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By ~~LC~~ NARA Date 11-3-08

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RUSSIAN CONFERENCE FILE

BOOK NO. 1

From: 1 September 1945

To: 30 June 1946

RUSSIAN CONFERENCE FILE

G-3 REPATRIATION

SECRET

# LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. Russ Conf #1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
51	DS	28 Jun 46	Sov	Ltr. fwding copy of stenographic rpt of conf of 19 Jun 46.
52	State Dept	30 Jun 46	SCAP	Rad WAR SVC 7907. relaying translating of ltr fr Lozovski re repat of Japs fr Dairen.

# LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. Russ Conf#1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
41	G-3	18 Jun 46	DS	C/N. "Repat." informing status of repat figures.
42	G-3	19 Jun 46	DS	C/N. "R <sup>u</sup> pat of Jap nats fr N. Ma N. K, Sak & kur," fwding CLOs 2814, 2842.
43	<del>SEARX</del> (DS)	19 Jun 46	Sov	Ltr. Re Sov ltr 40194 outlining repat progress & rqtstg repat of Japs fr Sov areas.
44	SCAP	19 Jun 46	WARCOS	Rad C 62233. fwding info on <u>Line 43</u> .
45				Draft agreements reached at conf concerning repat of Jap civilian fr Kor North of 38° N. Lat to Jap, & Kor nats fr Jap to K, n of 38° n. lat.
46		19 Jun 46		Rpt. "Agenda SCAP-Soviet conf on mutual repat bet Jap & N. K."
47	G-3 Repat	21 Jun 46	Gen Russell	Memo. "Repat N Kor - Jap," outlining conf of 19 Jun rpt.
48		19 Jun 46		Rpt "stenographic rpt on conf bet SCAP representatives & Sov representatives concerning mutual repat bet Jap & N. K. "
49				Rpt. "Summary of conf bet representatives of SCAP & Sov re mutual repat bet N. K & Jap held 19 Jun in Tokyo w/3rd draft agreements."
50		29 Jun 46	C/S	Memo "Mutual repat bet N. K. & Jap," rpt of conf of 19 Jun 46.
50A	G-3	25 Jun 46	DS	C/N. "Mutual repat bet Jap & N. K," fwding rpts of conf of 19 Jun for info.

# LIST OF PAPERS

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SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
29	SCAP	16 May 46	C/S Wash	Ltr. "transfer to Sov Union of Jap destroyers & surface combat ant vessels of lesser tonnage."
30	SCAP	22 May 46	Sov	Ltr fwding petition CLO #2344 re repat of North Seas Seasonal Fishermen.
31	Sov	22 May 46	SCAP	Ltr 40169 fwding changes & additions to agreement.
32	SCAP	25 May 46	USAFIK	"ad CX 61404. Negot w/Sov based on SCAP proposed agreements for dir repat of Jap nats fr N. K. expected to begin shortly,
33	G-3	27 May 46	All SCAP agencies	C/N. "Mutual repat bet N. K. & Japan," rqsting comments on draft agreements incorporated w/Sov changes.
34				Rpt. "Comments by Staff sections re draft agreements.
35		1 Jun 46	C/S	Memo. "Conf on repat bet N. K. & Japan,"
36	Wash	8 Jun 46	SCAP	Rad WAR SVC 7414. Sov reply on disposition of Jap naval & merchant fleets.
37	SCAP	11 Jun 46		Rpt "Agenda for staff conf on N. Kor repat."
38		12 Jun 46	C/S	Memo. "Mutual repat bet Jap & N. Kor," conf rpt of 11 Jun 46 w/revised draft of agreements.
39	SCAP	13 Jun 46	Sov	Ltr notifying conf for 19 Jun 46
40	G-3 SCAP SCAP G-3 SCAP	15 Jun 46 Jun 46 Jun 46 15 Jun 46 15 Jun 46	AG JG Soviets DS C/S, Wash	Action re "repat of Jap nats fr N. Man, N. K. Sak & Kuriles," re info of CLO #2814/

# LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. Russ Conf #1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
18	24 Corps	5 Mar 46	SCAP	Rad TFGCT 2097. Can't recom repat of Jap fr N. K. thru S. K. to Pusan.
19		15 Mar 46		M/R on Wash rad WX 80449, re State Dept recom take up mat of repat of Kor families fr Sak w/Sov mission in Tokyo.
20	Soviets	12 Mar 46	SCAP	Ltr #43 Sov Gov auth entry fr Jap to southern part of Sak Is to 2300 families, Sov ship will be sent to Jap.
21	SCAP	20 Mar 46	Soviets	Ltr "Ret fr Jap for the Families of Residents of S. Sakh," inform Sov of movmt voluntary & supervised by Occupation forces. List of individuals & addresses be furnished SCAP.
22	SCAP	23 Mar 46	Soviets	Ltr "Repat of Kors fr Sak",
23	Sov	12 Apr 46	SCAP	Ltr. 4076. Rep to SCAP ltr 4 Mar 46 no objection to repat of Japs fr N.K. No of ships captured fr Jap but cannot assigned ships for purpose of repat.
24	SCAP	20 Apr 46	Sovi	Ltr. "Ret fr Jap of families of residents of S. Sak," outlining decision re movt of Jap in Jap will be controlled by SCAP.
25	SCAP	23 Apr 46	Sov	Ltr. "Mutual repat bet N. K. & Jap," fwding draft agreements for conf 26 Apr 46.
26	G-3 Repat	2 May 46	Col Howello	Memo "Repat fr Manchuria" status
27	Sov	3 May 46	SCAP	Ltr N 40126. re destruction of former Jap naval vessels.
28	SCAP	5 May 46	Sov	Ltr. re rep to Sov ltr 40126 re destruction of former Jap naval vessels.

# LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. Russian Corf #1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
7	SCAP	16 Sep 45	WEDEMEYER(Chin) DEANE (Soviets)	Rad CAX 51996Rqst info fr Chin & Sov re amount & condition of merchant shipping recovered fr control of Jap.
8	Moscow	7 Oct 45	SCAP	Rad WX 25713. No rep fr Sov re SCAP rad CAX 52377.
9	SCAP	30 Dec 45	24 Corps	Rad CA 565175. Concurs in proposed plan but recom negot to ship repats direct to Jap fr ports in N. K.
10	SCAP	31 Dec 45	WARCOS	Rad info passing/24 Corps proposed plan re repat of Japs.
11	WASH (CAD)	4 Jan 46	CINCPAC ADV	Rad WX 91218. Amb Harriman made representation on 24 Dec in ltr to Vyshinsky re Jap repat.
12	SOViets	23 Feb 46	SCAP	Ltr#14. Repat of Jap fr N. K. to commence 1 Mar 46 thru ports of Kanko, Genzan and Chinampo.
13	Act C/S	1 Mar 46	G-3	C/N. Gen Hodged informed Russ ship w/300 repatd Kors arvdw/o warning at Inchon.
13A	G-3	1 Mar 46	Gen Chamberlin	Memo. Outlinging status of repat of Japs fr N. Kor.
14	Wash	3 Mar 46	AFPAC	Rad WCL 21227. Ref SCAP ltr 20 Feb 46 re repat of Kors fr Sak not in file. <i>See Kor for Sak file re 2 for rep ltr.</i>
15	24 Corps	3 Mar 46	SCAP	Rad TFGCT 2090. Shipmt of Kor repats fr Dairen to Inchon.
16	COMGENCHINA	Mar 46	SCAP & USAFIK	Rad CFBX 24710. No fur repat of Kors be made til negot be made bet Chin & Russ Govts.
17	Gen Chamberlin	4 Mar 46	Soviets	Memo. Re Sov ltr 28 Feb 46. Rqst No. & condition of ships recov fr Jap to assist in repat progra

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30 June 1946

FROM : STATE DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON  
 TO : SCAP (POLITICAL ADVISER)  
 INFO : WAR DEPARTMENT (CHIEF OF STAFF)  
 NR : WAR SVC 7907 (291506 Z)

SVC 756 relays message 2044, June 29, 10 AM from Moscow:  
 "Following is translation of letter from Lozovski, dated June 27:  
 "Soviet military authorities propose that repatriation of Japs located in port of Dalny and in Caval Base Area be carried out through port of Dalny in manner similar to that which was proposed by Soviet representatives in Tokyo for repatriation of Japs from northern Korea. In event of acceptance of such procedure, Soviet military authorities of Naval Base at Port Arthur will be responsible for delivery to port of Dalny of those being repatriated, their sanitary processing and embarkation on vessels, while staff of General MacArthur will be responsible for delivery of those being inoriated on ships at its disposal from port of Dalny to Japan. Details of repatriation of Japs through port of Dalny could be agreed upon in Tokyo. As regards repatriation of Japs located beyond boundaries of Naval base area and Dalny, the Soviet military authorities consider it expedient to use for repatriation of these Japs other nearby Manchurian ports. The Soviet ambassador in China has been instructed to inform General Marshall of above proposal of Soviet military authorities." Department please repeat to Tokyo and Nanking for General Marshall. Smith."

ACHESON

ACTION: DIPLOMATIC SECT

INFORMATION: COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, G-3, G-4, AG,  
 C GOVT SECT, COMNAVJAP

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TOO: 300648 Z  
 MCN: SA 16/30

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*Return to A-3 Report 52*

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North Korea

## Diplomatic Section

The Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers presents its compliments to the Office of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the Allied Council for Japan and has the honor to forward a copy of a stenographic report of the conference between representatives of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Soviet representatives concerning mutual repatriation between Japan and Northern Korea.

## Enclosures

Stenographic report of conference  
on 19 June 1946.

Tokyo, June 28, 1946

## Distribution (without enclosure) to:

C/S  
G-1  
G-2  
G-3  
G-4  
SCAJAP  
PH&W  
C Sig O  
Govt Sec  
701 ESS  
MWBishop/blc

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*N. Korea conf.  
Own file  
copy*

6007

Mutual Repatriation Between Japan and N. Korea

G-3

Diplomatic Section

25 June 1946

G-3

1. Forwarded herewith are the following papers:

a. Memorandum to Chief of Staff with 4 inclosures and 4 tabs.

b. Two copies of Stenographic Report of the Conference held between representatives of SCAP and Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan on 19 June in Tokyo on the subject of Mutual Repatriation Between Japan and Northern Korea.

2. The action has been prepared with concurrence of Mr. Bishop and is forwarded for formal approval, and return to G-3

3. Request that one copy of the Stenographic report be retained by the Diplomatic Section and one copy forwarded to the Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan.

Incls: as listed in paragraph 1 above.

----- C. A. R. -----

*Return to G-3 Repatriation Sect*

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*Return to G-3 Repatriation*

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*Strauss*GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

29 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

SUBJECT: Mutual Repatriation between Northern Korea and Japan.

1. The following report of a conference held with a representative of the Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan on 19 June in Tokyo, Japan is submitted herewith.
2. The names of those present at the conference are listed in inclosure No. 1.
3. A summary of the conference is attached as Inclosure No 2.
4. The stenographic report of the conference appears in Inclosure No 3.
5. The tentative agreements reached so far are contained in Inclosure No 4.
6. The following additional comments are pertinent.
  - a. The basic principal underlying repatriation is contained in the Potsdam Declaration which states in part, "The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives".
  - b. Inasmuch as the Diplomatic Section has begun negotiations with the Soviets on the matter of repatriation from all Soviet controlled areas, see ourad C-62233 of 19 June, Tab A, the matter of returning the military will be taken up at that time. Hence, for this particular conference and at this particular time SCAP could accept the Soviet proposal to limit discussion to Japanese Nationals in Northern Korea.
  - c. There is shipping assigned to repatriation available for use in repatriation from North Korea. The total number, subject to repatriation in Soviet controlled areas, is estimated at 640,000.
  - d. Agreement exists within various SCAP staff sections that currency for repatriates to Northern Korea remain at 1000 yen.
  - e. The question of increased baggage allowance and handcraft tools and equipment, has been under consideration by the Government Section for sometime. Their tentative study recommends: (a) baggage allowance be increased to 500 lbs per repatriate; (b) that each repatriate be permitted to take out of Japan handcraft tools and equipment up to two tons; (c) that individual requests from repatriates for additional handcraft equipment in excess of 4000 pounds will be considered on the merits of each request; (d) that above provisions be retroactive to 2 September 1945. This action was undertaken to stimulate repatriation

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from Japan to Southern Korea and to increase the economic stability in Korea.

f. In the matter of supply of fuel from US sources, the US has taken the position, in the case of repatriation from SEA and AMP commands, that operating supplies for repatriation will be furnished from British sources. See CCS/3 of 17 April attached as Tab B.

g. Concerning the use of coal burning ships, SCAJAP has available 60,000 spaces in coalers. These ships have been used continuously in repatriation. Fuel has been from Japanese sources. SCAJAP (Captain Weiss) and G-4 (Commander Ryan) state fuel is available from Japanese sources.

7. Recommendations:

a. That SCAP stand firm with respect to the amount of currency repatriates to Northern Korea may take out of Japan.

b. That SCAP position with respect to the amount of personal baggage and handicraft tools and/or equipment repatriates may take out of Japan be based on the staff study now in preparation by the Government Section when approved by the Chief of Staff.

c. That any increase in amounts of property repatriates may take with them be applied to all repatriates prior to the conclusion of any agreement with the Soviets.

d. That the draft of the attached radio to WARCOS be approved for dispatch. (Tab C).

8. Concurrences: G-4 (Comdr Ryan)  
Govt Sect (Comdr Stevens)  
E & SS (Lt Beplat)  
SCAJAP (Capt Weiss)  
Dip Sect ( s/ G. A. )

s/ C. A. R.  
t/ C. A. R.

