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ships will be loaded to capacity and will not be unduly delayed in terminal ports in either northern Korea or Japan.

F. The operational control of repatriation shipping furnished from sources under SCAP control will be exercised by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers through the administrator, Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (abbreviation: SCAJAP), a subordinate of Commander U.S. Naval Activities Japan. In northern Korean waters, repatriation ships will follow routes and procedures as prescribed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

G. On all matters other than routine sailing dispatches, representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will make the necessary arrangements with \_\_\_\_\_  
(Control Agency in Korea to be designated by Soviet Government)

Routine sailing dispatches will be handled as prescribed in Section IV.

H. Nominal lists of repatriates will be prepared by the commander exercising control over the evacuation port, and five (5) copies will be given to the captain of the repatriation ship. (See paragraph I A 6, Section II).

II. Priority of ports from which repatriates will be lifted, and the estimated number for planning purposes to be processed through each port.

<u>Port</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>Total Repatriates</u>
Genzan		
Kanko		
Maizuru	1	10,000

III. Ports, maximum daily capacity for repatriates, and port capacities (berthing for type and number of ships) follow:

A.

Maximum Daily Capacity

<u>Port</u>	<u>Incoming</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>	<u>Port Capacity</u>
Genzan			
Kanko			
Maizuru	2,500	2,500	

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B. Changes in repatriation ports to be used in northern Korea will be a subject for mutual arrangements between representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

C. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reserves the privilege of changing repatriation ports to be used in Japan at his discretion.

IV. Shipping to be utilized and shuttles to be established.

A. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers agrees to provide shipping initially to move repatriates from northern Korea to Japan at a minimum daily average rate of 750, provided ports on the east coast of northern Korea are used. If west coast ports of northern Korea are used this rate will be reduced proportionally to the increased time of turn around. Korean repatriates in Japan, destined for northern Korea, will be outloaded in Japan on this shipping.

B. At a subsequent date to be determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, additional repatriation shipping may be assigned to shuttles between Japan and northern Korea. Necessary coordination will be effected between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and (control prior to agency in Korea, to be designated by the Soviet Government) establishing new shuttles or increasing ships on shuttles agreed upon herein.

C. Within compass of this plan, no Japanese from northern Korea or Koreans destined for northern Korea will be repatriated through Korea south of 38° North Latitude.

D. Hospital ships, as available, will be used for movement of sick or injured repatriates.

Section II - Medical Procedures

I. Processing Repatriates.

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Military commanders, both in Korea and Japan, are responsible for medical processing of repatriates leaving their areas in accordance with international quarantine procedures. As a minimum, the following will be done:

1. Smallpox vaccination will be given to all.
2. Typhus vaccine will be given to all.
3. Cholera vaccine will be given during spring and summer.
4. Disinfestation of repatriates and their baggage. DDT or a comparable substitute will be used.
5. Repatriates will be examined by competent medical personnel and no individual having the following quarantinable diseases will be placed aboard a repatriation ship: smallpox, typhus, cholera, anthrax, yellow fever, plague, leprosy, and such other communicable disease which might prejudice the health of subsequent contacts.
6. Appropriate notation will be made on the passenger lists to show whether these minimum medical requirements have been met.

## II. Aboard repatriation ships.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible that:

1. The masters of repatriation ships notify the responsible control agency in the country of entry of the presence on board ship of any of the following diseases or exposed passengers traveling during incubation periods as follows: Cholera - 5 days, plague - 6 days, yellow fever - 6 days, louse-borne typhus - 12 days, and smallpox - 14 days.
2. Repatriation ships are cleaned and disinfested in Japan.

## III. Japanese medical personnel aboard repatriation ships.

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Japanese medical personnel will be placed aboard all repatriation ships. This personnel is part of the permanent ships party and will not be removed from their ship in Soviet controlled ports for other purposes.

IV. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reserves the right to suspend repatriation from North Korea if the presence of contagious disease or diseases renders such action advisable in his opinion.

Section III - Currency, Securities, and Other Documents and Possessions.

I. Japanese Repatriates Returning to Japan.

A. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will permit individual repatriates to bring with them from northern Korea the following:

1. Currency in current Bank of Chosen notes or the equivalent in local currency not to exceed ¥1000. Upon arrival in Japan repatriates will be screened to classify them as Army, Navy or civilian and processed financially in accordance with current SCAP directives.
2. Japanese Government bonds expressed in yen, in lieu of yen currency up to the limits stipulated in paragraph I A 1 above.
3. Japanese prisoners of war will be permitted to bring into Japan with them additional amounts of currency in Bank of Chosen notes or the equivalent in local currency, equal to payments made to them or accumulated by them while interned as prisoners of war.
4. Financial instruments.
  - a. Postal savings pass books of the Japanese Postal Savings System.
  - b. Post Office Life Insurance policies and other insurance policies issued by Japanese companies.

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- c. Bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan.
- d. Japanese Army and Navy field-postal savings pass books.
5. Clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner and **limited** to the amount each person can carry at one time.

B. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will permit returning Japanese military units to bring into Japan with them from northern Korea the following:

1. Administrative documents relating to military personnel to include service records, data on promotions, awards, decorations, pay, allowances and allotments, and other official documents necessary for completing final records and discharge papers of military and auxiliary personnel, to include administrative regulations and procedures covering personnel matters.
2. Tables of organization and equipment, strength returns, changes in command and military directories.
3. Health regulations, hospital records and sick reports.
4. Courts martial proceedings, records of arrests and confinements, and files of pending cases.
5. Inventories, budgets, receipts, disbursements and settlements of purely military accounts.
6. Demobilization and repatriation regulations.
7. Official documents necessary for settlement of records and accounts of the deceased who were formerly in the military or auxiliary service.
8. Lists of missing personnel and deserters.
9. Official organizational seals.

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## II. Korean repatriates returning to northern Korea.

A. Individual repatriates will be permitted to take with them the following:

1. ¥1000 per person ((Bank of Chosen) or its equivalent.)
  2. Postal Savings pass books and bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan and in Korea.
  3. Insurance policies issued in Japan and in Korea.
  4. Checks, drafts, and certificates of deposit drawn on and issued by financial institutions in Japan and payable in Japan.
  5. Clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner.
- These effects will be limited in weight to 250 lbs per person.

B. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers agrees to explore, in the near future, the feasibility of increasing the baggage allowance for outgoing repatriates to 500 pounds of personal effects and 4000 pounds of handicraft tools and equipment per individual.

Section IV - Communication

## I General.

It is agreed that:

A. The English language and the Russian language would be used in signal communications between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning repatriation.

B. The English language will be used in communicating between repatriation ports.

C. The Japanese language will be used in communicating from ship to shore.

## II. Sailing dispatches.

A. Port directors or other Allied military personnel in charge of

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various ports embarking repatriates will send sailing dispatches on all repatriation ships leaving their ports. Addressees are as follows:

1. For debarkation ports in Japan:

<u>Port</u>	<u>Action Addressee</u>	<u>Information addressee</u>
Maizuru	CG 25th Inf Div	SCAP CG Eighth Army CG I Corps

2. For debarkation ports in northern Korea.

<u>Port</u>	<u>Action Addressee</u>	<u>Information Addressee</u>
Genzan Kanko		

B. Information to be included in sailing dispatches as follows:

Dispatches are in two parts.

Part I.

The code word "Repats" is the first word of the text, followed by name and number of ship, port of departure, actual time of departure, port of debarkation, and estimated time of arrival.

Part II.

Code.

A	- Total repatriates embarked.
B	- Total number litter cases
C	- Number of repatriates who have not been completely medically processed. See paragraph I, Section II above.

C. Dispatches shall be condensed and prepared without classification in the following form:

(Example)

Movement of 3,750 repatriates from KANKO to MAIZURU on ship TARA

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MARU. 14 are litter cases. All have been completely medically processed. Ship departed at 1300 hours 17 May, with an estimated time of arrival at MAIZURU of 0800 hours 21 May.

## Form for Dispatch:

From: (USSR command at KANKO)

To : CG 25th Infantry Division

Info: SCAP, CG Eighth Army, CG I Corps, (add any USSR Commands desired).

REPATS X TARA MARU KANKO 171300 MAIZURU 21800 A 3750 B 14.

Note: The absence of "C" in the above message indicates that all medical processing has been completed.

B. Upon consummation of this agreement, representatives of SCAP and USSR will meet to determine details of signal communications.

Section V - Supply in Repatriation

## I. Food, medical supplies, and coal.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible that the Japanese Government furnish the necessary food, medical supplies, and coal for ships engaged in repatriation to and from northern Korea.

## II. Fuel Oil.

In as much as fuel oil is unavailable for repatriation ships from Japanese sources, the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to furnish fuel oil and bear the initial cost thereof for ships repatriating to and from northern Korea subject to ultimate Japanese reimbursement in accordance with accounting instructions to be established on a governmental level. Ships will be fueled in northern Korean ports for the round trip. Sailing dispatches will include the amount of oil each ship requires.

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## III. Emergency Supplies for repatriation ships at ports in northern Korea.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees, in cases of emergency, to furnish food, medical supplies, coal, or material repairs to repatriation ships so that they can continue their voyage. The master of the ship will give a quantitative receipt for supplies obtained. These receipts will specify amount and kind of supplies, and whether the supplies are to be used for Japanese troops or civilians. The receipts will be held for later accounting as may be determined on a governmental level.

The agreements contained herein have been concurred in by the representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, whose signatures appear below:

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12 June 1946

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Action taken to inform the C/S of the results of the Staff Conference held 11 June 46 on mutual repatriation between Japan and N. Korea.

2. This conference crystallized SCAP Staff opinion on Soviet counterproposals (Tab B) to our original proposed agreements. (Tab C).

3. New draft has been prepared (Tab A) incorporating changes that SCAP will agree to if necessary. These changes represent the maximum concessions to which SCAP Staff will agree. This draft is classified as "Restricted" and is not to be shown to the Soviets.

4. Recommend dispatch of attached C/N.

5. Concurrences are shown on Memo to the C/S.

6. This matter has been considered in its relation to Korea.

7. This completes action on this conference but not on this matter.

Strauss.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AGENDA FOR STAFF CONFERENCE  
ON  
NORTH KOREAN REPATRIATION

11 June 1946

*File N.  
Korea  
Conf*

1. Proposal to eliminate differentiation between Japanese military and civilian personnel. (Sec I, Par IA)
  - a. Effect on demobilization.
  - b. Present repatriation through S. Korea.
2. Control of repatriation shipping (Sec I, Par I F).
  - a. Present wording ambiguous.
  - b. Counter-proposal - change insertion to read "furnished from sources under SCAP control."
  - c. Use of Soviet shipping inferred.
  - d. Proposal regarding Soviet ships in Japanese waters.
3. Lack of differentiation between Japanese military and civilian personnel (Sec I, Par II).
4. Shipping.
  - a. 750 daily rate.
  - b. Ability to increase.
  - c. Amount of increase.
  - d. Availability of hospital shipping.
5. Restriction in event of epidemics.
  - a. Recommend addition of a sub-section III to the effect that SCAP reserves the right to suspend repatriation from N. Korea should a serious contagious disease reach epidemic proportions there.
  - b. In accord with present policy.
  - c. Should be mentioned specifically.
  - d. Necessary to safeguard public health in Japan.

6. Soviets desire handle all Japanese repatriates as Japanese nationals (Sec III, Par IA1, 3 and 4d).
  - a. If agreed, additional processing in Japan necessary.
  - b. Preferential treatment (¥1000 for all vs ¥500 and ¥200 limit on military personnel from other areas).
  - c. Geneva Convention violation (POW pay).
  - d. Error on draft (proposed Soviet change in paragraph A1 should read "Bank of Korea").
7. Deletion provisions for documents into Japan (Sec III, Par IC).
  - a. Effect on US military intelligence.
  - b. Effect on demobilization.
8. Deletion provision for return of documents from Japan (Sec III, Par D).
9. Soviets recommend increases in financial and economic items. (Sec III, Par II and III.)
  - a. Preferential treatment as compared with Koreans repatriating to S. Korea.
  - b. Transportation difficulties (rail and water).
  - c. Prejudice to US position and prestige.
  - d. Counter-proposal - that a paragraph III, IIB be added as follows: "The USSR will permit Korean repatriates returning to N. Korea to take with them items in kind and amounts as listed in paragraph IIA, Section III above."
10. Communications; Soviets desire to use Russian language also (Sec IV, Par IA and B).
  - a. Headquarters to headquarters.
  - b. Ship to shore.
  - c. Communication facilities.
  - d. Ship to shore frequencies and call signs.
11. Responsibility for provision of fuel oil (Sec V, Par II).
  - a. Preferential treatment as compared with British.

- b. Prejudice to US position in this matter. ✓
- c. Other possible solutions.
  - (1) Barter.
  - (2) Reimbursement in kind.
  - (3) Dollar cost.
- d. Suggested counter proposals.

RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

## INCOMING MESSAGE

*Secret*  
ROUTINE

8 June 46

FROM : WASHINGTON  
 TO : SCAP (POLITICAL ADVISER)  
 INFO : WAR DEPT CHIEF OF STAFF  
 NR : WAR SVC 7414 (STATE SERIAL 347 June 7, 6 PM) (DTG 080201 Z)

Following has been received from Moscow as 1759 June 5,  
 10 AM:

"Lozovski replied on June 1 to our previous letters of April 6 (Reemb's 1067 April 6) and of May 8 (Reemb's 1478 May 9) in regard to disposition of Japanese Naval and Merchant Fleets. Letter in translation reads as follows:

1. Soviet Govt, in accordance with proposal of Govt of USA, gave instructions to its member on Allied Council for Japan, Lt General Derevyanko, to communicate with Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Japan on question of allotting to Soviet Command portion of Jap Warships and Merchant vessels under his control for fulfilling tasks connected with completion of capitulation of Japan in districts occupied by troops of Red Army. Appropriate date on quantity and condition of Jap vessels which are under control of Soviet Command were communicated to Supreme Allied Commander in Japan by member of AC, Lt General Derevyanko in letter of April 12, 1946.

2. Prior to moment of final allocation of Jap War vessels among 4 Allied Powers, Soviet Govt believes it necessary to proceed now to inventory and draw up exact lists of War vessels subject to division. For these aims it is proposed to form commission of competent representatives of 4 Allied Powers, USSR, USA, Great Britain and China with a view toward this commission setting to work in very near future.


For purpose of maintaining Jap War vessels subject to division in good condition, Soviet Govt believes it necessary that these vessels be freed from carrying out repatriation work, the more so considering they are fully unsuited for accomplishment of this type of task. Instead of these vessels it would be more expedient to use for repatriation the large Jap War vessels subject to destruction as well as transport ships of Jap Merchant fleet.

