential threats come from Russia – which more corresponds to the post-modern security understandings (Mölder 2007, p. 141).

Russia appears to be tied to the only identity dilemma in the Baltic Sea regional security complex, presenting a serious cooperative security dilemma not only for the Baltic Rim but also in the larger European context. Russia continually identifies NATO as an opposing military power. During the second presidency of Vladimir Putin, the economic situation of the country improved due to high oil prices, and Russia clearly showed its intent to restore its one-time position as a superpower.³

While attempting to establish cooperative security arrangements between Russia and the European security communities (EU, NATO), it is important to

note the complexity of the situation. Russia has not been keen to adapt the post-modern security concept, and it may prove dangerous to accept Russia – or any other country that does not share Western liberal democratic values – into European security communities. In the context of cooperative security dilemma, it is more important that Russia identifies itself as a competing power to the European security communities. Russia tends to define international policy in traditional Hobbesian terms, keeping spheres of influence in a significant position of their security policy practices. Being under the influence of a modern approach to security, in which nation-states play geopolitical games, Russia prefers to communicate with the European powers bilaterally and tends to ignore supranational institutions (Budryte 2006, pp. 68–9). Russia complains that NATO has failed to reform itself and that the EU ‘remains a complicated and inefficient partner’ (Karaganov 2003).

Russia’s new military doctrine depicts Russia as an object of threats from NATO and its members (Weitz 2010). President Medvedev has said that no state can enjoy having representatives of a military bloc to which it does not belong coming close to its borders (Steinbock 2008, p. 206). Medvedev’s words confirm the existence of cooperative security dilemma between Russia and other countries in the region, as Russia remains the sole actor outside of the EU/NATO framework in the region. The Russian attitude vis-à-vis NATO as a hostile military bloc is comparable to an earlier vision of the Soviet Union of a similar kind.

Russia has officially stated that it has no intention to become a full member of either the European Union or NATO. At the same time, Russia is already a part of NATO and EU cooperative security arrangements. The European Union signed a partnership agreement with Russia in 1994, which came into force in 1997. In 1997, Russia also signed a partnership agreement with NATO, which started a process towards forming permanent mechanisms of communication to promote mutual understandings and avoid misperceptions on various security issues (Wilhelmsen 2002, p. 21). A Permanent Joint Council was established in 1997 and was replaced by the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. Nevertheless, the involvement of Russia in cooperative security arrangements is the only way to resolve an identity dilemma between Europe and Russia. Otherwise, if security cooperation with Russia proves unworkable and Russia remains completely outside cooperative security arrangements, a Cold War-style rivalry may yet resume.

There are applicable mechanisms for developing a security dialogue with Russia at the Euro-Atlantic level. The major problem preventing communication is that the current security architecture in the Baltic Sea region does not support a dialogue with Russia on regional security matters. The lack of multilateral mechanisms and procedures confirms that a cooperative security dilemma between Russia and other parties in the Baltic Sea security complex is unlikely to vanish in the near future. Attempts to solve regional security concerns through NATO or the European Union have remained relatively weak because Russia has demonstrated no interest in using these channels to foster mutual interests (see also Budryte 2006). At the same time, the bilateral relationship with the greatest military power in the region would be unfavorable for the development of a post-modern security environment as it may create threatening misperceptions.

Proximity to Russia, the only unconsolidated democracy in the region, still strongly influences the presence of various security dilemmas in the Baltic Rim. A majority of Baltic Sea countries have common borders with Russia (Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland). Although no country in the region officially recognizes Russia as a security concern, daily security discourse often names Russia as a potential security threat, especially in the Baltic countries owing to their historical disputes with Russia (see also Möller 2007, pp. 256–7). Collective memory of the Baltic countries forms a much stronger association with possible threats from Russia. At the same time, memory-influenced policies of the Baltic countries support Russia in maintaining its modern understandings of security, which paradoxically makes the security of the Baltic states more dependent on Russia's intentions.