4 Inclosures:

- Incl 1 - Representatives at the Conference.
- Incl 2 - Summary of the Conference.
- Incl 3 - Stenographic Report of the Conference.
- Incl 4 - Tentative Agreements.

A TRUE COPY:

R. V. STRAUSS,  
Lt. Col., Inf.

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## Inclosure #1

to

Memo for Chief of Staff, subject: "Mutual Repatriation Between Northern Korea and Japan".

Representatives at the conference were:

## 1. SCAP

G-1 -	Lt Col Hudgins
G-2 -	Lt Col Blake
	Capt Page
G-3 -	Brig Gen Russell
	Col Howell
	Lt Col Strauss
G-4 -	Col Breden
SCAJAP	Capt Weiss
PH & W	Maj Bourland
C Sig O	Maj Couch
Govt Sec	Comdr Stevens
ESS	1st Lt Beplat
Dip Sec	Mr. Bishop

## 2. USSR

Representative of USSR member of Allied Council

Mr. Anurov

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

**SUBJECT:** Summary of Conference between Representatives of SCAP and the Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan, concerning Mutual Repatriation between Northern Korea and Japan, held 19 June 1946 in Tokyo, Japan.

1. The Soviet representative stated that he was authorized to discuss the repatriation of Japanese civilians from Northern Korea and the return of former residents of Northern Korea, now in Japan only. In order to proceed with the conference, the Soviet proposal to restrict discussion to these two categories was accepted. The numbers involved are 100,000 Japanese civilians in Northern Korea and 10,000 Koreans, desirous of repatriation, in Japan.
2. Concerning the amount of currency and baggage Japanese repatriates would be permitted to take with them from Northern Korea, there was complete agreement.
3. The amount of currency Northern Korean repatriates would be permitted to take out of Japan was not settled. The Soviet representative took the position that returning Koreans should be permitted to take from Japan, currency in the amount of ¥3,000 each. The reasons advanced were: (a) this amount would permit the Korean to better establish himself in the economic society of Northern Korea; (b) that Koreans, liberated people, should be permitted to take more currency in repatriation than the Japanese, a conquered people. Under present directives, each category is permitted to carry one thousand yen each. SCAP took the position that: (a) repatriates from Northern Korea should be permitted to take out of Japan one thousand yen, which is the same amount that has been allowed to each of 894,895 Koreans, 31,760 Formosans, and 31,188 Chinese, who have been previously repatriated to Southern Korea, Formosa and China respectively; (b) SCAP cannot justify, at this late date, giving discriminatory and preferential treatment to a small minority, 10,000 repatriates destined to Northern Korea.
4. With reference to the amount of property Korean repatriates could take with them from Japan, no agreement was reached. The Soviets held firm to their demand that the amount of personal effects permitted each repatriate, be increased from 250 to 500 pounds, and in addition, insisted that each repatriate for Northern Korea be permitted to withdraw from Japan handcraft tools and equipment in amounts not to exceed two tons. The argument advanced by the Soviets was that these increased amounts would assist the Korean to gain his livelihood subsequent to repatriation. SCAP position was to the effect that such treatment was discriminatory and preferential to a small minority, 10,000, in view of the fact that the amounts were in excess to those previously allowed to repatriates, especially to those destined for South Korea.
5. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers agrees to explore, in the near future, the feasibility of increasing the baggage allowance for all outgoing repatriates to 500 pounds of personal effects and 4,000 pounds of handcraft tools and equipment per individual.

*Return to Col Strauss file*

6. Agreement was reached on the language to be used in conducting repatriation operations. In general, English and Russian were to be used in dispatches transmitted from Japan and North Korea respectively, and Japanese was to be used in communicating from ship to shore, both in areas under the control of SCAP and the Soviets.

7. The question of availability of shipping for repatriation was touched upon. The Soviets were informed that shipping in excess of that required to lift 750 repatriates a day from Northern Korea could be supplied.

8. The Soviets desire to use the ports of Genzan and Kanko as repatriation ports, evacuating approximately 50,000 through each. They did not have available, information as to the capacity of ports to accommodate shipping, nor the number of repatriates that could be processed daily through each. The Soviet member indicated he would obtain this information and furnish it to SCAP.

9. No agreement was reached concerning the supply of fuel necessary to operate repatriation ships. The Soviets stated flatly, they had no fuel oil available, and that they did not know whether coal was available in Northern Korea. SCAP position was to the effect that under the existing directives, fuel could not be supplied to repatriation shipping servicing Soviet controlled areas. It was agreed (1) the negotiations for the furnishment of fuel be referred to higher authorities; (2) that the Soviet representative explore the possibility of furnishing coal from resources in Northern Korea; (3) that SCAP explore the possibility of furnishing coal for Japanese ships from Japanese sources.

10. The draft copy of the agreements was then revised to show the progress to date.

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*Tab 9.*

AGREEMENTS REACHED AT CONFERENCE CONCERNING REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE CIVILIANS FROM KOREA NORTH OF 38° NORTH LATITUDE TO JAPAN, AND KOREAN NATIONALS FROM JAPAN TO KOREA NORTH OF 38° NORTH LATITUDE.

All agreements contained herein have been concurred in by representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, whose signatures appear at the end of this document.

Section I - General

I. Responsibilities and General Agreements:

A. Japanese civilians now located in Korea north of 38° north latitude, estimated number for planning purposes being 100,000, will be accepted in Japan by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. Koreans who were formerly resident of Korea north of 38° north latitude, estimated number for planning purposes being 10,000, will be accepted in northern Korea by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

C. Shipping for repatriation of personnel specified in paragraphs IA and IB above will be furnished by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; Movement of individuals, as passengers, other than those in categories mentioned in paragraphs IA and IB is prohibited.

D. The responsibility of delivering repatriates to evacuation ports, processing them, and placing them aboard repatriation ships lies with the commander exercising control over the evacuation port. Each ship has a rated capacity. However, all details concerning selection of repatriates to be loaded on each ship, the loading plan, and the supervision of loading, including all matters related thereto, are the responsibility of the commander exercising control over the evacuation port.

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E. Responsible commanders will be charged with furnishing repatriates to evacuation ports in numbers agreed upon herein so that insofar as practicable, ships will be loaded to capacity and will not be unduly delayed in terminal ports in either northern Korea or Japan.

F. The operational control of repatriation shipping furnished from sources under SCAP control will be exercised by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers through the Administrator, Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (abbreviation: SCAJAP), a subordinate of Commander U.S. Naval Activities Japan. In northern Korean waters, repatriation ships will follow routes and procedures as prescribed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

G. On all matters other than routine sailing dispatches, representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will make the necessary arrangements with Headquarters of Soviet Troops in Phenyan (Heijo). Routine sailing dispatches will be handled as prescribed in Section IV.

H. Nominal lists of repatriates will be prepared by the commander exercising control over the evacuation port, and five (5) copies will be given to the captain of the repatriation ship. (See paragraph I A 6, Section II).

II. Priority of ports from which repatriates will be lifted, and the estimated number for planning purposes to be processed through each port.

<u>Port</u>	<u>Total Repatriates</u>
Genzan	50,000
Kanko	50,000
Maizuru	10,000

III. Ports, maximum daily capacity for repatriates, and port capacities (berthing for type and number of ships) follow:

A.

Maximum Daily Capacity

<u>Port</u>	<u>Incoming</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>	<u>Port Capacity</u>
Genzan			
Kanko			
Maizuru	2,500	2,500	

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B. Changes in repatriation ports to be used in northern Korea will be a subject for mutual arrangements between representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

C. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reserves the privilege of changing repatriation ports to be used in Japan at his discretion.

IV. Shipping to be utilized and shuttles to be established.

A. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers agrees to provide shipping initially to move repatriates from northern Korea to Japan at a minimum daily average rate of 750, provided ports on the east coast of northern Korea are used. If west coast ports of northern Korea are used this rate will be reduced proportionally to the increased time of turn around. Korean repatriates in Japan, destined for northern Korea, will be outloaded in Japan on this shipping.

B. At a subsequent date to be determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, additional repatriation shipping may be assigned to shuttles between Japan and northern Korea. Necessary coordination will be effected between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Headquarters of Soviet Troops in Phenyan (Heijo) prior to establishing new shuttles or increasing ships on shuttles agreed upon herein.

C. Within compass of this plan, no Japanese from northern Korea or Koreans destined for northern Korea will be repatriated through Korea south of 38° North Latitude.

D. Hospital ships, as available, will be used for movement of sick or injured repatriates.

#### Section II - Medical Procedures

I. Processing Repatriates.

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Military commanders, both in Korea and Japan, are responsible for medical processing of repatriates leaving their areas in accordance with international quarantine procedures. As a minimum, the following will be done:

1. Smallpox vaccination will be given to all.
2. Typhus vaccine will be given to all.
3. Cholera vaccine will be given during spring and summer.
4. Disinfestation of repatriates and their baggage. DDT or a comparable substitute will be used.
5. Repatriates will be examined by competent medical personnel and no individual having the following quarantinable diseases will be placed aboard a repatriation ship: smallpox, typhus, cholera, anthrax, yellow fever, plague, leprosy, and such other communicable disease which might prejudice the health of subsequent contacts.
6. Appropriate notation will be made on the passenger lists to show whether these minimum medical requirements have been met.

## II. Aboard repatriation ships.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible that:

1. The masters of repatriation ships notify the responsible control agency in the country of entry of the presence on board ship of any of the following diseases or exposed passengers traveling during incubation periods as follows: Cholera - 5 days, plague - 6 days, yellow fever - 6 days, louse-borne typhus - 12 days, and smallpox - 14 days.
2. Repatriation ships are cleaned and disinfested in Japan.

## III. Japanese medical personnel aboard repatriation ships.

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Japanese medical personnel will be placed aboard all repatriation ships. This personnel is part of the permanent ships party and will not be removed from their ships in Soviet controlled ports for other purposes.

IV. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or the Commanding General, Soviet Troops in Northern Korea reserves the right to suspend repatriation if the presence of contagious disease or diseases renders such action advisable.

Section III - Currency, Securities, and Other Documents and Possessions.

I. Japanese Repatriates Returning to Japan.

A. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will permit individual repatriates to bring with them from northern Korea the following:

1. Currency in current Bank of Chosen notes or the equivalent in local currency not to exceed ¥1000.
2. Japanese Government bonds expressed in yen, in lieu of yen currency up to the limits stipulated in paragraph I A 1 above.
3. Financial instruments.
  - a. Postal savings pass books of the Japanese Postal Savings System.
  - b. Post Office Life Insurance policies and other insurance policies issued by Japanese companies.
  - c. Bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan.
4. Clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner and limited to the amount each person can carry at one time.

II. Korean repatriates returning to northern Korea.

A. Individual repatriates will be permitted to take with them the following:

1. per person (Bank of notes).
2. Postal Savings pass books and bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan and in Korea.

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3. Insurance policies issued in Japan and in Korea.
  4. Checks, drafts, and certificates of deposit drawn on and issued by financial institutions in Japan and payable in Japan.
  5. Clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner.
- These effects will be limited in weight to                    lbs per person.

B. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers agrees to explore, in the near future, the feasibility of increasing the baggage allowance for outgoing repatriates to 500 pounds of personal effects and 4000 pounds of handicraft tools and equipment per individual.

Section IV - Communication

I. General.

It is agreed that:

A. The English language and the Russian language will be used in signal communications between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Headquarters of Soviet Troops in Northern Korea concerning repatriation.

B. The Japanese language will be used in communicating from ship to shore.

C. The English language will be used in all sailing dispatches emanating from ports in Japan. Similarly the Russian language will be used in all sailing dispatches emanating from ports in Northern Korea.

II. Sailing dispatches.

A. Port directors or other Allied military personnel in charge of various ports embarking repatriates will send sailing dispatches on all repatriation ships leaving their ports. Addressees are as follows:

1. For debarkation ports in Japan:

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3D D R A F T

3D D R A F T

PortAction AddresseeInformation Addressee

Maizuru

CG 25th Inf Div

SCAP  
CG Eighth Army  
CG I Corps

2. For debarkation ports in northern Korea.

PortAction AddresseeInformation AddresseeGenzan  
KankoGenzan Military Commandant  
Kanko Military CommandantHq of the Soviet Troops in Phenyan (Heijo)  
Hq of the Soviet Troops in Phenyan (Heijo)

- B. Information to be included in sailing dispatches as follows:

Dispatches are in two parts.

## Part I.

The code word "Repats" is the first word of the text, followed by name and number of ship, port of departure, actual time of departure, port of debarkation, and estimated time of arrival.

## Part II.

Code.

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| A | - Total repatriates embarked.  |
| B | - Total number litter cases.   |
| C | - Number of repatriates who have not been completely medically processed. See paragraph I, Section II above. |

- C. Dispatches shall be condensed and prepared without classification in the following form:

(Example)

Movement of 3,750 repatriates from KANKO to MAIZURU on ship TARA MARU. 14 are litter cases. All have been completely medically processed. Ship departed at 1300 hours 17 May, with an estimated time of arrival at MAIZURU of 0800 hours 21 May.

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## Form for Dispatch:

From: Kanko Military Commandant

To : CG 25th Infantry Division

Info: SCAP, CG Eighth Army, CG I Corps (add any USSR Commands  
desired).

REPATS X TARA MARU KANKO 171300 MAIZURU 210800 A 3750 B 14.

Note: The absence of "C" in the above message indicates that all medical processing has been completed.

B. Upon consummation of this agreement, representatives of SCAP and USSR will meet to determine details of signal communications.