41781

ROUTINE

*note*  
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Handling and transmission of literal plain text of this message as correspondence of the same classification has been authorized by the War Department in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 16-C, 18-E, 53-A, 53-D (1) (2) (3), and 60-A (1) (2) (3) (4), AR 380-5, 6 March 1946.



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RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

## INCOMING MESSAGE

*Secret*  
ROUTINEFROM WASHINGTON, NR WAR SVC 7414, DATED 8 JUNE 46, CONT'D

3. For carrying out preliminary measures for disposition of Japanese Merchant fleet among Allied Powers and for purpose of facilitating negotiations for its final allocation, Soviet Govt believes it expedient to form analogous competent commission for representatives of 4 Allied Powers. USSR, USA, Great Britain, China, which should immediately proceed to take inventory of Jap Merchant fleet, evaluate it, ascertain technical condition, etc. "

Dept has not been informed that data on Japanese vessels under Soviet control were submitted to SCAP by Gen Derevyanko as stated in Soviet note. Your comments requested.

BYRNES

ACTION: DIPLOMATIC SECT.

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, G-4, AG,  
C GOVT SECT, COMNAVJAP

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ROUTINE

TOO: 080917 Z  
MCN: SA 60/08

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

1 June 1946

## MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Conference on Repatriation Between Northern Korea and Japan.

1. On 23 April, there was presented to Lieutenant General Derevyanko, Chief of the Soviet Military Mission in Japan, a proposed draft of agreements which would govern mutual repatriation between Korea, north of 38° north latitude, and Japan. See Tab A.

2. Counterproposal submitted by the Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan, was received on 26 May 1946. See Tab B.

3. The original draft and proposed changes have been incorporated in one paper attached as Tab C.

4. Comments by interested staff sections on the changes proposed by the Soviets have been compiled and appear in Tab D. These comments defend the provisions contained in original draft and recommend no changes be made.

5. The separate points of difference in the United States and Soviet proposals have been analyzed and recommendations appear below:

## a. Section I - Par I A

Comment: Soviets recommend deletion of references to Japanese military personnel.

Discussion: The Potsdam Declaration permits the return of Japanese military personnel. The responsibility for their return from Russian held areas is a Soviet responsibility.

Demobilization in Japan will be made more difficult since military records will not be forwarded by the Soviets. The possibility that individuals may be indoctrinated with communism is recognized. Viewed realistically, however, SCAP is at present repatriating Japanese nationals from northern Korea thru southern Korea without regard to their military status at the rate of about 1400 per day.

Recommendation: That the change be accepted.

b. Section I - Par I F

Comment: Soviets recommend insertion of words so as to limit the operational control of repatriation shipping by SCAP to such shipping "from Japan".

Discussion: It is believed that the Soviets desire to prevent SCAP's control of such shipping as is now under Russian control and may be used later in repatriation. As now worded, the meaning is possibly ambiguous.

Recommendation: That the insertion be changed to read "furnished from sources under SCAP control".

c. Section I - Par II

Comment: Soviets recommend change so as to eliminate reference to military repatriates.

Discussion: See Par 5a above.

Recommendation: That the changes be accepted.

d. Section III - Par 1 A 1, 3 & 4 d

Comment: Soviets desire deletions so as to omit references to military personnel and to handle all repatriates as Japanese nationals.

Discussion: Reduced to its fundamentals SCAP has the authority to prescribe what repatriates can bring into Japan and what they can take out of Japan. Similarly the Soviets may prescribe what repatriates can carry into and out of Soviet controlled areas. The fact that the Soviets desire to make no distinction between military and civilian will require segregation of repatriates and their processing to be accomplished in Japan. At that time control procedures, the same as for other repatriates, can be applied. Par I-A-1, I A 3, I A 4 d are necessary controls as they have been applied to repatriates from other countries and are in accord with the Geneva Conference. To satisfy the Russian objection paragraph I 4 B Section III can be amended to indicate the items and amounts of each the Soviets will permit Japanese nationals to take from northern Korea.

Recommendation: That Paragraph I A of Section III be retained in agreement and that Paragraph I B of Section III be amended by Soviets to indicate items and amounts repatriates can bring.

e. Section III - Par I C

Comment: Soviets desire deletion of entire paragraph.

Discussion: This is similar to paragraph 5d above.

Recommendation: That Paragraph I C, Section III be retained in agreement and that Paragraph I D, Section III be amended in accordance with Soviet desires.

f. Section III - Par D

Comment: The Soviets recommend deletion of paragraph. See remarks in paragraph 5e above.

g. Section III - Par II and III

Comment: Soviets desire to increase that which the repatriate returning to northern Korea may carry as follows:

Money	From ¥ 1000 to ¥3000
Clothing and Personal Possessions	From 250 lbs to 500 lbs
Handicraft Shop Personal Equipment	Up to 2 tons

Discussion: These changes would give preferential treatment to repatriates returning to northern Korea. This change if agreed to would prejudice the U.S. position as almost one million residents of southern Korea have been repatriated under conditions substantially as outlined in our original proposal. Furthermore, although this increase in weight probably could be handled on repatriation ships, an unacceptable slow-up in repatriation would result.

Recommendation: That these changes not be accepted and that a sub-paragraph be added to Section III paragraph II as follows: "B. the U.S.S.R. will permit Korean repatriates returning to northern Korea to take with them items in kind

and amounts as listed in paragraph II A, Section III above".

h. Section IV - Par I A & B

Comment: Soviets desire to add that the Russian language also will be used in communications between SCAP and USSR and between ship and shore.

Discussion: The original draft indicated the English language for communications between SCAP and Japanese for the communications between ship and shore. Communications from the Soviets are now being received in Russian and translated here. G-2 states that sufficient Russian speaking Japanese are available for this purpose to translate messages received by ships from Soviet controlled areas.

Recommendation: That the changes be accepted.

i. Section IV - Par II

Comment: Soviets desire to eliminate references to military repatriates.

Discussion: This paragraph concerns contents of sailing dispatches. See par 5d above.

Recommendation: That the changes be accepted.

j. Section V - Par II

Comment: Soviets desire to change fuelling arrangements so that SCAP will be responsible for the supply of fuel oil from Japanese of U.S.A. sources for northern Korea repatriation.

Discussion: Fuel oil should be furnished in accordance with the original wording, i.e., by U.S.S.R. This corresponds with the arrangements applicable to SEAC area and with instructions from JCS. An alternate solution would be for Soviets to reimburse U.S. on a dollar basis.

Recommendation: That the change not be accepted.

6. It is recommended that:

a. A staff conference be held by representatives from the following section: G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, E&SS, PH&W, C Sig O, COMNAVJAP (SCAJAP), and Government Section on 5 June at 1400 in conference room sixth floor, Dai Ichi Building.

b. That the recommendations contained in attached memorandum to Chief of Staff be discussed to establish SCAP's position prior to scheduling a meeting with the Soviets.

c. That if the recommendations contained in paragraph 6a and b are accepted, the attached check note with Tabs C and D, be dispatched.

C. A. RUSSELL,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

5 Inclosures:  
Check Note  
Tabs A, B, C, & D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

TAB D

Comments by Staff Sections follow:

## A. G-1:

G-1 does not concur in the deletion of paragraph I-A-3 and paragraph I-C of Section III. It is believed that the deletion of the first paragraph is a violation of the spirit of the Geneva Convention. The deletion of the second paragraph will lead to confusion in the first and second demobilization ministries and we cannot see where any useful purpose can be served in the Russians withholding of the military records in question.

## B. G-2:

1. Comments:

a. The majority of the changes proposed by the Soviets have a direct bearing on G-2 matters. It will be noted that the proposed changes delete all reference to Japanese military personnel, civilians in military employ or prisoners of war, both as to permission to bring home extra funds, service postal savings books, etc., and in any exchange of tabulations on repatriates. More important, however, is the proposed deletion in toto of paragraph C, Section III (see page 6). This deletion, if agreed upon, would deny to us any official records concerning the Japanese troops in North Korea by in effect prohibiting the return of any military documents or records upon which we are dependent to reconstruct the picture of the Japanese war machine.

b. There appear, on the surface, three main reasons from the Soviet point of view for the proposed deletions discussed above.

1) Because military and civilian repatriates will arrive unsegregated, demobilization processes will be impaired and ex-military personnel who have no doubt been "indoctrinated" will be able to come into Japan without detection and be in an excellent position to infiltrate among the people here undetected to spread communistic progaganda.

2) The Soviets are attempting to conceal the fate of the approximately 130,000 Japanese troops who were in North Korea at the time of surrender.

3) The Soviets appear determined not to allow US access to the records of the Japanese forces in North Korea, and have no intention of repatriating former service personnel who could give us information.

2. Recommendation: That none of the proposed changes in Section I, III, or IV be agreed to.

## C. G-4:

G-4 does not concur in the Soviet position that fuel oil for Korean repatriation vessels shall be supplied by the Japanese Government of U.S. military authorities. Fuel oil for this project should be supplied by the Soviets in accordance with language as originally drafted, which conforms to similar arrangements applicable to the SEAC area.

## D. ESS:

1. Specifically the objections to the proposed procedure are as follow:

a. Section III of draft permits all repatriates from northern Korea to bring in Yen 1000. All repatriates are thus treated as civilians with no distinction made between military personnel and civilians. AG 370.05 (7 May 46) permits civilians to bring in Yen 1000, officers Yen 500 and enlisted men Yen 200. If all proposed repatriates are actually civilians the limitation of Yen 1000 is acceptable. If not, there is no obvious reason for granting military repatriates from northern Korea preference over those from southern Korea.

b. The proposal does not permit the importation into Japan of Japanese Army and Navy field postal savings pass books as permitted in AG 370.05 (7 May 46). If military personnel are included among those to be repatriated, no reason can be seen for not permitting such pass books to be brought in.

c. The proposal does not permit returning POW's to bring in the proceeds of their earnings accumulated during internment. This is provided by the Geneva Convention and although Japan was not a signatory, this privilege has been extended to returning Japanese POW's. If no returning POW's are included in the group to be repatriated this objection of course is not valid.

d. Part II of Section III of proposal permits Koreans repatriating to northern Korea to take with them Yen 3000. Repatriates returning to other parts of Korea are allowed by AG 370.05 (7 May 46) to take only Yen 1000. This preferential treatment does not seem warranted nor is the reason for it understood.

e. Although Finance Division is not directly concerned except insofar as the original memorandum on articles that could be brought into and taken out of Japan were drafted by Finance Division, objection is made to the discrepancy in the amount of personal possessions permitted. Repatriates coming from Northern Korea are to be allowed to bring in clothing and personal possessions up to the amount each person can carry. In contrast, repatriates leaving Japan for northern Korea are to be permitted to take 500 pounds of clothing and personal effects plus 2 tons of their own equipment, from handicraft shops. This description is obscure but the preference appears to be unjustified.

## E. PH &amp; W:

Concur.

## F. OCSigO:

1. Concur with the section dealing with communications, i.e., Section IV.

2. Attention is invited to the lack of necessary information as to action and information addressees under Section IV, II, A2.

## G. COMNAVJAP (SCAJAP):

1. Paragraph I-A-3 of Section III is in accordance with international law and as such should be adhered to by all nations. Russian disagreement on this point is not understood as it is believed not subject to controversy or compromise.

2. Paragraph I-A-4-d of Section III - no comment.

3. Paragraph I-C of Section III is considered necessary to insure a complete record of Jap military units.

4. Paragraph II-1 of Section III no objection to increase in amount of yen/person.

5. Paragraph II-5 of Section III - This increase to 500 lbs/person is considered high but could possibly be handled. It would result in greatly decreased passenger carrying capacity of the repat ships.

6. Paragraph III of Section III - Could not be handled on repat ships. Not in accord with previous limitations and considered an unwarranted proposal.

7. Section IV - Use of Russian language acceptable only if a sufficient number of interpreters for each ship can be made available. Believed to be unnecessary but a small point possible subject to agreement.

8. Subject to the above remarks, the original draft is considered fair, complete, in accord with existing precedent, and should be the basis for any consideration of repatriation to or from the subject area.

## H. Govt Sect:

1. Koreans to be repatriated to North Korea should not be given more favorable treatment than those being repatriated to South Korea.

2. Section III A (Page 7), Para II, 1 and 5 should allow ¥1000 and 250 pounds respectively as originally written, unless the increased amounts suggested by Gen Derevyanko are made applicable to repatriates to South Korea.

3. Section III A, Para III, is considered to be a desirable addition, provided the same privilege is accorded repatriates to South Korea. However, it will necessitate the working out of details covering inspection, proof of ownership, and shipping.



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D R A F T

*N. Korea Conference*

Agreements Reached at Conference Concerning Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from Korea North of 38° North Latitude to Japan, and Korean Nationals from Japan to Korea North of 38° North Latitude.

All agreements contained herein have been concurred in by representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, whose signatures appear at the end of this document.

Section I - General

I. Responsibilities and General Agreements:

A. ~~Japanese military personnel and other~~ Japanese nationals now located in Korea north of 38° north latitude, estimated number for planning purposes being \_\_\_\_\_ (No.), will be accepted in Japan by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. Koreans who were formerly resident of Korea north of 38° north latitude, estimated number for planning purposes being 10,000, will be accepted in northern Korea by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

C. Shipping for repatriation of personnel specified in paragraphs IA and IB above will be furnished by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Movement of individuals, as passengers, other than those in categories mentioned in paragraphs IA and IB is prohibited.

D. The responsibility of delivering repatriates to evacuation ports, processing them, and placing them aboard repatriation ships lies with the commander exercising control over the evacuation port. Each ship has a rated capacity. However, all details concerning selection of repatriates to be loaded on each ship, the loading plan, and the supervision of loading, including all matters related thereto, are the responsibility of the commander exercising control over the evacuation port.

E. Responsible commanders will be charged with furnishing repatriates to evacuation ports in numbers agreed upon herein so that insofar as practicable, } }

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ships will be loaded to capacity and will not be unduly delayed in terminal ports in either northern Korea or Japan.

\*\* from Japan\*\*

F. The operational control of repatriation shipping/will be exercised by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers through the administrator, Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (abbreviation: SCAJAP), a subordinate of Commander U.S. Naval Activities Japan. In northern Korean waters, repatriation ships will follow routes and procedures as prescribed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

G. On all matters other than routine sailing dispatches, representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will make the necessary arrangements with \_\_\_\_\_  
(Control Agency in Korea to be designated by Soviet Government)

Routine sailing dispatches will be handled as prescribed in Section IV.

H. Nominal lists of repatriates will be prepared by the commander exercising control over the evacuation port, and five (5) copies will be given to the captain of the repatriation ship. (See paragraph I A 6, Section II).

II. Priority of ports from which repatriates will be lifted, and the estimated number for planning purposes to be processed through each port.