The security dilemma between Russia and the Baltic states feeds on a complexity of issues: the Nord Stream pipeline issue, where the positions of Baltic countries seeing a potential military threat here contrast with their neighbors, the Nordic countries and Germany, who identify it as an economic-environmental issue; a yet to be resolved border issue between Estonia and Russia, which has been complicated by the introductory declaration made by the Estonian Parliament; the Kaliningrad question; the position of Russian minorities; and decoding of common historical experience (see also Bult 2006, pp. 132–43).

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have formally accepted the post-modern security architecture, acquiring membership in both post-modern European security communities. Therefore, due to their accession to NATO, 'the recurrent representation of Russia as a threat to Baltic security had to be adapted to the modes prevalent in NATO's representation of Russia as a partner' (Möller 2007, p. 310). Already before their membership in NATO and the EU, Baltic cooperation has achieved remarkable international success, particularly in security and defense areas. Baltic defense projects (BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET, BALTSEA, BALTDEFCOL) have been progressive examples of cooperative security initiatives, involving countries and institutions outside the region. Unlike the case of Nordic countries, the cooperation of the Baltic states is more security-driven. The security interdependence has played a major role in developing a comprehensive security- and defense-related cooperation between three Baltic countries. The security-complex approach to the Baltic case (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) has been thoroughly analyzed by Antti Kaski (2001). Kaski (2001, p. 158) concludes that the Baltic countries constitute a joint complex relying on multifunctional interdependence, as their primary security concerns are closely linked together.⁴

However, despite their seemingly successful integration with European structures, the commitment of the Baltic countries to a post-modern security architecture is vulnerable. The recent geopolitical strengthening of Russia has negatively influenced the Baltic-Russian relationship. Russia's security concerns in the region focus on the status of the Kaliningrad area and the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia (Tassinari 2005, p. 392). Estonia's relations with Russia, after the annulment of the border agreement following the 'Bronze Soldier' monument drama, are at the lowest point yet, with no signs for considerable improvement in the near future. Latvia has had more progress in its bilateral relationship with Russia, signing a border agreement in 2007. Lithuania's most vulnerable security dilemma with Russia has been

the highly militarized Kaliningrad enclave of Russia (Budryte 2006, p. 68; Bult 2006, p. 133).

History remains an influential player in interstate relations. Myths, narratives, and traditions constitute group beliefs that construct 'collective memories' (Wendt 1999, p. 163). Collective knowledge fostered by collective memory may create favorable conditions for the emerging conflict in the particular security environment. Wendt (1999, p. 162) realizes that collective knowledge depends on beliefs that induce actors to engage in practices. As a cognitive phenomenon, a collective knowledge often lies on self-reinforcing mechanisms where distrust creates more distrust and trust produces more trust (Bengtsson 2000, p. 383). The security dilemma between Russia and the Baltic states is more complicated because it is not only an identity dilemma, but it also has obvious features of a traditional security dilemma, as mutual distrust between opponents is highly recognizable. Several authors (e.g. Kuus 2007; Möller 2007) point out that the main reason for these tensions comes from history. Väyrynen (1999, p. 216) notes that the Baltic states' relationship with Russia causes their relations with the West to be translated into security terms.

After NATO and EU enlargement, the Baltic countries have been expected to present calmer views towards a relationship to Russia. However, this has not happened. The tense atmosphere in their relations with Russia makes them more supportive of Cold War bipolarity. Former President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus expressed views that refer to maintaining conflict with Russia if the country does not follow the same values as the Euro-Atlantic countries, stating, 'the relationship of the international community with Russia should correspond to the level of Russia's readiness to commit to the international community'.⁵

Helmut Hubel (2004, p. 290) points out that 'despite all positive achievements during the 1990s, Russia's participation in Baltic Sea cooperation continues to be a major problem for developing balanced and stable interactions among partners'. The durability of a security dilemma depends on measures used to cope with existing perceptions. Russia, not being party to any pluralistic security community, may provoke security dilemmas vis-à-vis its neighbors. There is an option to maintain Russia as a permanent security concern by embedding security dilemmas between Russia and its neighbors. Another option is trying to find expedient ways that would make Russia co-responsible for regional security issues.