Section V - Supply in Repatriation

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## III. Emergency Supplies for repatriation ships at ports in northern Korea.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees, in cases of emergency, to furnish food, medical supplies, coal, or material repairs to repatriation ships so that they can continue their voyage. The master of the ship will give a quantitative receipt for supplies obtained. These receipts will specify amount and kind of supplies. The receipts will be held for later accounting as may be determined on a governmental level.

The agreements contained herein have been concurred in by the representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, whose signatures appear below:

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STENOGRAPHIC REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN SCAP REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING MUTUAL REPATRIATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND NORTHERN KOREA.

19 June

General Russell:

Gentlemen, the question, or subject for consideration rather, is one of repatriation between Japan and Northern Korea. We understand that the Russian authorities are about to grant permission to repatriate between Japan and Northern Korea. Subject for the conference is a determination of the procedures involved so that the result will come within the desires of SCAP and the Russian authorities. Correct?

As a preliminary, we have sent to General Derevyanko, a draft of an agreement which is similar to, or probably identical with, agreements made with others of the Allied nations, covering repatriation to and from Japan. That draft was returned to us with certain suggestions for amendments or modifications as desired by the Russian authorities. They generally divide themselves into five parts. If you wish or if it meets with your concurrence, we can take those points in the order in which they appear on the agenda and discuss them one by one. That agreeable?

I will ask Colonel Howell of our Repatriation Section to take up the discussion in detail from here on.

Colonel Howell:

I think the first point concerning which we have different ideas is the classification of Japanese nationals from Northern Korea into military and civilian. One of the missions in Japan, that was given to General MacArthur, was to demobilize the Japanese Army and Navy. The final phases of demobilization is effected when repatriates from other areas return to Japan. They are picked up and processed in the reception centers and then

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returned to their prefectures for final demobilization. For that reason, we have in the past requested all countries, from which repatriates are returning, report the classification as to military, naval and civilian personnel, to assist in the demobilization. That is the reason why we asked that the repatriates from Northern Korea be broken down by category and SCAP be informed as to the number of military, naval and civilians that are on the repatriation ships. We would appreciate it if the representative of the Soviet Government would give the Soviet views on that particular matter.

Mr. AMROY:

I am authorized to take up the matter of repatriation from Northern Korea of the civilians only, and so far as the repatriation of the military is concerned, I was not authorized to discuss this subject.

General Russell:

Are we to understand then, that at this time, we shall exclude in this conference all consideration of repatriation of Japanese military personnel and confine the terms of whatever agreement we work out here, exclusively to Japanese civilians?

Mr. AMROY:

Yes sir.

General Russell:

One further point: We understand that this agreement shall also cover the repatriation of Koreans, formerly resident in North Korea from Japan to Korea?

Mr. AMROY:

Yes sir.

General Russell:

You gentlemen understand then, that the conference now appears to restrict itself to repatriation of Japanese nationals, exclusive of the military, from North Korea to Japan and conversely of Koreans, former residents of North Korea, from Japan to Korea. One other thing I would like to ask for the purpose of clarification. There may be Koreans, former residents of North Korea, in other areas outside of Japan. Can we not also include them, who are anxious to get home?

Mr. Anurov:

Where are those Koreans?

General Russell:

China possibly. I have not yet taken a reading on all who may be in that class. There may be some and we would like, at this time, inasmuch as the Soviet authorities have permitted the return of other Koreans, not to differentiate between Koreans from Japan and those from other areas. We would like to extend the right to them if they so desire. I don't know for sure if there are any, but there may be.

Mr. Anurov:

Until I know where these Koreans are now located, how many of them and the exact location, I can not give you the answer.

General Russell:

Well, then, to summarize and to clarify, this agreement, if and when reached, will cover: (1) Japanese now in North Korea, non-military, to be returned by permission of the Soviet authority from North Korea to Japan; (2) Koreans, formerly residents of North Korea now in Japan only, to be permitted by the Soviet authority to return to North Korea. These are the only two groups we are talking about then.

Mr. Amurov:

Let's discuss the matter of these Japanese and Koreans as mentioned in group 1 and group 2. Let's discuss them now and, as to the rest of the Koreans, we can go back to that and discuss them after we have finished the discussion about these two groups.

General Russell:

Agreed. I would like to have any remarks any of you may care to make.

Mr. Bishop:

If then we accept that proposal, many of the controversial points will be eliminated.

General Russell:

Very well, then, that will automatically eliminate some of the points of difference that were on the agenda for discussion.

Mr. Bishop:

We can take up these two groups, and later take up those in other categories. This agreement will not automatically be applied to any other groups.

General Russell:

That is a point I want to be doubly sure of: that any agreement made now will apply only to those two groups just mentioned.

Mr. Amurov:

That is correct.

Colonel Howell:

We can proceed then to currency and property restrictions, as to what repatriates may bring into Japan, take out of Japan, bring into Korea and take out of Korea.

Mr. Bishop:

If we limit discussion as stated above, the phraseology of the first

paragraph on page 1 of the agreements will have to be changed.

General Russell:

Mr. Bishop brings up the matter of terminology, as applied to Japanese repatriates, and we will have to consider that later in Section 1, paragraph 1a of the draft of Agreements.

Colonel Howell:

The entire agreement will have to be rewritten, but it would be better to reach an agreement on the controversial points before proceeding to the details of rewriting.

By eliminating the military the question then resolves itself as to the amount of currency, and personal belongings and handcraft equipment that can be taken out of and be brought into the respective countries under SCAP and Soviet control.

Mr. Anurov:

Yes.

Colonel Howell:

With reference to currency, our repatriation program has been continuing for the past 9 months. We have limited the amounts that repatriates could bring into or take out of Japan to a thousand yen per individual repatriate. If we made an exception in the case of Northern Korea, the United States prestige with reference to other countries would suffer.

Mr. Anurov:

And what do you offer? Only one thousand yen?

Colonel Howell:

One thousand yen. As stated in the original proposal it is the amount that repatriates from other countries have been permitted to take with them, repatriates from China, South Korea, and islands all through the South Pacific where repatriates were located.

Mr. Amurovi:

So far as I understand, the only repatriates who arrive at Japan were Japanese who were in China and other countries, and now being returned to Japan and are allowed one thousand yen. I have no objections, and I have no objections that the Japanese who need to be repatriated from Northern Korea to Japan will also be authorized to have one thousand yen.

Colonel Howell:

That is agreed then.

Mr. Amurovi:

In regard to the Japanese I agree. As you know the Koreans who are now in Japan may be considered as a liberated people. They will be returned to Korea, to a country which has not yet established its economic and financial stability. As I personally see it, these Koreans are going back to their home, will try to establish new homes, and will try to start from the beginning again. In my opinion, there should be an entirely different approach on the subject of the Koreans, as to how much they can take with them when they go back to their own country.

General Russell:

It has been our experience that repatriates, regardless of where they come from or where they go to, in all instances, have gone back to a devastated or disrupted country to re-establish themselves under chaotic conditions. It has also been our experience that the carrying with them of large sums of any currency to their destination was no assurance that it would aid them in re-establishing themselves. What they sought was commodity and consumer goods, and material things rather than an abundance of currency. Because we have set the figure at one thousand yen for all other places, we do not readily accept the argument presented, that in this instance, an exception should be made for return of Northern Koreans.

Mr. Bishop:

We might want pointed out that we are equally solicitous for the well-being and the future of the Koreans. Their arguments are well-known to us. We too hope to see a free and independent Korea.

Mr. Amurov:

I call attention to the fact that the Koreans should receive more consideration, as to the amount they should take with them when they are returned from Japan, than the Japanese when they are being returned from China, from other countries, and from Korea itself. Japanese shouldn't be classified the same as the Koreans, because Koreans were in a position where they could not help themselves. They were under oppression and in a position where they could not better themselves, whereas Japanese returning to their own country are receiving the same consideration as the Koreans. It doesn't stand to reason. They, the Koreans, are returning from the occupied country. The Japanese, all these years, were in a position where they could loot and get away with riches, whereas Koreans lost everything during the occupational period.

General Russell:

I would like to reiterate what Mr. Bishop has already said, that we are fully cognizant of the plight of the Koreans and are most sympathetic with them for the reason stated. We are equally interested in their welfare and well-being. I might point out that we have other parallel cases: Ryukyans from the Ryukyus, Formosans from Formosa, Chinese from China, and other nationals farther to the south, all of whom are in the same category, and all of whom have been accorded the same rights and restrictions. Again, I wish to point out that at this belated date it would be manifestly unfair to make an exception to this group, who are in an identical situation as those who have been repatriated previously.

Mr. Bishop:

It might be helpful to the Soviet member, if you were to point out to him that there is no evidence that in allowing Koreans to take out a greater amount of currency, as he apparently wants, that it will aid them in re-establishing themselves. On the contrary, repatriates bringing in large quantities of money still will not get the commodities they want. He is not really accomplishing what he says he wants to. To put on the record, at this belated date, that certain Koreans were able to take more money from Japan than other Koreans might momentarily gain an advantage for the Soviets. It would put us in a position which could be wrongly interpreted for propaganda purposes.

Mr. Anurov:

From such a viewpoint, there seems to be no purpose of these repatriates even taking with them one thousand yen. What do you think of that?

General Russell:

We would desire to accord to Koreans, formerly resident of North Korea, when permitted by the Soviet Government to return to their former homes, the same privileges that we have accorded to all other nationals leaving the occupied area. We prefer to put in the agreement the fact that they do have the privilege of taking one thousand yen with them. That by no means assures that each and every one of them will take one thousand yen with them because they may not have it. We accede that the Soviet authorities could prevent them from taking it in with them after they have left here. But we hoped that we would be in agreement on some stipulated sum to give the repatriate; some firm ground upon which to plan the establishment of his new home or the home to which he is returning. For the record, we should continue now as we have heretofore, in all other agreements made with all other Allied countries or commands, to place the limitation at one thousand yen.

Mr. Amurey:

I look at the Koreans as liberated people. The people who will, upon their return to their own country, have to start to build their homes from nothing. So far as the Japanese are concerned they return to their own country, where they may find their own homes. Because of that, I believe that we should, in the case of Koreans, give them special consideration as compared with the Japanese. For the reasons I have just stated, I believe the Koreans should be allowed to take three thousand yen. I understand that, as the General said, not all of those repatriates will have the three thousand yen.

Capt Weiss:

I am in doubt as to whether the Soviet member understands that approximately one million Koreans have been repatriated under the existing plan, and this present proposal affects less than ten thousand.

General Russell:

It is indeed most comforting and encouraging to learn again that the viewpoint and opinions of the Soviet Government are so closely in concert with those of the United States Government. We are most happy to learn of their anxiety, which we share, over the difficulties encountered by repatriated personnel, especially in regard to re-establishing themselves. For the moment, we will not debate on the conditions confronting the repatriated Japanese when he returns to what obviously is anything but an orderly atmosphere.

On the point as to how much the returning Japanese shall take with them, I understand we are already agreed upon one thousand yen. Hence, we have only now to consider the repatriated Korean. In consideration of his return, we cannot afford to disregard others, who have found themselves in similar circumstances. Many such nationals have already been repatriated

to their respective former places of residence. The conditions confronting them on arrival were the same as those that the Koreans returning to Northern Korea will be confronted with. When so returned, it is still doubtful whether or not large quantities of currency will be of lasting aid to them in re-establishing themselves. I know that the Soviet representatives have evidenced the desire to effect the early repatriation of Koreans to Northern Korea, and I again request their acceptance of the limitation, for such repatriation, which is now in effect and which has been in effect for all other repatriated nationals leaving Japan for their respective place of residence.

Colonel Howell:

Would you point out to Mr. Amurov that over nine hundred thousand residents of Southern Korea, 35000 Chinese, our Allies, and 35000 Formosans have been repatriated under the one thousand yen limitation. We do not know how the United States can justify giving preferential treatment, three thousand yen, to this very small number, the thousand, who are subject to repatriation to Northern Korea.

Mr. Bishop:

I think that the point, the Soviet representative has apparently not realized, is that there is no question of comparison between what the Japanese are allowed to bring back and the Korean allowed to take out. I think that the Soviet difficulty is that they believe we are classifying the Koreans in the same status as they do Japanese. That is not the case at all. The 1000 yen happens to be the same amount. You might also point out to him that there is no country, with which we have conducted repatriation in the past, <sup>that</sup> has felt that we have treated the Japanese in the same manner as Allied repatriates.

Mr. Anurov:

What is the difference of allowing the former enemies, the Japanese, and the liberated people, Koreans and the Chinese, to have the same amount of money to bring back with them? Why such equal treatment for both former enemies and former allies? They are both allowed to take the same amount of money.

Mr. Bishop:

There is no connection between the two.

Mr. Anurov:

Then what is the difference? You have just stated that one thousand yen happens to be the same amount. Is there any difference in the treatment of these people, former allies, liberated people and enemies? I don't see why 1000 yen should be permitted the Japanese as well as other nationals.

Mr. Bishop:

He doesn't seem to see the difference why one thousand yen should be allowed to be brought in by Japanese and taken out by other nationals. They have no connection, one with the other.

General Russell:

The amount one thousand yen was just an arbitrary figure picked and agreed upon by people who set up this repatriation scheme. It is pocket money, if you please, to an individual repatriate who, if he had nothing, would be a charge on the community.

Mr. Anurov:

General, as long as there seems to be no agreement as to the amount in this case, I suggest that the next question be taken up, and the solution of this be delayed until the end of the meeting.

General Russell:

I am afraid that the same principles are embodied in consideration of items, other than currency, such as baggage allowance.

Mr. Amurov:

It remains to be seen.