<u>Port</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Repatriates</u> <u>Civilians</u>	<u>Total</u>
Genzan				
Kanko				
Maizuru	1	-	10,000	10,000

III. Ports, maximum daily capacity for repatriates, and port capacities (berthing for type and number of ships) follow:

A.

Maximum Daily Capacity

<u>Port</u>	<u>Incoming</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>	<u>Port Capacity</u>
Genzan			
Kanko			
Maizuru	2,500	2,500	

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B. Changes in repatriation ports to be used in northern Korea will be a subject for mutual arrangements between representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

C. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reserves the privilege of changing repatriation ports to be used in Japan at his discretion.

IV. Shipping to be utilized and shuttles to be established.

A. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers agrees to provide shipping initially to move repatriates from northern Korea to Japan at a minimum daily average rate of 750, provided ports on the east coast of northern Korea are used. If west coast ports of northern Korea are used this rate will be reduced proportionally to the increased time of turn around. Korean repatriates in Japan, destined for northern Korea, will be outloaded in Japan on this shipping.

B. At a subsequent date to be determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, additional repatriation shipping may be assigned to shuttles between Japan and northern Korea. Necessary coordination will be effected between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and (control agency in Korea, to be designated by the Soviet Government) prior to establishing new shuttles or increasing ships on shuttles agreed upon herein.

C. Within compass of this plan, no Japanese from northern Korea or Koreans destined for northern Korea will be repatriated through Korea south of 38° North Latitude.

D. Initially hospital ships will not be available for movement of repatriates.

Section II - Medical Procedures

I. Processing Repatriates.

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Military commanders, both in Korea and Japan, are responsible for medical processing of repatriates leaving their areas in accordance with international quarantine procedures. As a minimum, the following will be done.

1. Smallpox vaccination will be given to all.
2. Typhus vaccine will be given to all.
3. Cholera vaccine will be given during spring and summer.
4. Disinfestation of repatriates and their baggage. DDT or a comparable substitute will be used.
5. Repatriates will be examined by competent medical personnel and no individual having the following quarantinable diseases will be placed aboard a repatriation ship: smallpox, typhus, cholera, anthrax, yellow fever, plague, leprosy, and such other communicable disease which might prejudice the health of subsequent contacts.
6. Appropriate notation will be made on the passenger lists to show whether these minimum medical requirements have been met.

## II. Aboard repatriation ships.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible that:

1. The masters of repatriation ships notify the responsible control agency in the country of entry of the presence on board ship of any of the following diseases or exposed passengers traveling during incubation periods as follows: Cholera - 5 days, plague - 6 days, yellow fever - 6 days, louse-borne typhus - 12 days, and smallpox - 14 days.
2. Repatriation ships are cleaned and disinfested in Japan.

## III. Japanese medical personnel aboard repatriation ships.

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Japanese medical personnel will be placed aboard all repatriation ships. This personnel is part of the permanent ships party and will not be removed from their ship in Soviet controlled ports for other purposes.

Section III - Currency, Securities, and Other Documents and Possessions.

I. Japanese Repatriates Returning to Japan.

A. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will permit individual repatriates to bring with them from northern Korea the following:

- \*\* Value of currency of the Bank of Chosen - maximum - ¥1000\*\*
1. ~~Currency in-current-Bank of-Chosen notes or-the-equivalent in~~  
local currency.
    - a. ~~Commissioned-officers - a maximum of-¥500.~~
    - b. ~~Non-commissioned-officers and enlisted-men--a-maximum of~~  
¥220.
    - c. ~~Civilians (including-civilians-attached to-Japanese Army~~  
~~and Navy) - a maximum of-¥1000.~~
  2. Japanese Government bonds expressed in yen, in lieu of yen currency up to the limits stipulated in paragraph I A 1 above.
  3. ~~Japanese-prisoners-of war will-be permitted to-bring-with them~~  
~~additional-amounts-of currency-in Bank-of Chosen-notes-or the~~  
~~equivalent-in local currency; equal to-payments made-to them~~  
~~or-accumulated-by them-while-interned as-prisoners-of war.~~
  4. Financial instruments.
    - a. Postal savings pass books of the Japanese Postal Savings System.
    - b. Post Office Life Insurance policies and other insurance policies issued by Japanese companies.
    - c. Bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan.

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d. Japanese Army and Navy field-postal savings pass-books.

5. Clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner, and limited to the amount each person can carry at one time.

B. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will permit Japanese repatriates returning to Japan to bring with them items in kind and amounts as listed in paragraph I A, Section III above.

G. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will permit returning Japanese military units to bring with them from northern Korea the following:

1. Administrative documents relating to military personnel to include service records, data on promotions, awards, decorations, pay, allowances and allotments, and other official documents necessary for completing final records and discharge papers of military and auxiliary personnel, to include administrative regulations and procedures covering personnel matters.
2. Tables of organization and equipment, strength returns, changes in command and military directories.
3. Health regulations, hospital records and sick reports.
4. Courts martial proceedings, records of arrests and confinements, and files of pending cases.
5. Inventories, budgets, receipts, disbursements and settlements of purely military accounts.
6. Demobilization and repatriation regulations.
7. Official documents necessary for settlement of records and accounts of the deceased who were formerly in the military or auxiliary service.
8. Lists of missing personnel and deserters. . . .
9. Official organization seals.

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D. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will permit Korean repatriates returning to northern Korea to take with them items in-kind and amounts as listed in paragraph F 6, Section III above.

II. Korean repatriates returning to northern Korea.

Individual repatriates will be permitted to take with them the following:

~~\*\*¥3000\*\*~~

1. ~~¥1000~~ per person (Bank of Chosen).
2. Postal Savings pass books and bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan and in Korea.
3. Insurance policies issued in Japan and in Korea.
4. Checks, drafts, and certificates of deposit drawn on and issued by financial institutions in Japan and payable in Japan.
5. Clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner:

~~\*\*500\*\*~~

These effects will be limited in weight to ~~250~~ lbs per person.

~~\*\*III.~~ In addition to those indicated in paragraph II of Section III, the Korean repatriates from Japan will be permitted to take with them their own equipment, owned by them, from handicraft shops, not in excess of two tons.\*\*

#### Section IV - Communication

I General.

It is agreed that:

~~\*\*and the Russian language\*\*~~

A. The English language/would be used in signal communications between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning repatriation.

~~\*\*and the Russian language\*\*~~

B. Japanese language/will be used in communicating from ship to shore.

II. Sailing dispatches.

A..Port directors or other Allied military personnel in charge of various ports embarking repatriates will send sailing dispatches on all repatriation ships leaving their ports. Addressees are as follows:

1. For debarkation ports in Japan:

<u>Port</u>	<u>Action addressee</u>	<u>Information addressee</u>
Maizuru	CG 25th Inf Div	SCAP CG Eighth Army CG I Corps
	2. For debarkation ports in Northern Korea.	

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PortAction AddresseeInformation AddresseeGenzan  
Kanko

## B. Information to be included in sailing dispatches as follows:

Dispatches are in two parts.

## Part I.

The code word "Repats" is the first word of the text, followed by name and number of ship, port of departure, actual time of departure, port of debarkation, and estimated time of arrival.

## Part II.

Code.

- |         |  |
|---------|--|
| A       | - Total repatriates embarked.  |
| B       | - <del>Total number army</del> embarked.   |
| C       | - <del>Total number navy</del> embarked.   |
| D       | - <del>Total number civilians</del> embarked.  |
| **B** E | - Total number litter cases.   |
| **C** F | - Number of repatriates who have not been completely medically processed. See paragraph I, Section II above. |

C. Dispatches shall be condensed and prepared without classification in the following form:

(Example)

Movement of 3,750 repatriates from KANKO to MAIZURU on ship TARA MARU. ~~2,150 are army, 730 are navy, 870 are civilians,~~ and 14 litter cases. All have been completely medically processed. Ship departed at

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1300 hours 17 May, with an estimated time of arrival at MAIZURU of 0800 hours 21 May.

## Form for Dispatch:

From: (USSR command at KANKO)

To : CG 25th Infantry Division

Info: SCAP, CG Eighth Army, CG I Corps, (add any USSR Commands desired).

REPATS X TARA MARU KANKO 171300 MAIZURU 21800 A 3750 B 2150

\*\*B\*\*

G 730 D 870 E 14.

\*\*"C"\*

Note: The absence of ~~MF~~ in the above message indicates that all medical processing has been completed.

B. Upon consummation of this agreement, representatives of SCAP and USSR will meet to determine details of signal communications.

Section V - Supply in Repatriation

## I. Food, medical supplies, and coal.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible that the Japanese Government furnish the necessary food, medical supplies, and coal for ships engaged in repatriation to and from northern Korea.

## II. Fuel Oil.

~~\*\*The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible for the~~  
~~In as-much as-fuel oil is-unavailable-for-repatriation ships from-Jap-~~  
~~anese-sources, the government-of the Union of-Soviet Socialist Republics agrees~~  
~~of the U. S. A., to be utilized for repatriation to and from Korea.\*\*~~  
~~to-furnish-fuel oil and bear-the-initial-cost thereof for ships repatriating-~~  
~~to and from-northern Korea subject to-ultimate Japanese-reimbursement-in ac-~~  
~~cordance-with accounting-instructions to-be established on-a-governmental level.~~  
~~Ships will-be fueled-in northern-Korean ports for the round trip. -Sailing-~~  
~~dispatches-will include the amount-of oil each-ship requires. -~~

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## III. Emergency Supplies for repatriation ships at ports in northern Korea.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees, in cases of emergency, to furnish food, medical supplies, coal, or material repairs to repatriation ships so that they can continue their voyage. The master of the ship will give a quantitative receipt for supplies obtained. These receipts will specify amount and kind of supplies, and whether the supplies are to be used for Japanese troops or civilians. The receipts will be held for later accounting as may be determined on a governmental level.

The agreements contained herein have been concurred in by the representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, whose signatures appear below:

---

N.K. Derevyanko, Lt. Gen  
Representative for the Government  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics.

---

Representative for the Supreme  
Commander for the Allied Powers.

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D R A F T

D R A F T

27 May 1946.

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Action is letter No. 40169, 22 May 1946, from the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Allied Council for Japan, to Maj Gen Chamberlain, concerning our proposed draft of "Agreements Reached at Conference Concerning Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from Korea North of 38° North Latitude to Japan, and Korean Nationals from Japan to Korea North of 38° North Latitude."

2. The above mentioned proposed draft was transmitted to Lt Gen Derevyanko, by letter, file AG 370.05 (23 Apr 46)GC, dated 23 April 1946, subject: "Mutual Repatriation Between Northern Korea and Japan."

3. The changes to the proposed agreements, as set forth in the inclosure to the letter mentioned in par 1 above have been incorporated in the new draft of the agreements. The changes should be studied by the appropriate staff sections of this headquarters prior to a conference with the Russian officials.

4. Recommend approval of attached C/N's enclosing copies of changed draft.

5. This matter primarily concerns Korea.

6. This does not complete action on this matter.

Stewart.

CONFIDENTIAL

*N. Korea Conference*

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SIGNAL CORPS MESSAGE

25 MAY 1946

FROM: SCAP

GC-0 RVS/ra

TO : CG USAFIK. . . . . PRIORITY

INFO: CG USAWGK . . . . . ROUTINE  
CG 7TH DIV . . . . . ROUTINE

270751

URAD TARE FOX GEORGE CHARLIE TARE TWO TWO EIGHT SEVEN OF TWO  
FOUR MAY REFERS PD ( **EX61404** ) NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIET  
REPRESENTATIVES BASED ON SCAP PROPOSED AGREEMENTS FOR DIRECT  
REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE NATIONALS FROM NORTH KOREA EXPECTED  
TO BEGIN SHORTLY PD NO ESTIMATED DATE TO INITIATE SUCH REPAT-  
RIATION CAN BE SET AT THIS TIME

OFFICIAL:

B. M. FITCH,  
Brigadier General, A.G.D.  
Adjutant General

APPROVED:

*C. A. Russell*  
C. A. RUSSELL,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

COPIES TO:

- C-in-C
- C/S
- G-2 (3)
- G-3 (3 return)
- Govt Sec
- Dip Sec

Handling and transmission of the literal plain text of  
this message as correspondence of the same classifica-  
tion has been authorized by the War Department in ac-  
cordance with the provisions of paragraphs 44g and 53g  
(3) (Changes No. 3) of AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL (25)

3 ✓

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN  
TOKYO  
Office of the Member  
for  
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES, PACIFIC  
General Chamberlain

Dear General:

I have the honor of informing you that as a result of the study of your suggested plan of agreement "the Repatriation of Japanese civilians from Korea, living north of the 38° parallel into Japan, and Repatriation of Korean civilians from Japan to Korea, North of the 38° parallel", I personally think it suitable to enter into the project certain changes and additions. (See attached).

Mr. Peter V. Anurov, Deputy Political Advisor for the Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan from U. S. S. R., has been designated as the representative in the discussion to conclude the agreement.

Respectfully,

Member of the Soviet Section  
of the Allied Council for Japan  
from the U.S.S.R.

/s/ DEREVYANKO  
/t/ DEREVYANKO  
Lieutenant General

No. 40169

22 May 1946

TRANSLATED fr RUSSIAN BY:

/t/ /s/ STEVE BENSKO  
STEVE BENSKO  
1st. Lt., AC  
G-2, Foreign Liaison

Changes and additions to the plan of agreement for repatriating Japanese citizens from Korea to Japan and Korean citizens from Japan to Korea, North of 38° parallel.

In Section I

1. In paragraph "I A", in the first phrase, omit the words "Japanese Military personnel and others....".
2. In paragraph "I F" - in the first phrase, add the words "from Japan".
3. In paragraph II exclude the words "Military" and "Civilian" likewise the number "10000" from the column "Civilian".

In Section III

1. Substitute the following paragraph, "Value of currency of the bank of Korea - Maximum - 1000". Paragraph la, b and c in paragraph "I A".
2. Exclude 3 in paragraph "I A".
3. Exclude sub-paragraph "d", in paragraph "I A", 4.
4. Exclude all 9 sub-paragraphs in paragraph "I C".
5. Exclude paragraph "I D".
6. Substitute the figure "3000" for "1000" in paragraph "II 1".
7. Substitute the figure "500" for "250" in paragraph "II 5".
8. Add the following new paragraph III.

"In addition to those indicated in paragraph II of section III, the Korean repatriates from Japan will be permitted to take with them their own equipment, owned by them, from handicraft shops, not in excess of two tons".

For Section IV

1. In paragraph "I A", this section; after the words "The English language", add the words; "and the Russian language";

2. In paragraph "I B", after the words, "Japanese language"; add the words "and the Russian language".

3. In "II B", part II exclude "B", "C", "D". Also make the resulting change of the alphabetical designation for the remaining parts of code.