Managing Cooperative Security Dilemma in the Baltic Sea Region: The Perspectives of structural Transformation

Unintended peace only occasionally produces stability. This leads to the conclusion that 'there is no basis at present for characterizing the Baltic Sea area as a zone of stable peace' (Bengtsson 2000, p. 381). The near future entails unpredictable conflict, a hodgepodge of institutions operating in the area, differing security preferences, and a lack of a comprehensive security forum dealing with specific regional security concerns. Hence, there is little to support the supposed consolidation of peace in the Baltic Sea region.

The integration dilemma is manageable on the basis of a common security culture where shared values and meanings can foster the appearance of collective identity. The identity dilemma, with its fundamental differences in culture, values, and social norms, demands enhanced cooperation and complex interdependence that enables people 'to live with differences' in the consolidated zones of peace and stability while enforcing trust between culturally different actors and emphasizing commonly recognized interests. The cooperative security arrangements (i.e. NATO's PfP; NATO-EU cooperation) can mitigate the effects of integration dilemma in the region. There is evidently a lack of regional arrangements that could transcend the misperceptions related to Russia and the identity dilemma.

The only institution in the Baltic Sea region that involves all countries of the regional security complex as member-states is the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), initiated by Denmark and Germany in 1992. This institution has been established in the spirit of medieval Hanseatic cooperation and includes twelve members (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and the European Commission) and ten observers (the Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, France, Netherlands, Belarus, Romania, Spain, and Slovakia). The involvement of the European Union as a member and the United States as an observer makes the institution potentially powerful. The CBSS has stimulated infrastructural projects, market economy reforms, economic cooperation, trade and investment, the fight against organized crime, the promotion of political and democratic rights, and educational cooperation (Bergman 2006, p. 80). The influence of the organization on regional security issues is rather limited, and the CBSS has not shown itself to be an effective mechanism for achieving consensus in this policy area. Framing the CBSS as strictly a soft security institution derives from the Realist security conception under which security is something exceptional and must be outside of an ordinary regional cooperation. Although the CBSS has promoted consultation and cooperation in some security-related fields, it seems to be ineffective for resolving major security concerns, as the space of its activities is restricted to 'soft security problems' (Hubel 2004, p. 289).

The CBSS has a promising framework to overcome the cooperative security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region. However, as a real 'asecurity community', this institution prefers to evade the regional security dimension. Regional security cooperation within the Baltic Sea framework still encounters several persistent cooperative security dilemmas: the integration dilemma between NATO-oriented countries and the EU-oriented countries, the identity dilemma with Russia, and the minor role of CBSS in regional security cooperation. Practically no actor in northern Europe is interested in a regionally limited security organization. There is no need for an institution to serve as an alternative to the current European security architecture. While the vast majority of the region belongs to the same security institutions, the excessive number of parallel regional security organizations in the area is hardly the answer to the outstanding security dilemmas. Nevertheless, having some specific mechanisms to compensate the integration dilemma in security preferences and the identity dilemma with Russia is certainly advisable.

Booth and Wheeler (2008, p. 226) mentioned that scholars who promote 'theories of structural transformation have been marginalized by mainstream academic

International Relation scholarship' as dreamers, revolutionaries or unrealistic. However, there is also the difficulty of managing security dilemmas without considering structural transformation. There are still problems requiring immediate multilateral consultations between all parties in the region. For example, the environmental problems connected with the Baltic Sea or the Nordic and Arctic regions may achieve stronger results in the sub-regional forum where all participants are more dependent on consequences of one activity or another. The development of the Nord-Stream gas pipeline case indicates how the lack of appropriate regional security mechanisms can cause a situation where the security concerns of Baltic countries and Poland have been simply ignored and where bilateral discussions held have precluded attempts to achieve consensus in the region.