General Russell:

Summarizing then, Soviet authorities agree that returning Japanese civilians from North Korea will be permitted to bring one thousand yen to Japan, but there is no agreement yet as to the amount Koreans returning to North Korea may be permitted to take.

Mr. Amurov:

That is correct and I agree that the Japanese returning to Japan will be allowed to take one thousand yen.

Colonel Howell:

The next point is property restrictions. There appears to be no question as to what the Japanese national will be allowed to bring home with him, that is, personal belonging that he can carry on his person. The first point of difference is that the Soviets desire that the amount of baggage, personal belongings, that can be taken out of Japan by Koreans, be 500 pounds instead of 250 pounds. The 250 pound limitation is in effect now, and repatriates returning to southern Korea, to Formosa, and to China, are permitted to take with them 250 pounds per person. Therefore it was proposed to treat the repatriates to Northern Korea in the same manner as repatriates returning to the countries just mentioned.

Mr. Amurov's interpreter:

He wants to know what is your opinion as to paragraph 3.

Colonel Howell:

I was going to discuss that as the next point on the agenda.

Mr. Amurov's interpreter:

He still thinks that he would like to hear your opinion on paragraph 3.

Colonel Howell:

At the present time repatriates going to Southern Korea, to China, and to Formosa are limited to personal belongings. There is no provision existing at the present time which would permit them to take with them any equipment from handicraft shops. We would like to continue repatriation to Northern Korea under the same conditions applied for other repatriates. We would like to make these two provisions, the provision to raise the amount of personal baggage to 500 pounds and the provision to permit them to take handicraft tools, out of this agreement and commence repatriation as we proposed. A separate study can then be made on the question of raising the allowance. This is necessary as it involves allowances repatriates are permitted to take to South Korea.

Mr. Anurov:

How long would it take to study these two particular questions? Would it delay the agreement?

Colonel Howell:

Yes. That is the reason we would like to have it taken out of this agreement and made the subject of a separate study.

Mr. Anurov:

What will happen if these two items are removed from this agreement now, and the agreement signed so that repatriates may start going without this particular baggage and without this handicraft equipment?

General Russell:

What we propose is that the question of 500 pounds of personal baggage and 2 tons of handicraft equipment be removed from this agreement, and repatriation continue with the 250 pound per person limitation as proposed here. The increase to 500 pounds and the question of the handicraft equipment would be studied separately and not made a part of this agreement at this time.

Colonel Howell:

If we can reach an agreement on our proposal that clothing and personal possessions will be limited in weight to 250 pounds per person, we can get repatriation started. We would like the Soviets to go along with us on that now on this agreement.

Mr. Anurov:

I cannot understand how these Korean families, who will be allowed to take only 250 pounds of baggage, and these handicraft tools cannot be part of this 250 pounds, how they can go to Korea and be expected to establish their livelihood. These handicraft tools will not be in their possession and it is their lawful possession, and we will take away from them something that belongs to them by right.

General Russell:

I wish to point out in the first place that it is not 250 pounds per family. It is 250 pounds per person, and 250 pounds is quite a creditable allowance for anybody on the move.

Mr. Anurov:

Well General, if we allow these Koreans to take 250 pounds each, in most cases it will be personal belonging such as clothing, shoes and other items. However, most of these Koreans who are now in Japan were established as handicraft workers and have some tools and small lathes with them. In order to make a living they will have to take this equipment with them. Otherwise they will not be in a position to make their livelihood in Korea.

General Russell:

If I may be permitted to say so, I think that we are about to embark on a lengthy discussion of conditions, all of which were discussed and stated with respect to the amount of currency. Further I wish to point out that this whole procedure for repatriation has long been in effect and has

culminated in the successful repatriation of hundreds of thousands of persons. I again reiterate that I can see no justification for making an exception at this late date for a smaller included group to a specified area. I further wish to invite attention to the basic principle of repatriation, and that is that the Allied Nations have pledged themselves to permitting, repeat, permitting repatriation. Whether or not the privilege extended to the individual is taken advantage of by the individual is entirely dependent on the individual's desires. It is on a voluntary basis. This applies to the class of people we are now discussing, namely those people who found themselves in the occupied area at the termination of hostilities through no control of their own.

Mr. Anurov:

General, I agree with you that Allied Nations promised to return these people to their countries, to repatriate them, but at the same time I see no reason why they should be placed in position where they cannot take with them their means of making their livelihood.

General Russell:

Again my only answer to that is that we are appreciative of the solicitation that the Soviet authorities feel for these returning Koreans and we approve of it heartily and share it to the utmost. But I again submit that as a matter of overall fairness and equity we do not feel justified in making the exception they request at this time.

Mr. Anurov:

General, what is the reason why we don't want to allow these Koreans to take their handicraft tools, such as lathes, which represent means of his livelihood, and what right would we have not to allow them to take this equipment with them?

General Russell:

It is not a question of picking out a Northern Korean and denying him any advantage that we could possibly extend to him. It is a question at this moment of extending preferential treatment to one small group of repatriated people destined to a particularly specified area.

Mr. Amurov:

I do not insist that this privilege of increased amounts be applied only to the Koreans to be repatriated to Northern Korea, but such privilege be extended to any repatriate who may be returning to his country. But we were not discussing this subject now. They all should be allowed to take tools with them, tools, which are the means of their livelihood.

General Russell:

The acceptance of such a proposition, although we well appreciate the generosity of the Soviet authorities, comes rather late in the game. We wish to point out that repatriation has been completed, to a great extent, in all other areas controlled by Allied Governments, and this is the last phase of repatriation. It seems wholly unfitting that we should change our standards of procedure at this late date.

Mr. Amurov:

These 10,000 Koreans which are to be repatriated to Northern Korea, is that the total number to be repatriated, or only the first group to be repatriated?

Colonel Howell:

That is the maximum number. From past experience it is probable many of those will not take advantage of their privilege of repatriation. The number was arrived at as a result of a registration held on 18th of March this year, when they were required to register whether they desired to go home.

Mr. Anurov:

Can you tell me how many Koreans will be left in Japan after these 10,000 Koreans are repatriated?

General Russell:

I don't know as your question is germane to this discussion. We agreed at the beginning to discuss two groups of people: Japanese now in Northern Korea, permitted by the Soviet Government to return to Japan; and Koreans now in Japan, who desired to return to Northern Korea. These are the only ones we are concerned with, and the conditions of this agreement do not concern other Koreans who might wish to take advantage of repatriation under other circumstances. I don't know that we have this data readily available.

Mr. Anurov:

More than 10,000 Koreans? You do not expect more Koreans after these 10,000 Koreans are repatriated?

Colonel Howell:

There are about 10,000 Koreans who have made known their desire for repatriation.

Mr. Anurov:

I cannot agree at this time to the provisions of this paragraph whereby 250 pounds are to be allowed to each repatriate, inasmuch as my suggestions were not accepted.

General Russell:

The suggestion referred to as not being accepted is specifically what? I mean by that, does he refer to the 500 pounds proposal?

Mr. Anurov:

Your offer, that we have in mind, is an offer made by the Colonel that for the time being this particular paragraph permitting 250 pounds be

allowed to remain in force. In regards to this suggestion I cannot agree to that nor to the Colonel's suggestion that we go to the next paragraph and allow this paragraph to remain in force with 250 pounds. I cannot accept this.

General Russell:

In lieu of the 250 pounds he has no figure to offer other than the 500 pounds plus the privilege of taking tools, etc. up to two tons? Is that it?

Mr. Amurov:

I offer that we include the 500 pounds and in addition to the 500 pounds, if the repatriate has any handicraft tools, that he be allowed to take them, not to exceed two tons.

Mr. Bishont:

I wonder if it would be helpful if we could get from the Soviet representative a statement of the Soviet's reason prompting their position in seeking what is in fact discriminatory treatment. It seems to me that such differences as we have are caused entirely by a desire, on the part of the Soviet representative, to obtain more favorable treatment for a smaller number of Koreans than it has been possible to accord to other Koreans, Chinese, other liberated peoples, and even others of our allied. That is a commendable desire on the part of the Soviets, but it is in no way different from the desire we had in mind in the beginning: to do as much as we could for all of these returning peoples. But in spite of our desire we were not able to do it. At this late date to attempt to secure for a small group especially favorable, but actually discriminatory, treatment seems to me very strange, and if he could explain to us why he seeks this discriminatory and especially favorable treatment, it would be helpful. We might also point out to the Soviet representative here that discriminatory treatment always

results in misunderstandings which cause ill-feeling.

Mr. Anurov's interpreter:

Could I ask you, Mr. Bishop, to repeat that in small doses?

Mr. Bishop:

What I had in mind was whether we could get a statement from the Soviet representatives as to the reason prompting the Soviet to seek preferential, discriminatory treatment for a small group of repatriates. Then I went on to say that such differences as exist here in this discussion today, are caused almost entirely by the apparent desire on the part of the Soviets to obtain more favorable treatment for a small number of Koreans than it was possible, for many reasons, technical and physical reasons, to accord to many other thousands of Koreans, Chinese, liberated people and our allies. The desire of the Soviets to be of assistance to these Koreans is certainly a commendable one, and it differs in no way from the desire which we had in the very beginning for all repatriates, Koreans, Chinese allies and liberated people. But in spite of the similar desire which we had, we were not able to give repatriates more favorable or more considerate treatment than we actually did, and that at this late date, as General Russell has already pointed out, to attempt to secure for a small group especially favorable, but in fact discriminatory, treatment seems to me very strange. As a final point, I mentioned that discriminatory treatment, whether it be favorable or unfavorable, has in most instances, I have observed, resulted in wide-spread misunderstanding which often caused ill-feeling, and which is sometimes used for false propaganda to the detriment of one group or another.

Mr. Anurov:

What do you mean by propaganda?

Mr. Bishop:

Perhaps propaganda may not be the right word. Misinterpretation may be the right word.

Mr. Anurov:

As I have already told you, the only concern I have in this matter is that I want these Korean repatriates to have with them everything that will provide means of livelihood. That is the only thought behind it. My suggestion is that this paragraph carry the figure 500 pounds per person, and in addition to that, if a repatriate has handicraft tools, that he be allowed to take them with him, but not in excess of two tons. There may be cases where an individual may have many lathes and a big shop. It doesn't mean that he will be allowed to take all that equipment. He will be allowed to take only what in my estimation he needs in order to make his livelihood, and that should not exceed two tons.

General Russell:

We regret our inability at this time to amend the draft presented in the manner proposed by the Soviet representative. Inasmuch as it appears that we cannot at this time come to an agreement insofar as Koreans returning to Northern Korea from Japan are concerned, covering the amount of currency that they may be permitted to take with them, nor the amount of clothing and personal possessions, nor property such as handicraft tools, etc, it would appear that up to this point, we have agreed on returning Japanese civilians from Northern Korea to Japan, which necessitates the further consideration of the manner of which such lift from Northern Korea will be carried on. Therefore, I propose that we go on to a consideration of the remainder of the proposed agreement in order to establish a procedure for the operation of ships plying between Japan and Korea, initially to transport Japanese nationals now in Korea, permitted by the Soviet authorities

return to Japan.

Mr. Amurov:

You mean to discuss the question of the returning Japanese now?

General Russell:

It would appear that we have resolved the question to one of returning Japanese civilians only, at this time.

Mr. Amurov:

I consider that discussions in regards to repatriation of Japanese alone cannot be taken as a separate matter but should be discussed at the same time as the question of repatriation of Koreans is taken up. I do not propose to make the discussion about Japanese repatriates a separate subject. Inasmuch as we did not agree on the first two subjects, I suggest that we put aside these subjects and proceed with the discussion of the next subject.

General Russell:

Exactly. Agreed. It is the same thing.

Colonel Howell:

The next point concerns the language to be used in signal communications, paragraph 7 of the draft. The Soviets desire to insert the words "and the Russian language" in subparagraph 1 A and B.

I think we should approach this problem from the standpoint of practicability. From headquarters to headquarters signal communications can be conducted in English and Russian. The transmitting headquarters to use the native language. Is that acceptable?

Mr. Amurov:

Acceptable.

Colonel Howell:

It is agreed that the Russian and English language will be used in signal communication between SCAP and headquarters of the Soviet authorities

in Northern Korea. The transmitting headquarters will use their native language.

The next problem is transmitting signal communication from ship to shore and shore to ship. We would like, if possible, to have that language be Japanese, for the reason that all our boats are operated by Japanese and we have no Russians or English as an integral part of the crew.

Mr. Amurov:

As far as I know, the Japanese telegraph-cable writing is very difficult to understand.

Colonel Howell:

We would have to have interpreters, Russian and English on each of the boats and that may involve anywhere from 20-30-40 crews, whereas, at each of the ports there will only be the need of one set of interpreters each.

Mr. Amurov:

In principal, I agree, but I am afraid due to the fact that Japanese telegraphic language is very complicated there will be a misunderstanding as to the meaning of the message received.

General Russell:

One point. There is a very nominal volume of traffic from ship to shore ~~from~~ involving boats engaged in repatriation, because communication between repatriation ports takes care of the bulk of the business transacted.

Second, most of the business transmitted between ship and shore is of a type that is readily susceptible to stereotyped code.

Mr. Amurov:

Accepted.

Colonel Howell:

It is agreed that the Japanese language will be used in communication from repatriation ships to shore, both from ports under Soviet and SCAP control.

Mr. Anurov:

Agreed.

Colonel Howell:

It is agreed that sailing dispatches from ports in Japan will be sent to the port authority in Soviet controlled areas in the English language. Similarly, sailing dispatches emanating from a port under Soviet control will be sent to the port in Japan in the Russian language.