4. In "II C", exclude the figures and words:

a. "2150 - Army Personnel, 730 - Naval Personnel, 870 - Civilian persons.

b. In communication forms from Commander, U.S.S.R., in Kanko, exclude the following letters and figures: B 2150, C 750, D 870.

For Section V

1. II (Fuel Oils) to be formulated thus:

"The Supreme Commander of Allied Powers is responsible for the supply of fuel oil, by the Japanese Government or the military authorities of the U. S. A., to be utilized for Repatriation to and from Korea.

A Certified True Copy

/s/ KUROV

/t/ KUROV

Chief of the Secretariat

TRANSLATED fr RUSSIAN BY:

/t/ /s/ STEVE BENSKO

STEVE BENSKO

1st. Lt., AC

G-2, Foreign Liaison

22 May 1946

5 copies made.

*Russia*GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSAPO 500  
23 May 1946Lieutenant General K. Derevyanko  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Chief of the Soviet Section,  
Allied Council for Japan

Dear General Derevyanko:

This letter forwards the following petitions:

C.L.C. No. 2344 (RF), dated 15 May 1946, subject:  
"Petition for Repatriation of North Sea Seasonal Fishermen",  
copy herewith.Petition for Relief and Repatriation of Japanese  
Students of Karafuto Medical College, copy herewith.These petitions are submitted to you for consideration  
in connection with the general subject of repatriation of  
Japanese nationals from Russian occupied areas.The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will accept the  
students and fishermen referred to in the enclosed petitions  
in Japan and is willing to designate a representative to discuss  
the matter of shipping requirements at your convenience.

Very cordially,

2 Incls - as indicated above.

Petition for Repatriation of Japanese from  
Soviet Occupied Areas.

G-3

G-2

22 May 1946

THRU: C/S

1. Forwarded herewith is letter to General Derevyanko, Chief of the Soviet Section, Allied Council for Japan, and allied papers.

2. It is requested that you deliver the above mentioned communication to the addressee.

-----C. A. R.-----

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSAG 370.05 (26 May 46)GC  
(SCAPIN- 1335/A)APO 500  
26 May 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Petitions For Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from  
Soviet Occupied Areas.

## 1. Reference is made to the following:

a. C.L.O. 2344 (RJ) dated 15 May 1946, subject: "Petition for  
Repatriation of North Seas Seasonal Fishermen".b. Petition for Relief and Repatriation for Japanese Students  
of Karafuto Medical College, copy herewith.2. The question of repatriation from areas under Russian control  
has ~~already~~ been referred to the proper authorities in Washington for  
action on a diplomatic level. The Imperial Japanese Government will be  
notified when arrangements have been made for repatriation from these  
areas.3. The Imperial Japanese Government will inform Noburu Midzushima,  
Director of the Association of Students and Parents Karafuto Medical  
College of the contents of this memorandum.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

1 Incl - as indicated above.

*Russia*

21 May 1946

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

## 1. Action papers are:

a. CLO No 2344 (RJ), 15 May 46, subject: "Petition for Repatriation of North Seas Seasonal Fishermen", which encloses copy of cited petition.

b. Petition for Relief and Repatriation for Japanese Students of Karafuto Medical College forwarded as a matter pertaining to G-3 by G-2 C/N dated 16 May 46 subject as above.

2. a. Memo to Gen Chamberlain, 14 March 46 (Tab A) contains a study and sets forth the background of the matter concerning Jap Fishermen. (Request return to G-3 Repat Files).

b. Three radios to WARCOS, CAX 56192 of 20 Dec, CAX 55456 of 30 Nov, CAX 53189 of 12 Oct all requested action regarding repatriation of Jap nationals from Soviet occupied territory. Tabs B, C, D (Request return to G-3 Repat files).

c. Ourad CAX 58062 of 20 Feb to WARCOS and our Ltr to C/S USA dated 20 Feb 46 subject: "Repatriation of Koreans from Sakhalin," concerned the repatriation from Sakhalin of the families of 18 Korean miners. Tabs E and F (Request return to G-3 Repat files).

d. Wash radio WX 80449 of 13 March informed SCAP that the State Dept recommended that this matter be first taken up with the Soviet Ln Mission in Tokyo. Should this approach produce no results requested SCAP inform WD so that action on a diplomatic level may be initiated. The Soviet Ln Mission has been incorporated in the Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan (Col Pash - G-2). Tab G (Request return to G-3 Repat files).

3. The action papers are the latest in a succession of such petitions. Inasmuch as this matter has already been referred to WARCOS reference of these petitions to Washington is not considered necessary. Recommend reference to the Soviet Member of the Allied Council for Japan through the G-2 Section in accordance with the policy expressed in WX 80449 (ref 2d above).

4. Recommend dispatch of attached memo and letter.

5. Concurrences: Dip Sec (Mr Bishop).  
G-2 (Col Pash)

6. This matter has been considered in its relation to Korea.

7. This completes action on these petitions but not on this subject.

Strauss.

*(23) Corrected Copy**30*

COPY

IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
Central Liaison Office

TO : GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER  
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

FROM : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT: Petition for Repatriation of North Seas  
Seasonal Fishermen.

C. L. O. No. 2344 (RJ)

15 May 1946

1. Masataro Omi, President of the North Seas Seasonal Fishermen's Repatriation Assistance League, has filed with the Japanese Government a petition for the repatriation of North Seas Japanese seasonal fishermen, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

2. The Japanese Government would be much obliged if the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, be good enough to accord favourable consideration to the matter and grant assistance for the prompt repatriation of those fishermen.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

/s/ S. Iguchi  
/t/ (S. Iguchi  
Director of General Affairs,  
Central Liaison Office.

Enclosure: A petition.

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Petition for the Repatriation of North Seas Seasonal  
Fishermen.

9 May 1946

1. The kind and sympathetic consideration accorded by the President of the Central Liaison Office, Tokyo, to the problem of repatriation of the Japanese Seasonal Fishermen in the North Seas is deeply appreciated. Those men, 4,331 in number, as per classified list enclosed, were detained around the fishing-banks of Kamchatka, Saghalien, Kurile Islands, etc., and have not returned as yet, over eight months having elapsed since the issuance of the Imperial announcement of the termination of hostilities.

2. Although it is a fortunate thing for Japan that, with her defeat in the war as the turning-point, she has been enabled to embark promptly upon the establishment of democratic administration as an unarmed peaceful State, her actual condition of to-day is anything but satisfactory. Her political situation is still in chaotic complexity and there is no stability in popular welfare, foodstuff shortage being even so extreme as to disturb the public peace and order in the country, and the precariousness of livelihood, as it would seem, increasingly aggravating day after day.

3. The Seasonal Fishermen in question, commissioned with the important task of increasing the supply of foodstuff to the nation, departed for the North Seas in the spring of 1945, bravely daring all personal dangers, and met with the fate of

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- 2 -

being detained or interned. Their families left behind feel extremely uneasy about the welfare of those poor internees who have been deprived of their personal liberty for the past eight months, and naturally they are heavy-hearted. Nevertheless, being encouraged by a faint light of hope for the repatriation of those seasonal fishermen, they are bitterly struggling against their hard-pressing privations and the social unrest.

4. In spite of the fact that the commencement of repatriation of the Japanese detained in the Soviet-controlled areas of Manchuria has recently been reported, no report, not even one that might suggest just a wishful thinking is available yet about the prospective repatriation of those who went fishing to Kurile Islands, Saghalien and Kamchatka. Instead, there is a report that the Soviets are taking measures to force those men to stay permanently where they are now, with the result that rumour has sprung up among their families, that they might also be compelled to move to Kamchatka, Kurile Islands, Saghalien, etc. which make them exceedingly worried.

5. In view of the State policy of increasing the supply of food-stuffs by the exploitation of aquatic products, we, the enterprisers in that line, had pressingly asked those fishermen to undertake the risky job, persuading their families by all means to agree to send them to the North Seas. Under such circumstances, though their detention might be attributable to an incidental result of the lost war, we could not compliantly allow their families to be forced to emigrate into the North Sea Regions when they are all of them so ardently longing for the return of the fishermen.

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6. The President of the Central Liaison Office, Tokyo, is heartily desired to sympathize with the said fishermen's families who are in such pitiful distress and to take special measures so that the following may be realized:

(1) The repatriation at the earliest possible date of those persons detained, who went out fishing to the North Seas under contracts of engagement only for the fishing season, without their being compelled for any reason to stay permanently where they are in view of the fact that their families are unanimously so ardently desirous of return, and also that they are mostly excellent aquatic technicians in the fishing industry at home and constitute indispensable personnel for the encouragement of such industry of Japan.

(2) The exemption of the fishermen's families from the necessity of emigration to the North Seas regions for any reason.

Respectfully,

Masataro Omi,  
President of the North Seas  
Seasonal Fishermen's Repat-  
riation Assistance League.

Encl.

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LIST OF JAPANESE SEASONAL FISHERMEN DETAINED  
IN NORTH SEAS REGIONS.

Names of Companies to which the De- tained Belong.	Numbers of the Detained	
	Fishing-Banks	Numbers
The Japan-Russia Fishing Company	Kamchatka	777
	Northern Kurile Islands	1427
	Saghalien	180
The Japan High Sea Fishing Company	Etorohu Island and Shikotan Island	58
The Etorohu Fishing Company	Etorohu Island	770
The Karafuto Aquatic Indu- stry Development Company	Saghalien	772
The Nippon Nobenawa Fishing Company	Etorohu Island	35
The North Aquatic Product Company	Etorohu Island	12
Individual Enterprises of Etorohu Island		approx. 300
Total		4,331

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 775009

By KJ NARA Date 11/05/08

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER: TOP SECRET FILE

Ltr ~~Memo~~ to C/S US Army, Washington 25, D. C., dtd 16 May 46,  
subj: Transfer to Soviet Union of Jap destroyers & surface  
combatant vessels of lesser tonnage. *with m/r dated*  
*15 May 46*

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5 May 1946

Lieutenant General K. Derevyanko  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Member of the Allied Council for Japan

Dear General Derevyanko:

General MacArthur asked me to reply to your letter of 3 May 1946 concerning destruction of certain former Japanese naval vessels. He feels that you are under misapprehension with regard to the subject matter thereof.

The directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in accordance with the basic principles in this matter that were agreed to by the four Allied Powers. The action being taken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is merely executive and is pursuant to instructions issued through the United States Government.

You will note by reference to the Moscow Communiqué of 27 December 1945, that the United States Government is the channel through which Allied decisions are communicated to the Supreme Commander. The agency for this purpose employed by the United States Government is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In general, the questions you raise in your letter as to governmental policies are ones quite beyond the scope of the Supreme Commander's authority. They are being handled, as I understand it, upon the highest governmental level.

The suggestion relative establishment of an executive committee representing the Allied Powers is not in accordance with the Moscow Communiqué which established the Supreme Commander as the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan and which provided that in all cases action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander.

As regards the temporary use of Japanese vessels for purposes of repatriation, the current procedure is in accordance with instructions received by the Supreme Commander from the United States Government, notice of which, I understand, was communicated to the Soviet Government. The destruction of Japanese submarines is in process pursuant to similar instructions.

General information on the disposition of Japanese war materials is being publicly announced from time to time. Detailed information

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Authority 775009

By KJ NARA Date 11/05/08

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on this subject, if desired by you, can be made available by SCAP Headquarters upon compilation.

Very cordially yours,

PAUL J. MUELLER  
Major General, GSC  
Chief of Staff

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C O P Y

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General of the Army  
Douglas MacArthur,  
Supreme Commander for  
the Allied Powers  
GHQ  
Tokyo.

Dear General,

I have the honour to bring to your attention the following reply on the draft memorandum to the Imperial Japanese Government concerning destruction of certain former Japanese Naval Vessels as well as concerning the opinion of the General Headquarters on this matter.

1. The subject stated in the memorandum is of vital importance in the light of its proper realization. The gravity of the subject requires proper discussion and full concord on the part of all interested Governments.

In this connection it seems unjustified to require an answer on this memorandum within 48 hours, especially so that the draft of this memorandum is an instruction received from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on which the Soviet Government was not advised and whose consent was not asked for as to this matter. Besides this, as it is understood from the draft of the memorandum, a part of the former Japanese naval vessels have already been sunk by the American Forces. Consequently this proposal in fact seems to be one to arrange an agreement for what has already been done.

2. Having no principal objections against the destruction of the Japanese naval vessels classified in the draft of the proposal or against scrapping those vessels which are not to be distributed among the four Allied Powers the Soviet Government does find it expedient to have representatives of the Members of the Allied Council for Japan during the destruction of the above mentioned Japanese naval vessels.

All the Members of the Allied Council for Japan should be supplied in copies with official properly arranged documents on the destruction of the Japanese naval surface vessels and submarines. Since the draft of the memorandum does not specify what is to be done with Japanese transport submarines, the Soviet Government believes that these submarines would be either destroyed or included into the list of vessels to be distributed among the four Allied Powers.

3. The Soviet Government has nothing against handing over to the United States for experimental use as targets of the above mentioned Japanese Combatant vessels. Simultaneously the Soviet Government would consider it proper to have some ships of this category handed over to the Soviet Government to use them as targets.

4. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to begin right now registering and compiling accurate lists of the Japanese naval vessels to be distributed among the four Allied Powers.

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C O P Y

Accordingly the Soviet Government suggests that a committee comprising competent representatives of the four Allied Powers be immediately set up which should set to work not later than by the end of May 1946.

5. Since the draft of the memorandum does not specify the fate of the auxiliary vessels of the Japanese navy (military transports, tenders, repairships, floating docks, icebreakers, hospitalships, tugs and others) which also should be included among the vessels to be distributed among the four Allied Powers, the Soviet Government considers it proper to charge the Committee suggested in paragraph 4 with the task of registering and compiling the list of vessels of this category as well.

6. The Soviet Government does not consider it advisable to use the combatant vessels to be distributed among the four Allied Powers for repatriation purposes having in mind their total unfitness for such task.

Accordingly the Soviet Government considers it necessary that measures be taken to immediately discontinue the use of these vessels in repatriation service as well as measures to preserve them up to the time of distributing them among the four Allied Powers. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to use large Japanese naval vessels which are to be destroyed as well as transports and ships of the Merchant Japanese fleet in the repatriation service instead of the above mentioned vessels.

7. The disarmament of the Japanese navy would not be complete without destruction of special facilities and ammunition. The Soviet Government, therefore, believes that all such special facilities and ammunition will be also destroyed including naval as well as air torpedoes, mines, ammunition for naval and shore artillery, naval air force bomb supplies and others.

The Members of the Allied Council for Japan should also receive copies of official documents properly arranged on the destruction of all these facilities and ammunition.