The security paradox of the Baltic Sea region means that no country in the region is interested in transcending cooperative security dilemmas in the short run. Sweden and Finland do not stream towards NATO membership.⁶ Denmark continually practices the opt-out policy towards the CSDP framework. The relationship between Russia and the Baltic countries still involves suspicion of malicious intentions. Adler (2008, p. 218) mentions that the institutionalization of PfP by NATO 'enabled the social construction of common ground among NATO countries and the latter and non-members'. Based on the NATO experience, structural transformation in the Baltic Sea regional security complex may provide common ground for mitigating the effects of cooperative security dilemmas and consolidating a regional peace.

Conclusions

Maintaining Cold War security orientations within a post-modern society may cause the emergence of a cooperative security dilemma. Currently, the Euro-Atlantic security environment is experiencing several integration and identity dilemmas. Some countries are not ready to accept the post-modern institutional framework, or they do not practice balanced representation in the two existing pluralistic security communities, the European Union and NATO. Thus, an integration dilemma appears. Some countries may not be ready to accept the liberal democratic values introduced by the European Union and NATO, which leads to an identity dilemma.

Within the model of Baltic Balance, the security policies of regional actors continue to be divided between the NATO orientation and the EU orientation, similarly as their security orientations have been balanced between the Soviet Union and the West during the Cold War's bipolarity and Nordic Balance. The post-modern security environment favors integration, and the Baltic Balance is not the optimal security agenda for the region.

Nonetheless, the post-modern security system is not unachievable in the Baltic Sea region. Structural transformation still offers applicable solutions for managing cooperative security dilemmas. If Finland and Sweden become more favorable towards NATO, if Denmark joins the CSDP, and if Norway and Iceland seriously consider EU membership, the region will become more visible in the post-modern European security architecture and will gain stronger representation of regional security concerns within the European Union and NATO.

Many countries of the region indirectly recognize Russia to be their prime security concern. At the same time, these countries prefer to preserve the dilemma, and regional actors have not produced reliable measures to transcend the identity dilemma with Russia. To this end, the establishment of appropriate regional frameworks must be considered. However, these mechanisms should not be used as an alternative to the current security architecture, but rather as additional cooperative security arrangements with the active involvement of NATO and the European Union. In the meantime, regional security cooperation within the CBSS or another similar framework may also transcend existing cooperative security dilemmas.

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Notes

- 1 There are plenty of examples concerning power games leading to civil war in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Chad, or the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi tribes in Burundi and Rwanda. The primordial primitivism also refers to the positioning of Sunni Arabs as the dominant group during Saddam's Iraq (and his predecessors) and the Alavites (branch of Shia Islam) in Syria.
- 2 Norway remains distant towards the EU membership, and there are no plans to file another application after rejections by the referendums in 1972 and in 1994. Iceland applied to join the EU in 2009 because of its economic situation and has been an official EU candidate since 2010.
- 3 This tendency is described in the words of Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin: 'Great powers don't join coalitions, they create coalitions. Russia considers itself a great power'. Pop, V. (2009) 'Russia does not rule out future NATO membership', EUobserver.com, 1 April 2009, available at <http://euobserver.com/9/27890>, accessed 10 April 2010.
- 4 However, in the cultural context, the Baltic countries maintain their diverse origins. Estonia is predominantly a Lutheran country and culturally more related to Northern Germany, Sweden and Finland. Lithuania, a Catholic country, is more related to Central Europe and has been deeply linked with Poland. Latvia is between them; some regions (e.g. Vidzeme) are culturally closer to Estonia and others (e.g. Latgale) to Lithuania.
- 5 President of the Republic Lithuania. Remarks by President Valdas Adamkus at the Discussion 'Russia and its Neighbours', World Economic Forum in Davos, 26 January 2008, available at <http://www.president.lt/en/news.full/8722>, accessed 1 May 2008.
- 6 See for example: Mission of Finland to NATO 'Foreign Minister Stubb hoped for open debate on security policy', 5 March 2010, available at <http://www.finlandnato.org/Public/default.aspx?contentid=187851>, accessed 25 April 2010.

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