We have available at the present time a great deal of shipping that can be made available for repatriation and can increase the rate to be evacuated per day from 750 to a substantial figure. In the agreement we agreed to take out of Northern Korea an average of 750 repatriates per day. We can increase that now if the Soviets so desire.

Mr. Anurov:

How many repatriates may one ship carry?

Colonel Howell:

We have different types of ships available to take repatriates out of ports in Northern Korea. According to this agreement we can provide shipping having a capacity of 750 per day.

General Russell:

We merely wish to point out the figure 750 was put in here at the time the agreement was prepared. The Soviet authorities need not feel themselves constrained to hold it to 750 per day. We have the facilities to increase it to a greater number and we will so increase it if they so desire.

Colonel Howell:

For planning purposes we would like to know how many civilians in Northern Korea are involved in this proposed repatriation.

Mr. Anurov:

About 100,000.

General Russell:

Now does Mr. Anurov care to name a greater rate per day than 750?

Mr. Anurov:

I have received information from the authorities in Northern Korea that repatriates will be shipped from two ports, Gensan and Konpon, and in equal numbers.

Colonel Howell:

50,000 through each port. That is fine.

Mr. Anurov:

Each port can clear each day three ships.

Capt Weiss:

What capacity?

Mr. Anurov's interpreter:

He doesn't have the information at this time but he will have to inquire as to the capacity of the ships that they can be taken care of.

Capt Weiss:

Has he information on the number of Japanese they can clear through the port per day?

Mr. Anurov:

The only information I have received was that they can clear 3 ships, but they did not give the details as to the capacity. I will have to inquire and should know later.

Capt Weiss:

I would like to put in 3 LSTs each day; that is, 2700 per day in each.

Mr. Anurov:

Captain, I think that the local Japanese have the information, and if you will ask them they probably will furnish it to you. They have the information, they must have, in regards to the type of ships that can be cleared at these two ports. At the same time I will send an inquiry.

Colonel Howell:

We want to know the number of repatriates that can be processed at each port per day.

General Russell:

There are really two things we would like to know. Firstly, the number of people that the Soviet authorities can process through each port and have ready for delivery per day. That involves many things: capacity of ports, capabilities of concentrating, and the number of people that can be processed per day. Secondly, we would like to know the accommodation or port limitations for a given type of ship.

Mr. Anurov:

I will inquire to the proper authorities.

Colonel Howell:

The next question involves fuel for repatriation ships. The Japanese Government is responsible for furnishing supplies and bearing the cost thereof of all expenses incurred in the repatriation program. So far the Japanese Government has shown it can furnish all supplies except fuel. Our present directives require that the government, to which we send repatriation shipping to bring back repatriates, furnish in kind the fuel necessary for the operation of the repatriation ships. That is the reason why the

original proposition appearing under Section 5, sub-paragraph II on Page 9 was worded as it is. The Japanese just cannot furnish it. They haven't got it.

Mr. Anurov:

It is a difficult problem. As you know, General, we had to import gasoline during the war under lend lease. The gasoline was sent to us by the United States, for which we are very grateful. Since the termination of war we receive no fuel from the United States, and at this time we experience a very acute shortage of fuel for our own ships' needs. We have no fuel at any place in the Far East or in Korea, and because of that we will not be in a position to furnish fuel to the ships which will repatriate these people.

General Russell:

It is indeed regrettable that there is such a paucity of fuel for the operation of ships throughout the entire area. We, too, have experienced a shortage in meeting our own requirements plus furnishing, as has been stated, fuel to help our allies. All the Allied governments have had to stint themselves and have given of the meager supply of fuel they had in their respective areas in order to consummate repatriation. We know, as evidenced here, that the Soviet authorities are anxious to effect repatriation likewise from Northern Korea. Unfortunately, however, it is not within the purview of SCAP to make an agreement to furnish fuel, because it is beyond his capabilities, and in all probability the matter will have to be referred for settlement on governmental level.

Mr. Anurov:

I understand General, all you say about shortage of fuel everywhere, but I just want to substantiate the fact that there is an extreme shortage

of fuel in the Far East. It is absolutely safe to say that there is no fuel left. We, ourselves, were receiving and were dependent upon the fuel as received from the United States. I myself can render no decision and agree with you that this subject should be settled by the higher authorities.

General Russell:

I think we have no other alternative under our respective instructions; we just haven't got it. It would seem that in the future shipping in this part of the world is going to be at a standstill. Nobody will have any fuel to use for ships pretty soon.

Mr. Anurov:

Do we understand correctly that the Japanese have no fuel?

Colonel Howell:

No fuel oil. They have some coal.

Mr. Anurov:

Do they get any oil from any source? It is our opinion that the Japanese have crude oil.

Capt Weiss:

It can't be used in any of our ships.

Mr. Anurov:

Would it be possible to designate ships which use coal instead of oil to repatriate these people?

Capt Weiss:

We have a few.

Mr. Anurov:

Do the Japanese have any coal burning ships?

Capt Weiss:

Some. The use of coal burning ships would cause a great delay due

to difficulties of loading.

Mr. Anurov:

Since there are only one hundred ten thousand repatriates, maybe it would be feasible to request the Japanese Government to use coal in their shipping.

Capt Weiss:

Is there plenty of coal in Korea?

Mr. Anurov:

I don't know.

Capt Weiss:

Would the Soviets investigate to see if they have coal?

Mr. Anurov:

But the Japanese have the coal.

General Russell:

Coal in Japan is limited, and is also in great demand. It has been allotted very carefully for the prevention and spread of disease, as well as a meager allotment for shipping. Further study could be made to see whether or not it could be made available, but as the Captain suggested, it would seem advisable in order to expedite repatriation that we make inquiry into resources in Northern Korea and furnish some or all of it from there.

Mr. Anurov:

The suggestion that you made, General, I will transmit to my superiors.

Colonel Howell:

One other point. I would like to include as an added proposal in the agreement, merely a statement to this effect: The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reserves the right to suspend repatriation from Northern Korea if the presence of contagious disease or diseases renders

such action advisable in his opinion.

Mr. Anurov:

That pertains to both, either Koreans or Japanese. Both ways.

General Russell:

I would like to state that this is a world-wide quarantine procedure.

Mr. Anurov:

I want to add to this provision that this right is reserved not only by the Supreme Commander but also by the Commanding General of the Soviet Forces in Northern Korea.

Colonel Howell:

Agreed. Absolutely.

General Russell:

We would like to know what agency we will deal with in Northern Korea on an operational level.

Mr. Anurov:

Headquarters Soviet Troops in Pheyan (Keijo).

Colonel Howell:

Does the Soviet propose to furnish any shipping?

Mr. Anurov:

They do not intend to furnish any shipping.

Colonel Howell:

It was agreed previously that the information as to port capacity would be furnished by the Soviets. That is port capacity, not ships, and the numbers that can be processed through each.

Mr. Anurov:

Your question was as to the type of vessel that can enter those two ports?

Capt Weiss:

Size, that<sup>is</sup> length and draft. - 29 -

Colonel Howell:

This would be the added proposal to paragraph Roman four just above Section III: The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Commanding General of Soviet Troops in North Korea, in Phenyang, reserve the right to suspend repatriation if the presence of contagious disease or diseases render such action advisable.

General Russell:

And also paragraph Roman III, Section III would be added as follows: The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers agrees to explore, in the near future, the feasibility of increasing the baggage allowance for outgoing repatriates to 500 pounds of personal effects and four thousand pounds of handicraft tools and equipment per individual.

Mr. Amurov:

I cannot take it upon myself. I would like to get advice from our financial experts.

Colonel Howell:

It is agreed that: (A) the English language and the Russian language will be used in signal communication between SCAP and the headquarters of the Soviet troops in North Korea, concerning repatriation; (B) the Japanese language will be used in communication from ship to shore; (C) the English language will be used in all sailing dispatches emanating from ports in Japan. Similarly, the Russian language will be used in all sailing dispatches emanating from ports in Northern Korea.

The following will be substituted under Section V as paragraph Roman II, Fuel Oil: Inasmuch as fuel oil is not available from Soviet resources, SCAP agrees to explore the possibilities of providing coal, from Japanese sources, to repatriation ships engaged in repatriation between Japan and Northern Korea; the Soviet representative agrees to explore the possi-

bilities of providing coal, from resources in North Korea, to ships engaged in repatriation between Japan and North Korea.

Is that acceptable now?

One more point, under Section V paragraph Roman I which reads: "The Japanese Government furnishes the necessary food and maintains the supply etc." The words, "and coal" should be deleted.

Mr. Anurov:

I object to this. I suggest that this be left in. In the written agreement before this conference, it was already stated that we would take upon ourselves, in emergency, to furnish this coal.

General Russell:

I would say this was an emergency created by the lack of fuel oil.

Mr. Anurov:

I had in mind this emergency clause when I agreed to the proposed paragraph the Colonel offered a short time ago, but now my suggestion is that we leave this particular paragraph blank.

General Russell:

In effect, we have arrived at certain partial agreements that we can be assured of in the event that repatriation from Northern Korea to Japan takes place, but at the present moment no repatriation is assured until the matter of provision for fuel of some kind is established. Therefore, I suggest: that the agreement remain incomplete at this time and we each, that is, the representatives of SCAP and the representatives of the Soviet authorities, undertake to establish the possibility of furnishing coal from their own resources, both in Japan or in Northern Korea respectively; that we meet at a selected future date, reporting back at that time their respective capabilities for the support of a repatriation program based on coal availability. It appears at the moment that any repatriation to

be undertaken is dependent upon the determination of fuel for repatriation ship operation. Fuel oil availability must be settled at governmental level, but an early declaration of locally, meaning Japan or Korea, available coal will accelerate the initiation of the hoped for repatriation program.

Mr. Anurov:

I have no authority to settle this question of coal, but I will report this to the higher authorities.

General Russell:

I am in the same position. I have no authority for a final determination either. No guaranty is given that it can be furnished from Japan nor that it can be furnished from Northern Korea. Merely asking for the possibilities of obtaining it from those two sources.

Mr. Anurov:

I presume that this question will remain open.

General Russell:

It must.

Mr. Anurov:

We will make reports to the higher authorities on this subject.

General Russell:

I can think of no further business to be accomplished at this session. Any further remarks?

Mr. Anurov:

I have no/thing further.

*Russia*GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

## G-3 Repatriation

21 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL RUSSELL.

SUBJECT : Repatriation Northern Korea - Japan.

1. A preliminary report of conference held by representatives of SCAP and U.S.S.R. concerning mutual repatriation between North Korea and Japan is submitted pending compilation of final report.
2. Representing the Chief of Staff, SCAP, was Brigadier General C. A. Russell. Representing General Derevyanko was Mr. Peter V. Arunov, Deputy Political Adviser for the Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan.
3. Discussion followed in order the subjects listed on Agenda. Tab A.
4. Soviet representative stated that he was authorized to discuss repatriation of Japanese civilians from Northern Korea and return of former residents of Korea, now in Japan, only. In order to precede with the conference discussion was limited to these two categories. The numbers involved were 100,000 Japanese civilians and 10,000 Koreans.
5. Concerning the amount of currency Japanese repatriates could carry into Japan from Northern Korea there was complete agreement. The amount of currency Northern Korean repatriates would be permitted to carry out of Japan was not settled. The Soviet representative took the position that returning Koreans should be permitted to take from Japan 3000 yen each. Reasons advanced were (a) this larger amount would assist the Northern Korean to better establish himself in the economic society of North Korea, and (b) a member of a liberated people, Korean, should be permitted to take more than currency in repatriation than a member of a conquered people, Japanese. Presently each category are permitted to carry 1000 yen each. SCAP took the position that: (a) repatriates for Northern Korea should be permitted to take out of Japan 1000 yen which is the same amount that has been allowed to each of the 894,895 Koreans, 31,780 Formosans and 31,188 Chinese who have been previously repatriated to South Korea, Formosa and China respectively, and (b) from a political and propaganda view point SCAP cannot justify giving discriminatory and preferential treatment to a small minority, 10,000 repatriates, to Northern Korea.
6. With reference to property no agreement was reached on the amount of personal baggage and tools that repatriates, destined for Northern Korea, could carry from Japan to North Korea. The Soviets held firm to their demands that the amount of personal effects be raised from 250 lbs to 500 lbs per repatriate and in addition insisted each repatriate for Northern Korea be permitted to withdraw from Japan 2 tons of handicraft tools and equipment. The argument advanced by the Soviets was that, the

increased amounts of property should be permitted so that the Korean repatriate would be better prepared to earn his livelihood in Korea. SCAP position was to effect that such treatment was discriminatory and preferential to a small minority (10,000) as compared to amounts allowed these previously repatriated, especially to these in Southern Korea.

7. SCAP has agreed to explore the subject of increased property allowances further.

8. Agreements were reached on the matter of signal communications and availability of shipping.

9. No agreement was reached on the matter of supply of fuel. The Soviets stated no oil was available for fuel from resources under their control for repatriation shipping. SCAP stated under present directives fuel oil could not be supplied from U.S. sources. In view of above it was agreed that matter of providing fuel oil for repatriation must of necessity be decided on a governmental level. The possibility of conducting repatriation in Japanese coal burning vessels with fuel from Japanese sources was discussed.

10. Recommendations:

a. That SCAP stand firm on the amount of currency (1000 yen) that Koreans repatriating to Northern Korea be permitted to carry with them from Japan.

b. That a Staff Study be made to determine the feasibility of increasing the baggage allowance of outgoing repatriates to 500 lbs of personal effects and 4000 pounds of handicraft tools and equipment per individual.

c. That the attached radio be dispatched to WDCSA informing them of the conference.