Sincerely yours,

(s) K. Derevyanko  
(t) K. DEREVYANKO  
Lt. General.  
U.S.S.R. Member of the  
Allied Council for Japan

N 40126  
"3" May 1946

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*China  
Russia*~~TOP SECRET~~  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

## G-3 Repatriation

2 May 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR COL HOWELL:

SUBJECT: Repatriation from Manchuria.

This document is top secret because of reference to documents so classified.

1. Our CAX 53189, 12 October to US Military Mission, Moscow, requested transmission of request by Japanese for authority and facilities for prompt repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria.
2. Washington radio M 25741, 14 October, states our request in CAX 53219 has been forwarded to the Soviet Repatriation Commission.
3. Our CA 54230, 2 November, to WARCOS gave a report furnished by the Japanese returned from Manchuria on unpleasant conditions in Manchuria.
4. XXIV Corps radio TFGCT 2090, 2 March, gives information on a shipment of Korean repatriates from Dairen. This shipment was made without authority from XXIV Corps. The Russians were being informed that no future shipments will be received in South Korea without proper clearance from XXIV Corps.
5. China CFBX 27401<sup>4769</sup>, 4 March, states that Russians were informed of the above and suggested that no promise be made to the Russians as to any repatriation of Koreans from Manchuria.
6. CG China in agreement to the Tokyo Conference on Repatriation 15 - 17 January 1946, implied acceptance of responsibility from Manchuria in setting up priorities that included Manchuria and its approximate 1,603,000 Japanese.
7. JCS 1617, 2 February 46 subject: Repatriation of Civilian Japanese from China, stated in Appendix B, paragraph 2b, that the rate of repatriation is to be determined by SCAP in consultation with CG China who is responsible for coordination with the National Government of U.S. operations in the China Theater. Appendix "A" states the Chinese Government is responsible for repatriation from the China Theater of the Japanese and that processing and movement is the responsibility of the Supreme Chinese Headquarters. "The problem stated in "The Problem" para 1 of the report by the State-War-Navy Coordination Subcommittee to the Far East "to determine U.S. policy concerning the repatriation of civilian Japanese from China (including Manchuria and Formosa)" C/S US Army in his memo to JCS 30 March 46 recommended agreement to repatriation of all Japanese nationals from China including Manchuria.

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8. A letter to Gen Dumas, 6 April, from Col Wittman, China Repatriation Officer, states expectations of setting up Laoyao Repat Team at Hulutao about 15 April, and then to follow through at Mukden and Dairen using personnel from Canton and Formosa.

9. China radio CFB 2859, 16 April, gives SCAP notice of plan to initiate repatriation from Manchuria using the port of Hulutao.

10. CG China and Com 7th Fleet joint radio CFBX 27412, 16 April, to WARCOS (passed to JCS) states CG USAFCHINA will carry out task of advice and assistance to Chinese Government in repatriating Korean and Japanese personnel and in assuming control of that part of China including Manchuria liberated from the Japanese. Com 7th Fleet will assist in the foregoing.

11. From the above it can be seen that SCAP has made no commitments to Russia on repatriation from Manchuria. That communications have been carried on at high level for this repatriation and that our position in relation to CG China has been to furnish transportation to Japan for such Japanese as were in China ports. Arrangements for these lifts being made by CG China with SCAP.

White.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 570.05 (23 Apr 46)CC

AFD 500  
23 April 1946

SUBJECT: Mutual Repatriation Between Northern Korea  
and Japan.

TO : Lieutenant General K. Derevyanko,  
Chief Soviet Military Mission,  
Tokyo, Japan.

1. Reference is made to your letter to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated 12 April 1946, concerning mutual repatriation between Korea north of 38 degrees north latitude.

2. It is noted that due to the inability of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to furnish shipping for this purpose, any repatriation must be consummated in shipping now under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

3. It is proposed that repatriation from Russian controlled areas be conducted, using the same procedures that have been employed satisfactorily in repatriation from other areas. An agreement embodying those procedures is included in draft form herewith.

4. It is requested that a conference be held between representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a view of consummating an agreement along the lines indicated. Conference to be held in the sixth floor, Dai Ichi Building, at 1400 on 26 April 1946.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

1 Incl - as indicated above.

S. J. CHAMBERLIN,  
Major General, G.S.C.,  
Acting Chief of Staff.

Agreements Reached at Conference Concerning Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from Korea North of 38° North Latitude to Japan, and Korean Nationals from Japan to Korea North of 38° North Latitude.

All agreements contained herein have been concurred in by representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, whose signatures appear at the end of this document.

Section I - General

I. Responsibilities and General Agreements:

A. Japanese military personnel and other Japanese nationals now located in Korea north of 38° north latitude, estimated number for planning purposes being \_\_\_\_\_ (No.), will be accepted in Japan by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. Koreans who were formerly resident of Korea north of 38° north latitude, estimated number for planning purposes being 10,000, will be accepted in northern Korea by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

C. Shipping for repatriation of personnel specified in paragraphs IA and IB above will be furnished by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Movement of individuals, as passengers, other than those in categories mentioned in paragraphs IA and IB is prohibited.

D. The responsibility of delivering repatriates to evacuation ports, processing them, and placing them aboard repatriation ships lies with the commander exercising control over the evacuation port. Each ship has a rated capacity. However, all details concerning selection of repatriates to be loaded on each ship, the loading plan, and the supervision of loading, including all matters related thereto, are the responsibility of the commander exercising control over the evacuation port.

E. Responsible commanders will be charged with furnishing repatriates to evacuation ports in numbers agreed upon herein so that insofar as practicable,

ships will be loaded to capacity and will not be unduly delayed in terminal ports in either northern Korea or Japan.

F. The operational control of repatriation shipping will be exercised by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers through the administrator, Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (abbreviation: SCAJAP), a subordinate of Commander U.S. Naval Activities Japan. In northern Korean waters, repatriation ships will follow routes and procedures as prescribed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

G. On all matters other than routine sailing dispatches, representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will make the necessary arrangements with (Control Agency in Korea to be designated by Soviet Government).

Routine sailing dispatches will be handled as prescribed in Section IV.

H. Nominal lists of repatriates will be prepared by the commander exercising control over the evacuation port, and five (5) copies will be given to the captain of the repatriation ship. (See paragraph I A 6, Section II).

II. Priority of ports from which repatriates will be lifted, and the estimated number of planning purposes to be processed through each port.

<u>Port</u>	<u>Priority</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Repatriates</u> <u>Civilians</u>	<u>Total</u>
Genzan Kanko				
Maizuru	1	-	10,000	10,000

III. Ports, maximum daily capacity for repatriates, and port capacities (berthing for type and number of ships) follow:

A.

<u>Port</u>	<u>Maximum Daily Capacity</u>		<u>Port Capacity</u>
	<u>Incoming</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>	
Genzan Kanko			
Maizuru	2,500	2,500	

B. Changes in repatriation ports to be used in northern Korea will be a subject for mutual arrangements between representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

C. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reserves the privilege of changing repatriation ports to be used in Japan at his discretion.

IV. Shipping to be utilized and shuttles to be established.

A. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers agrees to provide shipping initially to move repatriates from northern Korea to Japan at a minimum daily average rate of 750, provided ports on the east coast of northern Korea are used. If west coast ports of northern Korea are used this rate will be reduced proportionally to the increased time of turn around. Korean repatriates in Japan, destined for northern Korea, will be outloaded in Japan on this shipping.

B. At a subsequent date to be determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, additional repatriation shipping may be assigned to shuttles between Japan and northern Korea. Necessary coordination will be effected between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and (control prior to agency in Korea, to be designated by the Soviet Government) establishing new shuttles or increasing ships on shuttles agreed upon herein.

C. Within compass of this plan, no Japanese from northern Korea or Koreans destined for northern Korea will be repatriated through Korea south of 38° North Latitude.

D. Initially hospital ships will not be available for movement of repatriates.

#### Section II - Medical Procedures

I. Processing Repatriates.

Military commanders, both in Korea and Japan, are responsible for medical processing of repatriates leaving their areas in accordance with international quarantine procedures. As a minimum, the following will be done.

1. Smallpox vaccination will be given to all.
2. Typhus vaccine will be given to all.
3. Cholera vaccine will be given during spring and summer.
4. Disinfestation of repatriates and their baggage. DDT or a comparable substitute will be used.
5. Repatriates will be examined by competent medical personnel and no individual having the following quarantinable diseases will be placed aboard a repatriation ship: smallpox, typhus, cholera, anthrax, yellow fever, plague, leprosy, and such other communicable disease which might prejudice the health of subsequent contacts.
6. Appropriate notation will be made on the passenger lists to show whether these minimum medical requirements have been met.

## II. Aboard repatriation ships.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible that:

1. The masters of repatriation ships notify the responsible control agency in the country of entry of the presence on board ship of any of the following diseases or exposed passengers traveling during incubation periods as follows: Cholera - 5 days, plague - 6 days, yellow fever - 6 days, louse-borne typhus - 12 days, and smallpox - 14 days.
2. Repatriation ships are cleaned and disinfested in Japan.

## III. Japanese medical personnel aboard repatriation ships.

Japanese medical personnel will be placed aboard all repatriation ships. This personnel is part of the permanent ships party and will not be removed from their ship in Soviet controlled ports for other purposes.

Section III - Currency, Securities, and Other Documents and Possessions.

I. Japanese Repatriates Returning to Japan.

A. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will permit individual repatriates to bring with them from northern Korea the following:

1. Currency in current Bank of Chosen notes or the equivalent in local currency.
  - a. Commissioned officers - a maximum of ¥500.
  - b. Non-commissioned officers and enlisted men - a maximum of ¥200.
  - c. Civilians (including civilians attached to Japanese Army and Navy) - a maximum of ¥1000.
2. Japanese Government bonds expressed in yen, in lieu of yen currency up to the limits stipulated in paragraph 1 A 1 above.
3. Japanese prisoners of war will be permitted to bring with them additional amounts of currency in Bank of Chosen notes or the equivalent in local currency, equal to payments made to them or accumulated by them while interned as prisoners of war.
4. Financial instruments.
  - a. Postal savings pass books of the Japanese Postal Savings System.
  - b. Post Office Life Insurance policies and other insurance policies issued by Japanese companies.
  - c. Bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan.

d. Japanese Army and Navy field-postal savings pass books.

5. Clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner, and limited to the amount each person can carry at one time.

B. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will permit Japanese repatriates returning to Japan to bring with them items in kind and amounts as listed in paragraph I A, Section III above.

C. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will permit returning Japanese military units to bring with them from northern Korea the following:

1. Administrative documents relating to military personnel to include service records, data on promotions, awards, decorations, pay, allowances and allotments, and other official documents necessary for completing final records and discharge papers of military and auxiliary personnel, to include administrative regulations and procedures covering personnel matters.
2. Tables of organization and equipment, strength returns, changes in command and military directories.
3. Health regulations, hospital records and sick reports.
4. Courts martial proceedings, records of arrests and confinements, and files of pending cases.
5. Inventories, budgets, receipts, disbursements and settlements of purely military accounts.
6. Demobilization and repatriation regulations.
7. Official documents necessary for settlement of records and accounts of the deceased who were formerly in the military or auxiliary service.
8. Lists of missing personnel and deserters.
9. Official organization seals.

D. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will permit Korean repatriates returning to northern Korea to take with them items in kind and amounts as listed in paragraph I C, Section III above.

II. Korean repatriates returning to northern Korea.

Individual repatriates will be permitted to take with them the following:

1. ¥1000 per person (Bank of Chosen).
2. Postal Savings pass books and bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan and in Korea.
3. Insurance policies issued in Japan and in Korea.
4. Checks, drafts, and certificates of deposit drawn on and issued by financial institutions in Japan and payable in Japan.
5. Clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner.

These effects will be limited in weight to 250 lbs per person.

Section IV - Communication

I General.

It is agreed that:

A. The English language would be used in signal communications between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning repatriation.

B. Japanese language will be used in communicating from ship to shore.

II. Sailing dispatches.

A. Port directors or other Allied military personnel in charge of various ports embarking repatriates will send sailing dispatches on all repatriation ships leaving their ports. Addressees are as follows:

1. For debarkation ports in Japan:

<u>Port</u>	<u>Action addressee</u>	<u>Information addressee</u>
Maizuru	CG 25th Inf Div	SCAP CG Eighth Army CG I Corps

2. For debarkation ports in northern Korea.

PortAction AddresseeInformation AddresseeGensan  
Kanko

## B. Information to be included in sailing dispatches as follows:

Dispatches are in two parts.

## Part I.

The code word "Rspats" is the first word of the text, followed by names and number of ship, port of departure, actual time of departure, port of debarkation, and estimated time of arrival.

## Part II.

Code.

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| A | - Total repatriates embarked.  |
| B | - Total number army embarked.  |
| C | - Total number navy embarked.  |
| D | - Total number civilians embarked.   |
| E | - Total number litter cases.   |
| F | - Number of repatriates who have not been completely medically processed. See paragraph I, Section II above. |

G. Dispatches shall be condensed and prepared without classification in the following form:

(Example)

Movement of 3,750 repatriates from KANKO to MAIZURU on ship TARA MARU. 2,150 are army, 730 are navy, 870 are civilians, and 14 litter cases. All have been completely medically processed. Ship departed at

1300 hours 17 May, with an estimated time of arrival at MAIZURU of 0600 hours 21 May.

Form for Dispatch:

From: (USSR command at KANKO)  
 To : CG 25th Infantry Division  
 Info: SCAP, CG Eighth/<sup>Army</sup> CG I Corps, (add any USSR Commands desired).

REPATS X TARA MARU KANKO 171300 MAIZURU 21800 A 3750 B 2150  
 C 730 D 870 E 14.

Note: The absence of "F" in the above message indicates that all medical processing has been completed.

E.. Upon consummation of this agreement, representatives of SCAP and USSR will meet to determine details of signal communications.

Section V - Supply in Repatriation

I. Food, medical supplies, and coal.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible that the Japanese Government furnish the necessary food, medical supplies, and coal for ships engaged in repatriation to and from northern Korea.

II. Fuel Oil.

In as much as fuel oil is unavailable for repatriation ships from Japanese sources, the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to furnish fuel oil and bear the initial cost thereof for ships repatriating to and from northern Korea subject to ultimate Japanese reimbursement in accordance with accounting instructions to be established on a governmental level. Ships will be fueled in northern Korean ports for the round trip. Sailing dispatched will include the amount of oil each ship requires.

D R A F T

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D R A F T

III. Emergency Supplies for repatriation ships at ports in northern Korea.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees, in cases of emergency, to furnish food, medical supplies, coal, or material repairs to repatriation ships so that they can continue their voyage. The master of the ship will give a quantitative receipt for supplies obtained. These receipts will specify amount and kind of supplies, and whether the supplies are to be used for Japanese troops or civilians. The receipts will be held for later accounting as may be determined on a governmental level.