E. C. B.

AGENDA  
SCAP-SOVIET CONFERENCE  
on  
Mutual Repatriation  
between  
Japan and North Korea

Tokyo, Japan  
19 June 1946

1. Classification of Japanese Nationals in Northern Korea.
2. Currency and Property Restrictions.
  - a. Jurisdiction in Japan. ✓
  - b. Jurisdiction in Northern Korea.
3. Language in Signal Communications.
  - a. Headquarters to headquarters.
  - b. Ship to shore.
  - c. Sailing dispatches.
- ✓ 4. Availability of Repatriation Shipping ✓
5. Fuel for Repatriation Shipping.
6. Added Proposal by SCAP.

Suspension of repatriation in event of epidemics.
7. Consideration of Detailed Changes.

Notes on Agenda

1. Classification of Japanese nationals.
  - a. References: Sec I; IA, II  
Sec III; IA1, IA3, IA4d  
Sec IV; IIB, IIC.
  - b. Potsdam Declaration Tab A.  
Geneva Convention Tab B.  
Hague Convention Tab C.  
Uniform Processing.  
Necessity of Segregation and application of controls in Japan.
2. Currency and Property restrictions.
  - a. Jurisdiction in Japan.
  - b. References: Sec III;
    - (1) Currency into Japan (IAI). SCAP will apply in any event parity with repatriates from other areas.
    - (2) Payments POWs (IA3) permitted under Geneva Convention. Tab B.
    - (3) A & N field postal savings pass book (IA4d). Fairness to individual and parity with other repatriates.
    - (4) Documents etc. (IC)  
Found to be of value in past. Assists in demobilization. Can be qualified subject to approval by Soviet Authorities.
    - (5) ¥ 3000 to Northern Korea (III).  
Parity with Southern Korea.  
Parity with other areas.  
Weaken U.S. prestige.
    - (6) 500 lbs personal belongings (II5). Same remarks as above. SCAP prepared to concur after raising allowance for Southern Korea.

"The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers agrees to explore, in the near future, the feasibility of increasing the baggage allowance for outgoing repatriates to 500 lbs of personal effects and 4000 lbs of handicraft tools and equipment per individual."

c. Jurisdiction in Northern Korea.

d. References: Sec III; IB.

Sec III; ID.

(1) Paras can both be eliminated or rewritten to indicate Soviet desires.

3. Language in Signal Communication.

a. References: Sec IV; IA and B.

b. Hq & Hq.

Transmit Russian from Soviet Hq.

Transmit English from SCAP.

c. Repatriation ports.

English to Russian Port (Many ports in Japan few in Russia).

Prefer English to Maizuru however can be Russian.

d. Ship to shore -

Simpler to use Japanese.

e. Further action of frequency, call signs, Hq, and channels.

4. Availability of shipping.

a. Shipping available at present.

b. SCAP can increase rate.

c. Future availability uncertain.

5. Fuel for repatriation shipping.

a. Policy C.C.S.

Operating supplies in kind "Tab D".

Substitute measures not acceptable.

b. Arrangements with British.

6. Added Proposal by SCAP.

Sec II, IV Add.

"The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reserves the right to suspend repatriation from ~~North Korea~~ if the presence of contagious disease or diseases renders such action advisable ~~in his opinion.~~"

*Excluded  
from way 5*

*Com many Command of  
Joint Troops in*

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*Civilians*  
Agreements Reached at Conference Concerning Repatriation of Japanese  
Nationals from Korea North of 38° North Latitude to Japan, and Korean Nationals  
from Japan to Korea North of 38° North Latitude.

All agreements contained herein have been concurred in by representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, whose signatures appear at the end of this document.

Section I - General

I. Responsibilities and General Agreements:

A. ~~Japanese military personnel and other Japanese nationals~~ *civilians* now located in Korea north of 38° north latitude, estimated number for planning purposes being 100,000 (No.), will be accepted in Japan by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. Koreans who were formerly resident of Korea north of 38° north latitude estimated number for planning purposes being 10,000, will be accepted in northern Korea by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

C. Shipping for repatriation of personnel specified in paragraphs IA and IB above will be furnished by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Movement of individuals, as passengers, other than those in categories mentioned in paragraphs IA and IB is prohibited.

D. The responsibility of delivering repatriates to evacuation ports, processing them, and placing them aboard repatriation ships lies with the commander exercising control over the evacuation port. Each ship has a rated capacity. However, all details concerning selection of repatriates to be loaded on each ship, the loading plan, and the supervision of loading, including all matters related thereto, are the responsibility of the commander exercising control over the evacuation port.

E. Responsible commanders will be charged with furnishing repatriates to evacuation ports in numbers agreed upon herein so that insofar as practicable,

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ships will be loaded to capacity and will not be unduly delayed in terminal ports in either northern Korea or Japan.

F. The operational control of repatriation shipping <sup>*furnished from someone*</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>*\*\* from Japan\*\* under*</sup> be exercised <sup>*SCAP.*</sup> by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers through the administrator, <sup>*Control*</sup> Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (abbreviation: SCAJAP), a subordinate of Commander U.S. Naval Activities Japan. In northern Korean waters, repatriation ships will follow routes and procedures as prescribed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

G. On all matters other than routine sailing dispatches, representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will make the necessary arrangements with Hq of Soviet Troops in Pheenyau (Heij) (Control Agency in Korea to be designated by Soviet Government)

Routine sailing dispatches will be handled as prescribed in Section IV.

H. Nominal lists of repatriates will be prepared by the commander exercising control over the evacuation port, and five (5) copies will be given to the captain of the repatriation ship. (See paragraph I A 6, Section II).

II. Priority of ports from which repatriates will be lifted, and the estimated number for planning purposes to be processed through each port.

Port	Priority	Military	Repatriates		Total
			Civilians		
Genzan ✓	1	-	50,000		100,000
Kanko ✓			50,000		
Maizuru		-	10,000		10,000

III. Ports, maximum daily capacity for repatriates, and port capacities (berthing for type and number of ships) follow:

A.

Maximum Daily Capacity

Port	Incoming	Outgoing	Port Capacity
Genzan	—	50,000	
Kanko	—	50,000	
Maizuru	2,500	2,500	

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B. Changes in repatriation ports to be used in northern Korea will be a subject for mutual arrangements between representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

C. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reserves the privilege of changing repatriation ports to be used in Japan at his discretion.

IV. Shipping to be utilized and shuttles to be established.

A. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers agrees to provide shipping initially to move repatriates from northern Korea to Japan at a minimum daily average rate of 750 provided ports on the east coast of northern Korea are used. If west coast ports of northern Korea are used this rate will be reduced proportionally to the increased time of turn around. Korean repatriates in Japan, destined for northern Korea, will be outloaded in Japan on this shipping.

B. At a subsequent date to be determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, additional repatriation shipping may be assigned to shuttles between Japan and northern Korea. Necessary coordination will be effected between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Hq. of Soviet Troops in Phermyan Bay (control agency in Korea, to be designated by the Soviet Government) prior to

establishing new shuttles or increasing ships on shuttles agreed upon herein.

C. Within compass of this plan, no Japanese from northern Korea or Koreans destined for northern Korea will be repatriated through Korea south of 38° North Latitude.

D. Initially hospital ships will not be available for movement of repatriates.

Section II - Medical Procedures

I. Processing Repatriates.

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Military commanders, both in Korea and Japan, are responsible for medical processing of repatriates leaving their areas in accordance with international quarantine procedures. As a minimum, the following will be done.

1. Smallpox vaccination will be given to all.
2. Typhus vaccine will be given to all.
3. Cholera vaccine will be given during spring and summer.
4. Disinfestation of repatriates and their baggage. DDT or a comparable substitute will be used.
5. Repatriates will be examined by competent medical personnel and no individual having the following quarantinable diseases will be placed aboard a repatriation ship: smallpox, typhus, cholera, anthrax, yellow fever, plague, leprosy, and such other communicable disease which might prejudice the health of subsequent contacts.
6. Appropriate notation will be made on the passenger lists to show whether these minimum medical requirements have been met.

## II. Aboard repatriation ships.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible that:

1. The masters of repatriation ships notify the responsible control agency in the country of entry of the presence on board ship of any of the following diseases or exposed passengers traveling during incubation periods as follows: Cholera - 5 days, plague - 6 days, yellow fever - 6 days, louse-borne typhus - 12 days, and smallpox - 14 days.
2. Repatriation ships are cleaned and disinfested in Japan.

## III. Japanese medical personnel aboard repatriation ships.

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Japanese medical personnel will be placed aboard all repatriation ships. This personnel is part of the permanent ships party and will not be removed from their ship in Soviet controlled ports for other purposes.

→ IV Add  
Section III - Currency, Securities, and Other Documents and Possessions.

I. Japanese Repatriates Returning to Japan.

A. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will ~~permit~~ individual repatriates to bring with them from northern <sup>Korea</sup> Korea the following:

\*\* Value of currency of the Bank of Chosen - maximum - ¥1000\*\*

9m. 1. ~~Currency in current Bank of Chosen notes or the equivalent in local currency.~~

a. ~~Commissioned-officers - a maximum of ¥500.~~

b. ~~Non-commissioned-officers and enlisted men - a maximum of ¥200.~~

c. ~~Civilians (including civilians attached to Japanese Army and Navy) - a maximum of ¥1000.~~

2. Japanese Government bonds expressed in yen, in lieu of yen currency up to the limits stipulated in paragraph I A 1 above.

9m. 3. ~~Japanese prisoners of war will be permitted to bring with them additional amounts of currency in Bank of Chosen notes or the equivalent in local currency, equal to payments made to them or accumulated by them while interned as prisoners of war.~~

3 4. Financial instruments.

a. Postal savings pass books of the Japanese Postal Savings System.

b. Post Office Life Insurance policies and other insurance policies issued by Japanese companies.

c. Bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan.

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~~d. Japanese Army and Navy field postal savings pass-books.~~

*me*  
4. Clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner, and limited to the amount each person can carry at one time.

*me*  
B. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will permit Japanese repatriates returning to Japan to bring with them items in kind and amounts as listed in paragraph I A, Section III above.

*me*  
C. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will permit returning Japanese military units to bring with them from northern Korea the following:

- Can be qualified*
1. Administrative documents relating to military personnel to include service records, data on promotions, awards, decorations, pay, allowances and allotments, and other official documents necessary for completing final records and discharge papers of military and auxiliary personnel, to include administrative regulations and procedures covering personnel matters.
  2. Tables of organization and equipment, strength returns, changes in command and military directories.
  3. Health regulations, hospital records and sick reports.
  4. Courts martial proceedings, records of arrests and confinements, and files of pending cases.
  5. Inventories, budgets, receipts, disbursements and settlements of purely military accounts.
  6. Demobilization and repatriation regulations.
  7. Official documents necessary for settlement of records and accounts of the deceased who were formerly in the military or auxiliary service.
  8. Lists of missing personnel and deserters. - -
  9. Official organization seals.

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*Approval of Soviet Authority*  
*subject to ities*

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~~D. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will permit Korean-repatriates returning to northern Korea to take with them items in-kind and amounts as listed in paragraph I C, Section-III-above.~~

II. Korean repatriates returning to northern Korea.

Individual repatriates will be permitted to take with them the following:

~~\*\*¥3000\*\*~~

1. ¥1000 per person (Bank of Chosen). *Bank of Japan (1) or (2)*

2. Postal Savings pass books and bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan and in Korea.

3. Insurance policies issued in Japan and in Korea.

4. Checks, drafts, and certificates of deposit drawn on and issued by financial institutions in Japan and payable in Japan.

5. Clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner.

These effects will be limited in weight to ~~250~~ <sup>\*\*500\*\*</sup> lbs per person. *(1) or (2)*

~~\*\*III. In addition to those indicated in paragraph II of Section III, the Korean repatriates from Japan will be permitted to take with them their own equipment, owned by them, from handicraft shops, not in excess of two tons.\*\*~~

Section IV - Communication

I General.

It is agreed that:

~~\*\*and the Russian language\*\*~~

A. The English language/would be used in signal communications between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning repatriation.

~~\*\*and the Russian language\*\*~~

B. Japanese language/will be used in communicating from ship to shore.

II. Sailing dispatches.

A..Port directors or other Allied military personnel in charge of various ports embarking repatriates will send sailing dispatches on all repatriation ships leaving their ports. Addressees are as follows:

1. For debarkation ports in Japan:

<u>Port</u>	<u>Action addressee</u>	<u>Information addressee</u>
Maizuru	CG 25th Inf Div	SCAP CG Eighth Army CG I Corps

2. For debarkation ports in Northern Korea.

*Agreements will be submitted to Mr. Munnis prior*

*leave 250 Note rewrite*

*leave out*

*SCAP U*

*Note Rewrite*

*Munnis*

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Port

Action Addressee

Information Addressee

Genzan  
Kanko

*Military Commandant*  
" "

*Hq of the  
Sordid Troops in  
Phenyau (Heijo)*

B. Information to be included in sailing dispatches as follows:

Dispatches are in two parts.

Part I.

The code word "Repats" is the first word of the text, followed by name and number of ship, port of departure, actual time of departure, port of debarkation, and estimated time of arrival.

Part II.

Code.

A

- Total repatriates embarked.

~~B~~

- Total number ~~army~~ embarked.

~~C~~

- Total number ~~navy~~ embarked.

~~D~~

- Total number ~~civilians~~ embarked.

**\*\*B\*\*** ~~E~~

- Total number litter cases.

**\*\*C\*\*** ~~F~~

- Number of repatriates who have not been completely medically processed. See paragraph I, Section II above.