The agreements contained herein have been concurred in by the representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, whose signatures appear below:

N.K. Derevyanko, Lt. Gen  
Representative for the Government  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics.

P.J. Mueller, Maj Gen.G.S.C.,  
Representative for the Supreme  
Commander for the Allied Powers.

D R A F T

D R A F T

D R A F T

23 April 1946

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Action directed by C/S. Action paper is letter from Lt. General K. Derevyanko, dated 12 April 1946, serial 4076.

2. In a letter dated 28 February 1946, Lt. General Dervyanko proposed that Japanese be repatriated from Korea north of 38 degrees N. Lat. commencing after 1 March. Our reply, dated 4 March, stated this headquarters would discuss the matter, provided Gen Dervyanko was empowered to speak for the USSR.

3. Reference paragraph IIA, Section I, attached draft, the letter from Gen Derevyanko mentioned par 2 above stated the USSR. intended to use the ports of Genzan and Kanko, (on the east coast of Korea) and Chinnampo on west coast.

4. Reference paragraph IIB, Section I, attached draft, this information was furnished by the Japanese Government, as a result of the registration of Koreans, Chinese, Ryukyans and Formosans.

5. Reference paragraph IV A, Section I, attached draft, a staff study concerning allocation of Japanese repatriation shipping, dated 16 March, sets up 10% of passenger spaces in Japanese long range shipping to repatriate Japanese from Northern Korea. This was approved by the Chief of Staff.

92,129	Passenger spaces on 14 April.
<u>10%</u>	
9,213	passenger spaces to Korea.
<u>50%</u>	operational at one time.
4,606	spaces operational.
<u>5</u>	trips per month.
23,030	

$\frac{23,030}{30} = 768$  spaces per day to Korea.

Due to the limited shipping available to repatriate from northern Korea it is preferable to use only one port in Korea (preferably Genzan) or at most two ports (preferably Genzan and Kanko). However if Russia insists on a west coast port it can be done although it will reduce the average daily lift.

6. Reference paragraph IV C, Section I, attached draft, in telephone conversations between Col Coolidge, XXIV Corps, and Col Butchers, G-3 Section, on 18 and 19 April, Col Coolidge stated XXIV Corps does not desire repatriates to or from Korea north of 38 degrees N. Lat. moving through southern Korea for the following reasons:

a. Critical welfare situation in S. Korea - Koreans become public charges since XXIV Corps can not get them north of 38 degrees within their own means.

b. Unsatisfactory existing arrangements with the Russians, especially rail transportation, fuel etc.

7. Reference Sections II and III, attached draft, the procedures as outlined therein are in effect in repatriation from China, S. Korea, and areas under the control of SACSEA and AMF.

8. Reference Section IV, attached draft, special radio circuits will have to be established as soon as the agreements are concluded and it is known what radio stations the Russians have available in norther Korea. Also, SCAJAP will furnish the Russians with the call signs and frequencies for ships repatriating to and from northern Korea.

9. Reference paragraphs II B and C, Section IV, attached draft, form for sailing dispatches is now in use in repatriation from all other areas.

10. Reference paragraph II, Section V, attached draft, Washington radio WCL 28062, 27 Mar 46, states that the JCS is of the opinion that Great Britain and Australia should bear the initial cost of fuel oil for ships repatriating from areas under their control. Washington radio W 83078, 4 Apr 46, states Great Britain and Australia have agreed to bear the initial cost of the oil. It is assumed that the same policy will hold for repatriation from Russian controlled areas.

11. Reference paragraph III, Section V, attached draft, the procedures as outlined has been agreed upon by China, AMF and SACSEA. This provision is necessary in case of damage, mechanical failures, and other unforeseen emergencies.

12. Recommend approval of attached draft of agreements, and letter.

13. Concurrences:

G-2 (Col Armstrong)  
G-1 (Lt Col Cullen)  
G-4 (Comdr Ryan)  
E&SS (Lt. Col McDiarmid)  
PH & W (Col Murray)  
Govt Sec (Col Robinson)  
SCAJAP (Capt Weiss)

14. This matter as it relates to Korea has been considered.

15. This completes action on this matter.

Howell.

*File  
Action Am*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 370.05 (20 Apr 46)GC

APO 500  
20 April 1946SUBJECT: Return from Japan of Families of Residents of  
Southern Sakhalin.TO : Lieutenant General K Derevyanko,  
Chief Soviet Military Mission,  
Tokyo, Japan.

## 1. Reference is made to:

a. Memorandum to Lieutenant General K. N. Derevyanko, file AG 370.05 (23 Mar 46)GC, dated 23 March 1946, subject: "Repatriation of Koreans from Sakhalin."

b. Letter, Soviet Section Allied Council for Japan, No. 43, Tokyo, dated 12 March 1946, to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers concerning return from Japan of families of residents of Southern Sakhalin.

c. Letter to Lieutenant General K. N. Derevyanko, file AG 370.05 (20 Mar 46)GC, dated 20 March 1946, subject: "Return from Japan of Families of Residents of Southern Sakhalin."

d. Letter, file No. 4077, Allied Council for Japan, Tokyo, Office of the Member For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the General Secretary of the Allied Council in Japan, dated 12 April 1946, subject as above.

2. The decision to permit the return of families of Japanese from Japan was made in letter referred to in paragraph 1c above. The conditions under which such movement was to be made were ~~was~~ prescribed in the same letter. These conditions when fulfilled will insure the voluntary and orderly movement of the families involved and were prescribed for that reason. While undoubtedly some families will incur additional hardships occasioned by the delay it is believed the advantages to be gained by a planned movement whereby individuals can be properly processed would best serve the interests of the Allied Powers.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

*Return to G-3  
for file*

B. M. FITCH,  
Brigadier General, AGP,  
Adjutant General

Russia

20 April 1946.

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Action paper is letter from Allied Council for Japan, Tokyo, Office of the Member for the Union of <sup>Soviet</sup> Socialist Republics #4077, dated 12 April 1946, subject: "Return of Families of Fishermen to South Sakhalin."

2. Soviet Section, Allied Council for Japan, letter of 12 March 1946, Serial No. 43, states that requests had been made by Japanese fishermen on the southern part of Sakhalin Island to allow their families, now in Japan, to return to Sakhalin Island, and that the Soviet Government has given authorization for temporary entry from Japan to Sakhalin Island to 2500 families, totaling about 8500 persons. It proposed to send a Soviet ship, carrying representatives of the fishermen mentioned above, to the Japanese ports of Niigata, Aomori, Hakodate and Wakkanai to pick up and load the Japanese families. Two or three men of Lt. Gen. K. Derevyanko's staff would be sent to the above mentioned ports.

3. Letter, Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, file AG 370.05 (20 Mar 46)GC, dated 20 March 1946, subject: "Return from Japan of Families of Residents of Southern Sakhalin," states the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers concurs in movement of Japanese families, subject to the following conditions.

a. The movement of any Japanese families concerned must be entirely voluntary on their part.

b. Prior to commencement of any detailed arrangements in the matter, the Soviet Government will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers a list, in the form of an individually signed request for return of their respective families to Sakhalin, of the Japanese fishermen concerned. This list should include, further, the full name of each member of each family in Japan whose return is desired, the address in Japan of each of these individual family members, and his or her relationship to the fisherman signing the request.

c. Complete supervision of the movement of these families, while in Japan and until they are embarked on Soviet shipping, will be effected by the Occupation Force authorities and not by representatives of the Soviet Government.

d. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will specify the ports, the dates, and, within reasonable limits,

the time of arrival in Japan of the Soviet vessels that are to be used for transport of the families.

It states action to commence movement of these families, provided they consent thereto, will be initiated without delay upon receipt of the information described above.

4. Letter from Office of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated 12 April 1946, Serial No. 4077, to the General Secretary of the Allied Council in Japan, states that the final decision of this question has been delayed on account of the provision stated in paragraph 2b above, and repeats the proposal given in the letter briefed in paragraph 1 above.

5. The action letter differs from letter referred to in paragraph 2 above only in that it states the need for repatriation of families is immediate; that representatives of Japanese fishermen would accompany boat presumably to round up families, and states conditions of families are deteriorating due to delay.

6. Primary question involved is whether movement of Japanese in Japan will be controlled by SCAP or USSR. It would appear that any concurrence in the Soviet proposal to allow their vessels and agents to come to Japan and remove Japanese nationals would seriously affect the prestige and position of the SCAP and outweighs the disadvantage that some additional suffering may be caused by the delay.

7. Recommend dispatch of attached letter.

8. Concurrences: ~~XXXXXX~~  
Govt Sec (Col Robison).

9. This matter as it relates to Korea has been considered.

10. This completes action on this subject.

Howell.

11717

TRANSLATION fr RUSSIAN  
AV

12 April 1946

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
GENERAL OF THE ARMY D. MACARTHUR

AG File

Dear Sir:

In reply to your letter of 4 March 1946, regarding the repatriation of Japanese from Northern Korea, I have the honor to inform you of the following:

The Soviet Government has no objections to the repatriation, from Japan to Northern Korea, of these Koreans who previously resided permanently in the territory of Northern Korea.

As for the amount and state of ships, captured by the Red Army from the Japanese during hostilities, which could be used for repatriation, competent Soviet authorities have stated the following:

Among the ships, captured from the Japanese, now at the disposal of the Soviet High Command, there is no single transport able to carry repatriates between Korean and Japanese Ports.

Among the ships, captured from the Japanese, there are 150 auxiliary powered Schooners, 50 powered Barges, also Launches, Tugs, Barges, small Sail Crafts, and other small vessels, the majority of which require routine or overall repairs.

Among 20 Freight and Cargo Passenger Ships, there is no single ship ready for use, all of them requiring repairs involving a long period of time.

Only 35 ships are ready for use, consisting of port vessels, completely unfit for passenger transportation.

In view of the above, the Soviet Government cannot assign any ships for the purpose of repatriation.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 775009

By KJ NARA Date 11/05/08

With Complete Deference,

U.S.S.R. Member of the Allied Council  
for Japan.

/s/ K. DEREVYANKO

/t/ K. DEREVYANKO

No 4076

(19)

23

*Russia*GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 370.05 (23 Mar 46)OC

APO 500  
23 March 1946

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Koreans from Sakhalin.

MEMO FOR: Lt. Gen. K. N. Derevyanko,  
U.S.S.R. Member,  
Allied Council for Japan.

1. Eighteen Korean laborers who were moved to Japan from Sakhalin just before the end of the war, have reported that they left their families in Sakhalin. They further state they have had no communication with their families for seven months. Their families, list inclosed, are Koreans, former residents of Korea south of 38° north latitude, who followed the laborers to Sakhalin.

2. The enforced separation of these families of a now liberated nation seems an unnecessary hardship. In view of this fact it is requested that the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics return the families of the Koreans as listed on the attached inclosure to their previous domiciles in Southern Korea or to Japan for onward repatriation and notify the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of the action taken.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

S. J. CHAMBERLIN,  
Major General, G. S. C.,  
Acting Chief of Staff.

1 Incl - List of Korean Families.

18

22

18 March 1946.

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Action is a result of WX 80449 14 March TO CINCAFPAC, referred to G-3 Repatriation by Gen Dumas.

2. In a report of a strike of coalminers submitted to us by indorsement by 8th Army, 11 Feb 46, it was found that a basis for the strike was a lack of communication between Korean miners here in Japan and their Korean Families left on Sakhalin. These Koreans did not desire to return to Korea until repatriation of their families was definite.

3. Our CAX 58062 (20 Feb) to WARCOS requested diplomatic action on case of Korean miners separated from their families in Sakhalin.

4. Our letter AG 370.05 (20 Feb 46) GC dated 20 February 1946 to C/S Washington on same subject forwarded names and addresses of Koreans in Sakhalin, and their home addresses in Korea.

5. A letter to Gen MacArthur from Lt Gen Derevyanko, 12 March 1946, indicates that Soviet Govt is taking steps to return to Sakhalin from Japan families of Japanese residents of Sakhalin. This would indicate that negotiations might be opened with the Soviet Mission on the subject of repatriation of Koreans in Sakhalin.

6. Recommend approval of the attached letter.

7. Concurrences: Govt Sec (Lt Col Bibb); POLAD (Mr. Service).  
G-2 (Col Snyder)

8. This action ~~as it relates to~~ Korea has been considered.

9. This completes action on this radio but not on this subject.

White.

xx. WX 80449, 14 March, replies to CAX 58062 recommending this matter be taken up with Soviet Ln Mission in Tokyo. If unsuccessful the WD to be so informed so action may be initiated in Diplomatic channels.

*Russia*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500

20 March 1946

TO : Lt. Gen K. Derevyanko  
Member for U.S.S.R.  
Allied Council for Japan

THROUGH: G-3 (Foreign Liaison Section)

SUBJECT: Return from Japan for the Families of Residents of Southern Sakhalin.

1. This refers to your letter, No. 43, 12 March 1946, to Gen MacArthur concerning Japanese fishermen of Southern Sakhalin who have requested that their families be allowed to return from Japan.

2. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers requires the following govern in the return of these families to Sakhalin:

a. The movement must be voluntary on the part of the Japanese families concerned.

b. The Occupation Forces, and not the representatives of the Soviet Government, will supervise the movement of these families in Japan until embarked on Soviet shipping.

c. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will designate the ports, the dates, and within limits the time of arrival of the Soviet vessels in Japan that will transport these families.

d. The Soviet Government furnish to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers a list of the Japanese fishermen who desire the return of their families to Sakhalin. This list will include the name of each member of each family, his or her relationship to the head of the family concerned, and the present address in Japan of the individual members of each family. The list will be accompanied by a signed request from each fishermen that his family be returned to Sakhalin.

3. When the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has been informed that the requirements of paragraph 2a and d above have been met, action will be initiated to expedite the movement of the families concerned.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

*Corrected  
file copy*

18 March 1946

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Action, as directed by C/S, is in reply to a letter to Gen MacArthur 12 March, from Lt Gen K. Derevyanko USSR Member for Allied Council for Japan. (Tab A).
2. Our radios CAX 55456, 29 Nov 45, and CAX 56192, 19 Dec 45, both asked that repatriation of Japanese from Sakhalin and Kuriles be taken up through diplomatic channels.
3. WX 91218, 15 Jan 46, stated that Ambassador Harriman had made representations to M. Vyshinsky on repatriation of Japanese in these areas.
4. Memorandum for General Chamberlin, dated 12 March, contains the background of former repatriation efforts concerning Sakhalin and Kuriles.
5. A concurrent action to the Soviet Ln Mission, as directed by WD, requests ~~comment on a proposal that negotiations be opened with USSR to repatriate families of 18 Koreans from Sakhalin.~~
6. As noted in the memorandum for General Chamberlin, a forced evacuation of the families from Japan would be contrary to policy and US public opinion.
7. SCAP Repatriation Section of G-3 has already handled mass repatriation and should be the directing force to facilitate such a movement.
8. Note from General Chamberlin indicates that a reply to Gen Derevyanko should follow the general lines: (Tab B).
  - a. Movement voluntary.
  - b. Movement supervised by Occupation Forces.
  - c. SCAP to designate ports and time of arrival of Soviet Ships.
  - d. A list of individuals and their addresses in Japan to be furnished with signed request of individual desiring return of family.
9. Recommend approval of attached letter.
10. Concurrence: POLAD (Mr Service).
11. This problem as it relates to Korea has been considered.
12. This completes action on this letter but not on this subject.