*Can go along*

C. Dispatches shall be condensed and prepared without classification in the following form:

(Example)

Movement of 3,750 repatriates from KANKO to MAIZURU on ship TARA MARU. 2,150 are army, 730 are navy, 870 are civilians, and 14 litter cases. All have been completely medically processed. Ship departed at

DRAFT

DRAFT

D R A F T

D R A F T

D R A F T

1300 hours 17 May, with an estimated time of arrival at MAIZURU of 0800 hours 21 May.

## Form for Dispatch:

From: (USSR command at KANKO)  
To : CG 25th Infantry Division  
Info: SCAP, CG Eighth Army, CG I Corps, (add any USSR Commands desired).

REPATS X TARA MARU KANKO 171300 MAIZURU 21800 A 3750 ~~D 2150~~

~~\*\*B\*\*~~

~~C 730 D 870 E 14.~~

~~\*\*C\*\*~~

Note: The absence of ~~UF~~ in the above message indicates that all medical processing has been completed.

B. Upon consummation of this agreement, representatives of SCAP and USSR will meet to determine details of signal communications.

Section V - Supply in Repatriation

I. Food, medical supplies, and coal.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible that the Japanese Government furnish the necessary food, <sup>and</sup> medical supplies, ~~and coal~~ for ships engaged in repatriation to and from northern Korea.

II. Fuel Oil.

*From*  
\*\*The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible for the ~~In as-much as-fuel oil is-unavailable-for-repatriation ships from-Jap- supply of fuel oil by the Japanese Government or the military authorities anese-sources, the government-of the Union of-Soviet Socialist Republics agrees of the U. S. A., to be utilized for repatriation to and from Korea.\*\*~~ ~~to-furnish-fuel oil and bear-the-initial-cost thereof for ships repatriating- to and from-northern Korea subject to-ultimate Japanese-reimbursement-in ac- cordance-with accounting-instructions to-be established on-a-governmental level. Ships will-be fueled-in northern-Korean ports for the round trip. -Sailing- dispatches-will include the amount-of oil each-ship requires. -~~

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D R A F T

D R A F T

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D R A F T

D R A F T

D R A F T

## III. Emergency Supplies for repatriation ships at ports in northern Korea.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees, in cases of emergency, to furnish food, medical supplies, coal, or material repairs to repatriation ships so that they can continue their voyage. The master of the ship will give a quantitative receipt for supplies obtained. These receipts will specify amount and kind of supplies, and whether the supplies ~~are to be used for Japanese troops or civilians.~~ The receipts will be held for later accounting as may be determined on a governmental level.

The agreements contained herein have been concurred in by the representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, whose signatures appear below:

---

N.K. Derevyanko, Lt. Gen  
Representative for the Government  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics.

---

Representative for the Supreme  
Commander for the Allied Powers.

D R A F T

D R A F T

D R A F T

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GA/MWB/blc

GHQ SCAP

No

19 June 1946  
: 272

WARCOS (PASS TO SECSTATE) . . . . . PRIORITY

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AS CHIEF CMA DIPLOMATIC SECTION ITEM AM TODAY FORWARDING THE FOLLOWING PAREN THIS IS ATCHESONS TWO SEVEN TWO JUNE NINETEEN PAREN ( C - 62233 ) LETTER TO GENERAL DEREVYANKO CMA SOVIET MEMBER ALLIED COUNCIL CLN PARA QUOTE WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR LETTER NO FOUR ZERO ONE NINE FOUR OF THREE JUNE ONE NINE FOUR SIX ADDRESSED TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER CMA AND TO MY LETTER OF ONE FOUR JUNE ONE NINE FOUR SIX IN REPLY REGARDING THE QUESTION OF JAP SHIPPING CMA ITEM FEEL THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL POINTS WHICH ITEM SHOULD BRING URGENTLY TO YOUR ATTENTION WITH THE REQUEST THAT YOU IN TURN CMA AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE CMA PAREN REMYTEL TWO SIX ONE JUNE ELEVEN PAREN INVITE THE ATTENTION OF YOUR GOVT TO THEM PARA QUOTE YOU WILL RECALL THAT ITEM MENTIONED IN MY LETTER THAT PRESENT REPATRIATION PLANS REQUIRE THE USE OF ALL OPERABLE JAP SHIPS PD TO MAKE POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION OF THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF THESE VESSELS IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THE REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE FROM ABROAD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE PARA QUOTE IN THE POTSDAM DECLARATION IT IS STIPULATED INTER ALIA THAT CLN INDENT SINGLE QUOTE THE JAP MILITARY FORCES CMA AFTER BEING COMPLETELY DISARMED CMA SHALL BE PERMITTED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEAD PEACEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE LIVES SINGLE QUOTE END INDENT THE SUPREME COMMANDER AT THE OUTSET WAS NOT ONLY EMPOWERED CMA BUT ALSO CHARGED TO TAKE ANY AND ALL STEPS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE TERMS OF SURRENDER FROM THE MOMENT OF JAP CAPITULATION PD IN THE LIGHT OF HIS AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES CMA THE SUPREME COMMANDER CMA IN SEPT OF LAST

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YEAR CMA SET IN MOTION ABLE REA TRIATION PROGRAM FOR JAPANESE  
ABROAD PD EXCELLENT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THIS PROGRAM AND  
CMA SINCE ITS INCEPTION CMA JAP HAVE BEEN BROUGHT BACK IN LARGE  
NUMBERS AND HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES PD THERE HAS BEEN  
HOWEVER ONE NOTABLE GROUP EXCEPTION DASH THOSE JAP WHO WERE  
CAPTURED AND DETAINED BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES PD ALLIED AUTHORITIES  
OF CHINA. CMA THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH CMA AND OF OTHER AREAS HAVE  
OFFERED PROMPT AND FULL COOPERATION TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN  
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE QUOTED TERM OF SURRENDER PARA  
QUOTE THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE REPATRIATION  
PROGRAM THE FOLLOWING RESULTS CLN INDENT QUOTE DURING THE PERIOD  
OCT ONE NINE FOUR FIVE DASH JUNE ONE NINE FOUR SIX CMA REPATRIATION  
OF JAP FROM AREAS UNDER CONTROL OF UNCLE SUGAR ABLE CAM BRITAIN  
CMA CHINA CMA AND RUSSIA HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN THE FOLLOWING  
PERCENTAGES BASED ON FIGURES AVAILABLE HERE CLN ABLE PD UNCLE  
SUGAR ABLE CONTROLLED AREAS NINE THREE PERCENT BAKER PD BRITISH  
CONTROLLED AREAS SIX THREE PERCENT CHARLIE PD CHINA CONTROLLED  
AREAS FIVE EIGHT PERCENT DOG PD RUSSIAN CONTROLLED AREAS ZERO  
PERCENT PARA QUOTE LARGE NUMBERS OF JAP REPATRIATES WHO ILLEGALLY  
CROSSED THE THREE EIGHT DEGREE NORTH PARALLEL TO SOUTHERN KOREA  
HAVE BEEN EVACUATED FROM PORTS IN SOUTHERN KOREA END INDENTATION  
PARA QUOTE THE QUESTION OF THE REPATRIATION OF JAP CAPTURED AND  
DETAINED BY SOVIET FORCES HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF  
THE SUPREME COMMANDER BY THE JAP GOVT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS PD  
INQUIRIES IN REGARD TO INDIVIDUAL JAP HAVE ALSO BEEN RECEIVED  
IN LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF PERSONAL LETTERS FROM FRIENDS AND  
RELATIVES OF JAP AS YET UNHEARD FROM IN FORMER WAR AREAS NOW OR

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FORMERLY CONTROLLED BY THE SOVIET ARMY PD THIS NATURAL APPREHEN-  
 SION ON THE PART OF LARGE NUMBERS OF JAP IS ABLE DISTURBING AND  
 DISQUIETING FACTOR WHICH SHOULD BE ALLEVIATED PARA QUOTE ITEM  
 SUBMIT THE OPINION THAT THE APPLICABLE TERMS OF SURRENDER SHOULD  
 NOT BE UNILATERALLY ABROGATED OR DISREGARDED BUT SHOULD BE CARRIED  
 OUT VOLUNTARILY CMA AND AS PROMPTLY AS PRACTICABLE CMA BY ALL  
 ALLIED AUTHORITIES CONCERNED PD THE SUPREME COMMANDER CMA ON HIS  
 PART CMA HAS DONE ALL IN HIS POWER TO SEE THAT THERE IS FULL AND  
 PROMPT COMPLIANCE WITH THESE TERMS PD FAILURE ON THE PART OF ONE  
 GOVT OR OFFICIALS OF ONE GOVT TO OFFER THE SAME MEASURE OF FULL  
 COOPERATION AS HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM OTHER ALLIED GOVTS TO  
 PUT INTO OPERATION A PROGRESSIVE PROGRAM FOR REPATRIATION OF JAP  
 MAY WELL GIVE RISE TO WIDESPREAD MISAPPREHENSION AND MISUNDER-  
 STANDING PARA QUOTE IT IS REQUESTED CMA THEREFORE CMA THAT THIS  
 MATTER BE BROUGHT URGENTLY TO THE ATTENTION OF YOUR GOVT IN ORDER  
 THAT INSTRUCTIONS MAY BE ISSUED TO THE APPROPRIATE SOVIET AUTHORITIES  
 TO DELIVER TO REPATRIATION PORTS JAP NOW HELD BY THEM PD DETAILS OF  
 THE PROGRAM MAY READILY BE WORKED OUT BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BE-  
 TWEEN APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME  
 COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS AND YOUR OFFICE PARA QUOTE AS THIS  
 MATTER IS ALREADY BEFORE THE ALLIED COUNCIL IN SOME ASPECTS CMA  
 ITEM EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT YOU MAY BE IN POSITION TO PROVIDE  
 DEFINITIVE INFORMATION IN REGARD TO IT BY THE TIME OF THE NEXT  
 REGULAR MEETING SCHEDULED FOR TWO SIX JUNE PD VERY SINCERELY YOURS  
 CMA FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER END QUOTE

OFFICIAL:

JOHN B. COOLEY,  
 Colonel, AGD,  
 Adjutant General.

APPROVED BY:

GEORGE ATCHESON, JR.,  
 Ambassador,  
 Chief, Diplomatic Section

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Diplomatic Section

CA/MWB/ch

June 19, 1946

Dear General Derevyanko:

With reference to your letter no. 40194 of 3 June 1946 addressed to the Supreme Commander, and to my letter of 14 June 1946 in reply regarding the question of Japanese shipping, I feel that there are several points which I should bring urgently to your attention with the request that you in turn, as expeditiously as possible, invite the attention of your Government to them.

You will recall that I mentioned in my letter that present repatriation plans require the use of all operable Japanese ships. To make possible consideration of the final disposition of these vessels it would appear to be necessary to complete the repatriation of Japanese from abroad as rapidly as possible.

In the Potsdam Declaration it is stipulated inter alia that:

"The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives".

The Supreme Commander at the outset was not only empowered, but also charged to take any and all steps necessary to implement the Terms of Surrender from the moment of Japanese capitulation. In the light of his authority and responsibilities, the Supreme Commander, in September of last year, set in motion a repatriation program for Japanese abroad. Excellent progress has been made in this program and, since its inception, Japanese have been brought back in large numbers and have been returned to their homes. There has been however one notable group exception -- those Japanese who were captured and detained by the Soviet authorities. Allied authorities of China, the British Commonwealth, and of other areas have offered prompt and full cooperation to the Supreme Commander in the implementation of the above-quoted Term of Surrender.

There has already been accomplished under the repatriation  
program

Lieutenant General K. Derevyanko,  
Member for the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics,  
Allied Council for Japan,  
Tokyo.

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program the following results:

During the period October 1945 - June 1946, repatriation of Japanese from areas under control of USA, British, China, and Russia has been accomplished in the following percentages based on figures available here:

a. USA controlled areas	93%
b. British controlled areas	63%
c. Chinacontrolled areas	58%
d. Russian controlled areas	0%

Large numbers of Japanese repatriates who illegally crossed the 38° North parallel to Southern Korea have been evacuated from ports in southern Korea.

The question of the repatriation of Japanese captured and detained by Soviet forces has been brought to the attention of the Supreme Commander by the Japanese Government on several occasions. Inquiries in regard to individual Japanese have also been received in literally hundreds of personal letters from friends and relatives of Japanese as yet unheard from in former war areas now or formerly controlled by the Soviet Army. This natural apprehension on the part of large numbers of Japanese is a disturbing and disquieting factor which should be alleviated.

I submit the opinion that the applicable terms of surrender should not be unilaterally abrogated or disregarded but should be carried out voluntarily, and as promptly as practicable, by all Allied authorities concerned. The Supreme Commander, on his part, has done all in his power to see that there is full and prompt compliance with these terms. Failure on the part of one Government or officials of one Government to offer the same measure of full cooperation as has been received from other Allied Governments to put into operation a progressive program for repatriation of Japanese may well give rise to widespread misapprehension and misunderstanding.

It is requested, therefore, that this matter be brought urgently to the attention of your Government in order that instructions may be issued to the appropriate Soviet authorities to deliver to repatriation ports Japanese now held by them. Details of the program may readily be worked out by mutual agreement between appropriate officials of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and your office.

As this matter is already before the Allied Council in some

aspects

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aspects, I express the hope that you may be in position to provide definitive information in regard to it by the time of the next regular meeting scheduled for 26 June.

Very sincerely yours,

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

GEORGE ATCHESON, JR.  
Ambassador  
Chief, Diplomatic Section

Copies to:

CinC  
C/S  
G-2  
G-3  
Col.Fellers  
ComNavJap  
AG

NOTE FOR RECORD:

This letter was approved by the CinC.