TRANSLATION fr RUSSIAN  
AV

Soviet Section  
Allied Council for Japan  
12 March 1946  
No. 43  
Tokyo

COPY

*Russia File*

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
GENERAL OF THE ARMY, D. MACARTHUR

Sir:

I have the honor of informing you of the following:

In reference to requests made by Japanese fishermen on the southern part of Sakhalin Island to allow their families, who entered Japan during the period of hostilities, to return to the southern part of Sakhalin Island; the Soviet Government has given authorization for temporary entry from Japan to the southern part of Sakhalin Island to 2300 families, totaling about 8500 persons.

In order to organize and perform the transportation of the mentioned Japanese families to the Southern part of Sakhalin Island, a Soviet ship will be sent to Japan, in the near future, carrying representatives of the fisherman of the Southern part of Sakhalin Island. The ship will enter the ports of: Niigata, Aomori, Hakodate and Vakanai to pick up and load the Japanese families. Two or three men of my staff, will be sent to the above mentioned ports.

The American High Command will be advised in the near future of the date of arrival of the ship.

With Sincere respect

U.S.S.R. Member of the Allied Council for Japan

Lt. Gen /s/ K. Derevyanko

(16)

COPY 20

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS*File  
Russia*

15 March 1946

## MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CHAMBERLIN:

1. Herewith a memorandum setting forth background for attached WASHINGTON radio WX 80449 submitted in compliance with oral direction of 15 March 1946.

2. a. Letter from XI Corps Arty dated 14 December 1945, subject: "Repatriation of Koreans" indorsed to SCAP by Eighth Army states 17 families of Korean miners were left in Sakhalin when Japs moved miners back to Japan prior to the Russian declaration of war. Miners have not heard from their families since August 1945. Miners do not desire to be repatriated from Japan to Korea until their families rejoin them in Japan. Miners are now located at the Yamaichi Coal Mine in Honshu. See Tab A.

b. Our 4th Indorsement to above letter requested names and Sakhalin addresses of families.

c. Basic letter reindorsed to us with list of 18 names attached.  
See Tab A.

d. Ourad CAX 58062 (201041 2 Feb) to WARCOS sets forth situation described reference 2a above and states names and addresses being forwarded air mail. Requests diplomatic action.

e. Our letter AG 370.05 (20 Feb 46)GC, subject: "Repatriation of Koreans from Sakhalin" refers ourad CAX 58062 and forwards the list of names and addresses. List attached as inclosure.

3. Do not believe reference to Imperial Japanese Government will elicit any additional information on this matter.

W. A. D.

*open* *Russia*

15 March 1946

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Action paper is WX 80449 (132204 Z Mar) from WASHINGTON info US MIL MISSION MOSCOW.
2. C/S desire's background this matter be furnished his office as action will be taken there.
3. Recommend dispatch of attached memo to C/S. This memo is to be attached to Staff Study on the Sakhalin Island fisheries and repatriation question forwarded to Gen Chamberlin on 12 March 1946.
4. No concurrence necessary.
5. This problem has been considered in its relation to Korea.
6. This completes action on this subject.

Strauss.



COPY

4 March 1946

## MEMORANDUM:

FOR : Lieutenant General Derevyanko  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Member of Allied Council for Japan

Reference your letter of February 28, 1946, relating to repatriation of Japanese subjects in Northern Korea, addressed to General MacArthur, handed to me in conference and discussed with you on February 28, 1946.

Your letter presents a request for the return of Japanese subjects by water from certain North Korean ports but does not touch upon related subjects, namely, the return of Koreans in Japan to Northern Korea, and utilization of Japanese ships seized by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the termination of hostilities, both of which must be considered together in the solution of our common problem. It is my understanding, that you are not authorized to confer on these related subjects. It is considered necessary that all must be included in our discussion, since available resources of Japanese shipping even under the most favorable circumstances will permit only a small allocation to the evacuation from Northern Korea in view of our obligations in other areas and will unduly extend this evacuation period. Moreover, if available shipping returning to North Korea did not return Koreans, uneconomical procedures would result.

This movement may be expedited should the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics make available suitable Japanese shipping which they seized at the termination of hostilities. Inquiry has been made on three different occasions through American agencies in Moscow to the Soviet Navy concerning the amount and condition of merchant shipping, recovered by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the control of the Japanese, which is suitable for repatriation. No reply has been received to date.

It is suggested that you query your government to obtain a reply concerning the number and condition of ships recovered from the Japanese which may be suitable to assist in this repatriation, and that you obtain authority to deal on matters connected with the repatriation of North Koreans in Japan. The Supreme Commander is eager to commence repatriation of Japanese and North Koreans. I will be pleased to discuss all of the above phases of the problem and agree on plans whenever you are prepared to discuss all of the matters indicated.

S. J. CHAMBERLIN  
Major General, G.S.C.  
Acting Chief of Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES - PACIFIC  
 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
 RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

*Koren*

# INCOMING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL  
 ROUTINE

14 March 1946

FROM : WASHINGTON  
 TO : CINCPAC  
 INFO : US MIL MISSION MOSCOW  
 NR : WX 80449

Reference CAX 58062 after studying reference and your letter dated 20 Feb, subject repatriation of Koreans from Sakhalin, State Department recommends that in absence of reasons to contrary you first take up matter of repatriation of Korean families from Sakhalin with Soviet Liaison Mission in Tokyo. Should this approach produce no results request you inform War Department in order that action may be initiated via diplomatic channels.

R-E-V-I-S-E-D

WARCOS

ACTION: CHIEF OF STAFF

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, G-1, G-3, G-4, AG  
 POLITICAL ADVISOR

TAB  
 A

Handling and transmission of the literal plain text of this message as correspondence of the same classification has been authorized by the War Department in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 44g and 53a (3)(Changes No. 3) of AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

76330

ROUTINE  
 CONFIDENTIAL



TOO: 132204Z  
 MCN: SC 50/14

5

COPY NO

163

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

*Russia File*  
*BMS*

*F-2*

**S E C R E T**  
**ROUTINE**

MARCH 1946

FROM : COMGENCHINA ✓  
TO : SCAP AND CG USAFIK  
NR : CFBX 24710

Reference radio TFGCT 2090 be released with instructions that no further repatriation of Koreans be made until negotiations can be made between Chinese and Russian Governments to effect repatriation from Manchuria. Further suggest no promise be made as to any repatriation of Korean from Manchuria."

Chinese Government being queried as to knowledge of cited incident suggest motorship P-113 YOSVUN.

NO SIG

ACTION: G-3 *[Signature]*

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-2, G-4, AG

69408

ROUTINE  
**S E C R E T**

TOO: 040922 Z  
MCN: ZE 78/4



(12)

COPY NO *5*  
*76*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
 RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~  
 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

5 March 1946

FROM : CG XXIV CORPS  
 TO : SCAP  
 NR : TFGCT 2097

Ref telephone conversation of Gen Arnold and Col Britton 4 Mar 46. This Command does not propose at this time to open discussions with Soviets in regard to the repatriation of Japanese from North Korea through South Korea to Fusan. This method of evacuation will be of no concrete benefits to this Command and will add to transportation and control problems on Southern Korea.

I contemplate holding this proposal for bartering purposes at joint Commission meeting.

NO SIG

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1  
 G-3, G-4, AG, C GOVT SECT

70073

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY  
 SECRET

T00 : 051430 I  
 MCN : TJC 49/05

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19

*File  
Russia*

(14)

18

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

*File  
Russia*

*F-10*

IN THE CLEAR  
ROUTINE

3 March 1946

FROM : WASHINGTON  
TO : AFPAC  
NR : WCL 21227

Reference is made to SCAP letter 20 Feb 1946 to Chief of Staff US Army subject repatriation of Koreans from Sakhalin. Radio referred to in that letter number CAX 58062 of 20 Feb is not on file in War Department Records. Request this radio be retransmitted in order that expeditious action may be taken on SCAP request.

NO SIG

ACTION: G-3


INFORMATION: G-1, G-4

NOTE: CAX 58062 has been retransmitted to WARCOS this date.

68369

ROUTINE  
IN THE CLEAR

TOO: 010743 Z  
MCN: USF D 88



COPY NO

*14*

*10*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
 RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

*3-a*

# INCOMING MESSAGE

*File Russia*

SECRET  
 OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

3 March 1946

FROM : CG 24 CORPS  
 TO : SCAP, CG CHINA  
 INFO : COMDR 7TH FLT, COMDR 5 FLT, CG ASCOM 24, CG 6 DIV,  
 CG USAMGIK  
 NR : TFGCT 2090

Subject is shipmt of Korean Repatriates from Dairen, Manchuria to Inchon, Korea.

1. On 27 Feb 46, the Motorship P-113 Yoshun, arrived at Inchon from Dairen, Manchuria, with 311 Korean Repatriates.

2. The ship was formerly owned by Japanese ship repair Company and taken over by Russians at the time of the surrender and placed under control of Dairen Transportation Co. The Yoshun was commanded by a Japanese, Hyodo Mitsuma, but to insure return of ship a Korean and a Chinese Cod Fish Capt were appointed; the crew is mixed Japanese, Chinese and Koreans. The ship flew a Chinese Flag. Voyage was initiated by Koreans through the Dairen transportation Union, authorized by the Russians and approved by the Dairen Marine Police Dept. This Hq had no knowledge of subject shipment.

3. Koreans reported processing at Dairen consisted only of a cursory search by the Russians. This Hq unloaded, processed and sent the Koreans to their homes. The ship is being held at Inchon until concurrence for its release is recd from CG China. The ship Capt has been informed that future shipmts of Koreans Repatriates will not be permitted to land in Korea South of 38 degrees parallel without approval of this Hq.

4. A letter from this Hq was dispatched this date to CG 25 Soviet Army stating that future shipmt of Korean Repatriates from Manchuria could not be accepted in Southern Korea until an agreement has been reached between the Soviet and USAFIK Hqs

68360

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY  
 SECRET  
 -1-



COPY NO

8

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
 ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
 RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

## INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: CG 24TH CORPS, RADIO NR TFGCT 2090, 3 MARCH 1946, CON'T.

and that this Hq has prepared to discuss with the Soviet authorities plans and schedules for future movements of Koreans from Manchuria; until such plans are completed, all future ships would be returned to the POE without unloading. A copy of ltr to CG 25 Soviet Army is being forwarded to SCAP.

NO SIG

ACTION: G-3

INFORMATION: COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-2, G-4

AG

Handling and transmission of the literal plain text of this message as correspondence of the same classification has been authorized by the War Department in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 44g and 53a (3) (Changes No. 3) of AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

68360

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECRET

-2-

TOO : 021154 I

MCN : TJC 80



COPY NO.

15

1 March 1946

## MEMORANDUM FOR GEN CHAMBERLIN:

1. a. Letter from the Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan to Gen MacArthur dated 28 February 1946, subject: "Repatriation of the Japanese subjects from North Korea," states that the Soviet Military Command is ready to begin repatriation of Japanese from North Korea on 1 March 1946. Repatriation to be through the ports of Kanko, Genzan and Chinnampo. Soviets to transport, feed and provide medical care until embarked in ships for Japan.

b. Radio WX 64268 (141854 Z Sept) WASH (JCS), see Tab A, sets forth the policy on the use of merchant shipping recovered from the Japanese. States representations should be made to Soviet Command, among others, for the employment of shipping recovered in their territory in accordance with this policy.

c. Ourad CAX 51996 (160839 Z Sept), see Tab B, to Wedemeyer (for China) and Deane (for Russia) cites WX 64268 and asks for info re amount and condition recovered Jap shipping in their areas.

d. MOSCOW (Maples) MX 25713 (060940 Z Oct), see Tab C, states 3 requests for info desired in ourad CAX 52377 (tracer on CAX 51996) have brought no reply.

e. CG USAFIK radio TFGCT 2003 (31 Jan 46), see Tab D, states Soviets request assistance in evacuation 232000 Japanese from N. Korea starting 15 February from ports of Wonsan and Chinnampo.

f. Ourad CA 57440 (011003 Z Feb), see Tab E, states allocation requested TFGCT 2003 cannot be made due overall commitments. Allocation of 8500 spaces resulting in daily lift of 700 from east coast N. Korea ports can be made. 4000 additional can be lifted daily from Pusan in short range shipping already allocated. Suggest Soviets augment North Korea lift with Japanese shipping recovered by them.

g. CG USAFIK radio TFGCT 2006 (1 Feb 46), see Tab F, further details Soviet plan proposed in TFGCT 2003.

h. Ourad ZA 14907 (020605 Z Feb), see Tab G, states we desire conduct repatriation from N. Korea in same general manner as repatriation from China. Points of difference outlined.

i. Repatriation plan prepared by Maj Gen Spaulding

and Lt Col Enders and attached to Col Howell's report of 22 Feb 46. See Tab H.

2. In spite of all the representations made to the Soviet Govt no evidence of any willingness to help in the matter of repatriation shipping has ever been shown. We have never had a reply to any of our inquiries on Japanese shipping recovered in Russian territory.

3. The objections raised in ourads CA 57440 and ZA 14907 to the original Soviet plan for repatriation from N. Korea apply also to the latest proposal (ref 1a above). Moreover necessary details of coordination could not be arranged in time to make plan operative by 1 March as proposed. It is felt that the plan proposed by Gen Spaulding and Col Enders is a fair and workable plan which can be integrated into our present program without disrupting it.

Strauss.

COPY

File  
RUSSIA

Actg C/S

G-3

1 March 46

G-4

1. General Hodge called yesterday and informed me that a Russian ship with 300 repatriated Koreans had arrived without warning at Inchon. He had authorized the Koreans to disembark but was on the point of advising the Russian commander in North Korea that further ships would not be received until cleared. It is expected that he will solicit our help to handle the higher level correspondence.

2. He called back later in the day and indicated that this was a Japanese ship apparently under Russian control.

3. Further information undoubtedly will be received.

---

S.J.C.

COPY

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COPY

Soviet Section  
Of the Allied Council  
for Japan.

February 28, 1946,  
Tokyo.

No ...<sup>14</sup>...

TO: Army General Douglas MacArthur,  
Supreme Commander of the Allied  
Powers and Chairman of the Allied  
Council for Japan.

SUBJECT: Repatriation of the Japanese subjects  
from North Korea.

Taking into consideration repeated requests to the Soviet Command from the Command of the United States Army in South Korea as well as your inquiry concerning the repatriation of Japanese subjects from the territory occupied by the Soviet troops and paying attention to the fact that this question was not solved at the meeting of the Soviet and American Commands in Seoul, the Soviet Military Command has authorized me to report to you that it is ready to begin the repatriation of Japanese subjects from the territory of North Korea commencing on March 1, 1946.

The Soviet Military Command is planning to carry out the shipment of the Japanese subjects to be repatriated from North Korea through the ports of Kanko, Genzan and Chinnampo.

The Soviet Command will take upon itself the transportation of the repatriates as well as providing them with food and medical care up to the moment of their embarkation to the ships in the above-mentioned ports.

The further shipment of the repatriates, providing them with food and other facilities from the ports of North Korea to the ports of Japan is incumbent on the Japanese Government which should provide

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 775009

By KJ NARA Date 11/05/08

COPY

all the necessary means, including transportation facilities.

Sincerely yours,

---

K. Derevyanko,  
Lt-Gen., USSR Member of  
The Allied Council for  
Japan.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
RADIO AND CABLE CENTER

*File  
Russia*

# INCOMING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL  
ROUTINE

4 January 1946

TO : CINCAPPAC ADV INFO: CINCAFMAC  
FROM : WASHINGTON (CAD)  
NR : WX 91218

Reurad WCL 30057 further reurad WCL 30057 concerning repatriation Japanese fishermen Ambassador Harriman has requested that you be informed that he made representations on 24 Dec in ltr to Vyshinsky.

WARCCS

TOO: 032122Z

MCN: SC 10


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O - 3

G - 4

ECONOMIC & SCIENTIFIC SECT



Handling and transmission of the literal plain text of this message as correspondence of the same classification has been authorized by the War Department in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 44g and 53a (3) (Changes No. 3) of AR 380-5, 15 March 1944.

36355

ROUTINE  
CONFIDENTIAL

8

8

11

POTSDAM DECLARATION

PROCLAMATION BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS.

UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND CHINA.

1. WE -- the President of the United States, the President of the Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, \* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

\* \* \* \* \*

TAB  
A

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSOPNL PRIORITY

SIGNALCORPS MESSAGE

31 DECEMBER 1945

FROM: SCAP

GC-0

CBH/dg

TO : WARCOS

THE FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF CHARLIE GEORGE TWO FOUR CCRPS TARE  
FOX GEORGE CHARLIE GEORGE TWO NAUGHT THREE PASSED FOR INFORMATION  
CLN FROM NORTHERN KOREA SOVIETS SHIPPED THE FOLLOWING IN TWO FIVE  
CARS CLN ALUMINUM SULPHATE TWO FIVE METRIC TONS SEMICLN CALCIUM  
HYPOCHLORIDE NINE METRIC TONS PD ( ) THESE  
CHEMICALS ARRIVED IN SEOUL TWO FOUR DECEMBER PD THEY INDICATED THAT  
IN JANUARY MORE CHEMICALS WOULD ARRIVE PD THAT SOVIETS ARE ENCOUR-  
AGING JAPANESE CMA IF NOT COMPELLING THEM CMA TO CROSS THE THREE  
EIGHT DEGREE BOUNDARY INTO SOUTHERN KOREA FROM THE NORTH IS CON-  
FIRMED BY REPORTS FROM SEVERAL SOURCES PD ITEM CONTEMPLATE THEREFORE  
CMA SUBMITTING TO SOVIET AUTHORITIES AFTER THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE IS  
ENDED AND SUBJECT TO AGREEMENTS OF THIS CONFERENCE CMA ABLE PLAN  
TO MOVE DISPLACED PERSONS FROM AND TO NORTHERN KOREA AS OUTLINED  
BELOW CLN PARA RAILROAD TRAINS FROM SOVIET STOCKS AND SCHEDULES WILL  
BE MADE UP BY SOVIETS PD THEY WILL MOVE INTO SOUTHERN KOREA FROM THE  
NORTH CARRYING NOT MORE THAN TWO FOUR NAUGHT NAUGHT PERSONS PER DAY  
PD UNDER OUR CONTROL TRAINS WILL MOVE TO FUSAN WHERE JAPANESE WILL  
BE MOVED TO JAPAN BY SHIPS PD ON RETURN TRIP TO SOVIET ZONE TRAINS

- 1 -

SECRET

10

## SECRET

WILL CARRY KOREANS TO THEIR HOMES THEREIN PD SOVIETS WILL BE ASKED TO SUPPLY TRAINS WITH ENOUGH COAL FOR ROUND TRIP BECAUSE OF COAL SHORTAGE IN SOUTHERN KOREA PD TO SUPPORT THIS PLAN REPATRIATION SHIPPING TO EVACUATE AT LEAST THREE NAUGHT NAUGHT NAUGHT JAPANESE PER DAY TO JAPAN WILL BE REQUIRED PD REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE IN THIS PLAN AND CAN REQUIRED SHIPPING BE MADE AVAILABLE

OFFICIAL:

B. M. FITCH.  
Brigadier General, US Army.  
Adjutant General.

APPROVED:

C. A. RUSSELL.  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

Copies to:

G-3 (2 return)

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSOPNL PRIORITY:

SIGNAL CORPS MESSAGE

30 DECEMBER 1945

FROM: SCAP

GC-0 CBH/jh/dr

TO : CG XXIV CORPS

INFO: WARCOS

020531

CONCUR IN YOUR PROPOSED PLAN FOR MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS FROM OR DESTINED FOR NORTHERN KOREA AS OUTLINED IN YOUR TARE FOX GEORGE CHARLIE GEORGE TWO NAUGHT THREE AND CAN PROVIDE SHIPPING NECESSARY TO SUPPORT YOUR PLAN. PD (CA565) 75

SOVIETS MAY IN ADDITION FUNNEL GREAT MASS OF JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA OVER PRESENTLY CONGESTED RAILROADS IN SOUTHERN KOREA UNDER YOUR PLAN PD REQUEST OBTAIN REACTION OF SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO A PROPOSAL FOR OPENING NEGOTIATIONS FOR MOVEMENT DISPLACED PERSONS BY SEA FROM AND TO NORTHERN KOREA PORTS

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

B. M. FITCH,  
Brigadier General, US Army,  
Adjutant General.

C. A. RUSSELL.  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

COPIES TO:

G in C  
C/S  
G-1 (3)  
G-2 (2)  
G-3 (2 Return)  
G-4 (3)  
G Govt Sec  
SCAJAP  
Public Health & Welfare

SECRET

⑦

corrected copy. 9

30 December 1945

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. In TFGCG 203 CG XXIV Corps requests our concurrence in a proposed plan for movement of displaced persons from or destined for Northern Korea with comment on continued availabilities of shipping to support the plan. He plans to submit to Soviets the plan which calls for transport by rail from Northern Korea to Fusan port 2,400 Japs daily - Soviets to provide rail stock and coal for round trip. He plans to return Koreans on return rail trip. The plan is based on assumption that repatriation shipping can be provided from Fusan to Japan for 3,000 daily.
2. SCAJAP (Comdr Duane) concurs insofar as shipping requirements are concerned.
3. Govt Section (Comdr Stevens) concurs in policy.
4. Pub Health & Wel Section (Maj Wyman) concurs.
5. G-1 (Lt Col Cullen) concurs.
6. It is recommended that this headquarters concur in proposed plan but that in view of possibility that Soviets may in addition funnel great mass of Japs in Manchuria over presently congested railroads in Southern Korea under this plan, it is also recommended that CG XXIV Corps obtain Soviet reaction to proposal for opening negotiations whereby Japs in Northern Korea can be repatriated by shipping direct to Japan from ports in Northern Korea.
7. Because of nature and importance of this subject it is recommended that WARGOS be info on attached message and that CG XXIV Corps radio ~~also~~ be passed to WARGOS.
8. This completes <sup>as paraphrased</sup> action on this subject.
9. Recommend dispatch of attached message.
10. The list of agencies which might desire copies of G-3 correspondence has been checked prior to submitting this action for approval.
11. G-4 (Col Humphries) concurs.

Hammerle.

Convention of July 27, 1929 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

\* \* \* ; The President of the United States of America; \* \* \*

Title I. General Provisions

\* \* \* \* \*

Chapter 5. Wages.

Article 34.

\* \* \* \* \*

The pay remaining to the credit of the prisoner shall be delivered to him at the end of his captivity. In case of death, it shall be forwarded through the diplomatic channel to the heirs of the deceased.

\* \* \* \* \*

Title IV. Termination of Captivity.

\* \* \* \* \*

Section II Release and Repatriation Upon Cessation of Hostilities

Article 75

When belligerents conclude a convention of armistice, they must, in principle, have appear therein stipulations regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war. If it has not been possible to insert stipulations in this regard in such a convention, belligerents shall nevertheless come to an agreement in this regard as soon as possible. In any case, repatriation of prisoners shall be effected with the least possible delay after the conclusion of peace.

\* \* \* \* \*

Done at Geneva, the twenty-seventh of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \*

For the United States of America  
Eliot Wadsworth  
Hugh R. Wilson

\* \* \* \* \*

(Russia not a signatory)

TAB  
B

(2)

9

IV

CONVENTION

Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land

\* \* \* \* \*

The President of the United States of America;

\* \* \* \* \*

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

\* \* \* \* \*

Chapter II - Prisoners of War

\* \* \* \* \*

Article 6

\* \* \* \* \*

The wages of the prisoners shall go towards improving their position, and the balance shall be paid them on their release, after deducting the cost of their maintenance.

\* \* \* \* \*

Article 20

After the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of prisoners of war shall be carried out as quickly as possible.

\* \* \* \* \*

Signed at The Hague October 18, 1907.

TAB C

(1)

g

COPY

SECRET  
PRIORITY

15 September 1945 45

TO : ACTION SCAP; INFORMATION REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF NIMITZ, WEDEMEYER, FOR CHINESE HIGH COMMAND, AND DEANE, (FOR SOVIET HIGH COMMAND)

FROM: WASHINGTON (JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

NR : WX 64268

Employment of merchant shipping recovered from the control of the Japanese is subject.

The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that maximum utilization of all merchant shipping recovered from control of the Japanese must be made for the repatriation of Japanese Nationals and for the maintenance of a minimum Japanese economy to the end that there will be a minimum diversion of Allied resources, especially troop shipping.

All merchant shipping recovered from the control of the Japanese should be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for use as indicated above or for other purposes as designated by him. The supervision and control of the allocation and operation of such merchant shipping is the responsibility of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The Japanese Government should, at its expense and as far as may be required, man, victual, operate and maintain the vessels in all respects.

Merchant ships recovered from control of the Japanese and authorized to operate with Japanese crews under control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should at all times fly the International Code Flag "E" with triangle cut from the end.

All arrangements for the employment of merchant shipping recovered from the control of the Japanese should be without prejudice to agreements ultimately to be made among the Allied Governments concerned as to the disposition of title to such vessels and without prejudice to prize proceedings.

Appropriate representations should be made to the British, Soviet, and Chinese Commands involved with regard to the employment for the purposes set forth in this dispatch of Japanese Merchant Shipping in their respective possessions.

2214  
ACTION COPY TO: G-4

PRIORITY  
SECRET

TOO: 141854 Z  
MGN: Y-239/14

NO SIG

INFORMATION COPIES TO:

COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, OFFICE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, FLT LO SCAP

(4)

COPY 9

TAB  
E

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500

AG 370.05  
(SCAPIN-

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North  
Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles.

1. Reference is made to C.L.O. No. 2814 (RJ), dated 11 June 1946, subject as above.

2. The matter of repatriation of Japanese nationals from Soviet occupied areas is under consideration. Specific answers to requests contained in reference 1 above cannot be furnished at this time.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:

SCAPIN-A plus:

C/S

G-2 (3)

G-3 (3 return)

G-4 (3)

Dip Sec

**INCOMING MESSAGE**PRIORITY  
SECRET

7 OCTOBER 1945

TO : ACTION TOKYO FORSCAP, INFO: CINCPAC POA  
 FROM : MOSCOW  
 NR : MX 25713

3 requests the last one on 6 October to Red Navy for information desired your CAX 52377 have brought no replies. Will continue to press for answer and any information received will be transmitted at once.

MAPLES

TOO: 060940 Z

MCN: USF B 27

DISTRIBUTION:

INFORMATION COPIES TO:COMMANDER-in-CHIEF

CHIEF OF STAFF

G-3

G-4

FLT LO SCAP

NOTE: Ref. CAX 52377 reads as follows:  
 "Reference our radio CAX 51996 dated  
 16 September subject Merchant Shipping  
 recovered from control of the Jap-  
 anese, when may a reply be expected?"



6715

PRIORITY  
SECRET

(6)

COPY NO. 8

138

PRIORITY XX

**SECRET**  
PRIORITY

SECRET

GD TT EJM/inh

16 SEPTEMBER 1945

160839Z

Signal Corps No.

FROM: SCAP

TO : WEDEMEYER (FOR CHINESE HIGH COMMAND)  
DEANE (FOR SOVIET HIGH COMMAND)

INFO: CINC PAC ADV

SUBJECT IS EMPLOYMENT OF MERCHANT SHIPPING RECOVERED FROM THE CONTROL OF THE JAPANESE REFERENCE RADIO WILLIAM XRAY SIX FOUR TWO SIX EIGHT WASHINGTON PAREN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PAREN DATED ONE FIVE SEPTEMBER PD PAREN CAX 51996 PAREN PARA REQUEST YOU SECURE FROM THE SOVIET AND CHINESE HIGH COMMANDS AND FORWARD TO THIS HEADQUARTERS THE AMOUNT AND CONDITION OF MERCHANT SHIPPING RECOVERED FROM THE CONTROL OF THE JAPANESE IN ORDER THAT THIS HEADQUARTERS MAY PLAN FOR ITS EMPLOYMENT FOR THE PURPOSES INDICATED IN THE ABOVE REFERRED TO RADIO

OFFICIAL:

HAROLD FAIR,  
Lt. Col., A.G.D.  
Ass't Adjutant General.

Approved by:

H.E. EASTWOOD  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.  
Deputy Ass't C/S, G-4

Copies to:

- G-3
- Flt LO SCAP
- C/S
- ✓ off of D C/S

*Chama*

**SECRET**

G-3

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden  
Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be  
made and marked consistent with its classification

INFORMATION COPY

(5)

7

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 775009

By KJ NARA Date 11/05/08

Russian Conference #1, From: Sep 45 to 31 Jun 46

SECRET