/s/ MWB  
/t/ MWB - 22343

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Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North  
Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles.

G-3

DS

19 June 1946

1. Forwarded herewith, as a matter of primary interest to the Dip-  
lomatic Section, are:

a. C.L.O. 2814 (RJ), 11 June 46, subject: "Repatriation of Jap-  
anese Nationals from North Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles".

b. C.L.O. 2842 (RJ), 13 June 46, subject: "Expression of  
Gratitude for safe Return of Japanese Diplomats, etc".

2. Diplomatic Section (Mr Bishop) agrees to accept action on memo-  
randums referred to in paragraph above.

2 Incls: as indicated above.

-----C. A. R.-----

Russia

Repatriation

G-3

DS

18 June 1946

1. During the period October 1945 - June 1946, repatriation of Japanese from areas under control of USA, Britain, China, and Russia has been accomplished in the following percentages based on figures available here:

- a. USA controlled areas 93% ✓
- b. British controlled areas 63% ✓
- c. China controlled areas (exclusive of Manchuria) 58% ✓ 91%
- MANCHURIA - - - - - 087% ✓
- d. Russian controlled areas 0%

2. Some 84,800 Japanese repatriates who illegally crossed the 38° North parallel to Southern Korea have been evacuated from ports in southern Korea.

3. Two (2) copies of report, "Status of Repatriation" are inclosed for your information.

1 Incl - as indicated above.

- C. A. R. -

For week ending 23 June

US areas 93%  
 British 68%  
 China (excl of Manchuria) 94%  
 Manchuria 10%  
 Russian 0%

7 July

US - 93%  
 Aust - 98%  
 China - 97%  
 Manchuria - 17%  
 Russian - 0%  
 British -

## Transmittal of Correspondence

G-3

AG

15 June 1946

## 1. Forwarded herewith following correspondence for dispatch:

a. Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government, file AG 370.05, subject: "Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles."

b. Check Note to G-2, dated 15 June 1946, subject: "Transmittal of Correspondence"; with inclosure, Memorandum to General Derevyanko, subject as la above; with inclosure, letter, C.L.O. #2814 (RJ), subject as la above.

c. Check Note to Diplomatic Section, dated 15 June 1946, subject: "Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles"; with inclosure, letter C.L.O. #2814 (RJ), same subject.

d. Letter to the Chief of Staff, US Army, subject: "Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles," with inclosure, letter, C.L.O. #2814 (RJ), same subject.

## A Inclosures:

- Incl 1. Memo to IJG.
- Incl 2. C/N to G-2.
- Incl 3. C/N to Dip Sec.
- Incl 4. Ltr to C/S US Army.

----- C. A. R. -----

Transferred  
to DS <sup>m</sup>  
19 June  
(See 183)

## Transmittal of Communication.

G-3

Thru: G-2  
C/S

15 June 1946

It is requested that the inclosed memorandum dated June 1946, subject: "Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles", with one inclosure, C.I.O. No. 2814 (RJ) 11 June, same subject be delivered to Lt General K. Derevyanko, Chief of the Soviet Section, Allied Council for Japan.

1 Incl - as indicated above.

----- C. A. R. -----

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 370.05 (

)cc

APO 500

MEMORANDUM TO: Lieutenant General K. Derevyanko, Member for  
U.S.S.R., Allied Council for Japan

SUBJECT : Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North  
Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles.

Forwarded herewith C.L.O. No. 2814 (RJ), dated 11 May  
1946, subject as above. It is requested that information be  
furnished on which to base a reply.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

1 Incl - as indicated above.

Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from  
North Manchuria, N. Korea, Sakhalin and  
Kuriles.

G-3

Dip Sec

15 June 1946

1. Reference is made to letter from the Imperial Japanese Government, file G.L.O. 2314 (RJ), dated 11 June 1946, subject: "Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles", copy herewith.

2. In view of the fact that the Allied Council for Japan is expected to discuss the matter of repatriation from Soviet controlled areas in the near future, it is requested that the Diplomatic Section take the necessary action to have the points raised in the reference letter included in the discussion. Following discussion by the Council it is requested that the necessary information on which to base a reply to the Japanese Government be furnished.

3. A copy of the above mentioned document has been forwarded to the Chief of Staff, US Army for transmittal to the US State Department for their information, and to General Derevyanko, Soviet Member of the Allied Council for Japan requesting information on which to base a reply to the Japanese Government.

1 Incl - as indicated above.

-----C. A. R.-----

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 370.05 (15 June 46)CC

APO 500  
15 June 1946SUBJECT: Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North Manchuria,  
North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles.TO : The Chief of Staff, United States Army,  
Washington 25, D.C.

1. Forwarded therewith is letter from the Imperial Japanese Government to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, file C.L.O. No. 2814 (RJ), dated 11 June 1946, subject as above.

2. Request that this communication be transmitted to the State Department for information.

3. In accordance with instructions contained in radio WX 80449 of 13 March 1946 the following action has been taken here:

a. The subject matter has been referred to the Allied Council for Japan to be placed on the agenda for discussion by the Council.

b. A copy of reference letter has been transmitted to General K. Derevyanko, Soviet Member of the Allied Council for Japan requesting information on which to base a reply.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

1 Incl - as indicated above.

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Action paper is C.L.O. 2814 (RJ), 11 June 46, subject: "Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles." Paper briefs what is known of the situation of Japs in Russian-occupied areas and asks that SCAP take the necessary steps to terminate the present situation. Also requests official info re the whereabouts, safety and approximate date of repat of these people.
2. Washington radio WX 80449 of 13 March (Tab A) lays down following State Dept policy in cases of petitions concerning repat from Soviet areas:
  - a. Take up with Soviet Ln Mission in Tokyo (now Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan).
  - b. If no result then refer to WD.
3. Conference is now being arranged by SCAP with the Soviets for discussion of mutual repatriation between Japan and N. Korea. Information on which to base a partial reply may be obtained in this conference.
4. Diplomatic Sec (Mr. Bishop) suggests the following action be considered:
  - a. Forwarding to Mr. Acheson, Allied Council for <sup>J</sup>apan, to be included in the Council's discussion concerning repatriation from Soviet controlled areas.
  - b. Forwarding to Gen Derevyanko requesting info on which to base a reply.
  - c. Forwarding to C.S, USA for transmittal to State for information.
5. The subject of repatriation from Soviet held areas is expected to be discussed shortly by the Allied Council for Japan (Mr. Bishop).
6. In view of State policy para 3b above it is believed the information should be furnished to WARCOS indicating steps we are taking.
7. Recommend dispatch of attached letters and C/N.
8. Concurrence: Dip Sec (Mr Bishop).
9. This matter has been considered in its relation to Korea.
10. This does not complete action on this subject.

Strauss.

COPY  
*Russia*IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
Central Liaison Office

TO : GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER  
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.

FROM : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from North  
Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles.

C.L.O. No. 2814(RJ)

11 June 1946

1. The rapid progress of the repatriation of overseas Japanese nationals is a matter of deep satisfaction to the Imperial Japanese Government. Especially the news of the recent opening up of South-Manchuria for partial repatriation was received by the entire Japanese nation with a sense of tremendous relief, as the fate of the Japanese nationals in Manchuria, numbering about 1,900,000 (1,200,000 civilians and 700,000 military personnel) at the time of surrender, had been their greatest concern. The Japanese Government would like to express its deepest gratitude to the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, in accomplishing this tremendous task despite many difficulties on the spot. At the same time the Japanese Government takes the liberty of asking the General Headquarters to transmit to the Government of the Allied Powers concerned its appreciation for their part in facilitating the repatriation of the Japanese nationals under their control.

2. However, the conditions in North Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles are still completely in the dark. Other than a few people who overcame dire peril to their lives and escaped to Japan, no Japanese nationals have so far been repatriated. Most of these Japanese are, according to eye-witness reports by the few persons who escaped to Japan, in a most miserable condition; they have lost their jobs, and their property was either plundered or confiscated, or sold in order to buy food, so that it is feared that they will be unable to survive a second winter. Their fervent desire is repatriation at the earliest possible moment, and their families and relatives in Japan are, as may well be known to the General Headquarters, awaiting most anxiously for the day of reunion. The Japanese Government, therefore, ventures to repeat once again its request that the General Headquarters be good enough to use its good offices in order to expedite the repatriation of the Japanese nationals from these areas.

3. It is believed that many of the demobilized Japanese soldiers in Manchuria, North Korea, Sakhalin and Kuriles were taken to Siberia and elsewhere in order to be used as laborers. In addition, many Japanese who were higher police and administrative officials were also similarly taken away (Some pertinent information as per attached). No notifi-

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cation about their whereabouts and the prospect of their repatriation has so far been received by the Japanese Government, and it is needless to say that these circumstances are causing much worry and anxiety among their families in Japan. In face of the stipulation of Article 9 of the Potsdam Declaration, which permitted the Japanese Military forces, after being completely disarmed, to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives, the Japanese Government believes it not improper to ask that the General Headquarters be good enough to take necessary steps in order to terminate the present situation. If, at least, official information about their whereabouts and safety, together with the approximate date of their repatriation, could be obtained through the good offices of the General Headquarters, the Japanese Government would be most grateful.

4. The Japanese Government trusts that the General Headquarters will appreciate the situation and give favourable consideration to this application.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

/s/ S. Iguchi

(S. Iguchi)  
Director of General Affairs,  
Central Liaison Office.

Enclosure: Information as indicated  
in Para. 3 above.

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Information concerning the whereabouts of the former  
Japanese Military Personnel in the areas  
occupied by the Soviet forces.

A. Press or radio reports.

1. Radio Moscow, 10.9.45 (Manchuria)

The total loss suffered by the Japanese forces in the Soviet-Japan fighting between 9 August and 9 September amounts to 674,000 officers and men, including 594,000 prisoners (of which 148 are Generals) taken by the Soviet forces.

2. AP-Kyodo, from Mukden 28.2.46 (Manchuria)

On 28 February 1946, General Stankvitch, Commander of the Soviet forces in the Mukden area, declared in the interview with American and British journalists that Japanese prisoners in the Mukden area were sent to the camps in Siberia instead of to Japan, but he didn't know whether and for what purpose.

3. Radio Moscow, 8.4.46 (Manchuria)

Lt. General Kamimura, former Commander of the Kwantung 4th Army, committed suicide on 23 March 1946 during his internment in a POW camp.

4. AP from Chungking, 14.3.46 (Manchuria)

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese National Army reported to the National Assembly that, of the 705,000 Japanese Army in Manchuria, 200,000 are receiving military training in Soviet style in the Soviet-Manchurian border area and other 100,000 were sent to Siberia.

5. "Pacific Stars and Stripes" 12.3.46 (Manchuria)

Mr. Reynolds Packard an UP correspondent, reported that according to reliable information Japanese soldiers in Manchuria

were

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were probably sent to Chita (in Siberia) as factory workers.

B. Reports brought back by the Japanese who escaped from the Soviet occupied areas.

1. (Manchuria and North Korea)

A Korean who came back from East Manchuria to Korea reported as follows:

Japanese soldiers wearing two blankets and heavy overcoat were seen being moved to eastward from Chientao and Tumen districts under the surveillance of the Soviet soldiers. Japanese soldiers attired in the same manner were also been being moved to Hsunchieh (forking point of the railway to Hunchun) from Kamisanpo and Nanyo in northern Korea. (Reported by Mr. Tateo Suzuki, engineer of the Korean Railway, on 6 February 1946.)

2. (Manchuria)

According to the information brought back by Mr. Masayuki Saito of the Manchuria Aquatic Products Co. who left Hsinking on 12 December, the Japanese soldiers in Tungning and Tunhwa districts seem to have been moved to Vladivostok, those in Hsinking and Harbin to the Soviet territory via Manchouli and those in Heiho district to Blagoveshchensk.

3. (Manchuria)

An official of the consulate of Manchukuo who returned from Blagoveshchensk in June, said that the Japanese soldiers and Japanese pioneer colonists were moved from Manchuria to Blagoveshchensk. However the pioneer colonists were sent back to Manchuria as they were not soldier.

4.

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4. (Manchuria) Mr. Kozo Otajima, a member of the Paiken Colonists Groupe in Heiho Province, who returned to Japan on May, told that he was transferred to Blagoveshchensk on 7 October together with 700 other Japanese assembled at Peian from various districts in the northern Manchuria, and was released on the next day. At that time he saw Japanese soldiers being employed in woodcutting and carrying of provisions.

5. (Manchuria) Mr. Iwao Nakamura, Councillor of the Manchuria Iron Manufacturing Company, and two others returned to Japan on February and reported as follows:

About 7,000 Japanese soldiers were moved to Soviet territory from Anshan as captives in the early part of November after completion of removing Anshan Iron Manufacturing factory by the Soviet forces. Destination of these Japanese soldiers was not known. But it was said that they were going to be transferred to Ukraine or Iran as laborers and would not be able to return to Japan for three years. Half of those Japanese soldiers who were astounded by this measure fled to the mountain district, east of the city, and others concealed themselves in factories or in the city. Thus, the number of soldiers who were taken from Anshan to the Soviet territory amounts to about 4,000.

Besides, it was told that about 200,000 to 300,000 Japanese soldiers were sent to Soviet Russia from northern Manchuria.

6. (Manchuria) The following information was received at the Hakata Reception Center on 28 May from a repatriate:

In Mukden about 60,000 Japanese Consisting of:

(a) disarmed Japanese soldiers in Mukden

(b)

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(b) Japanese soldiers and male Japanese civilians in Shan-haikuan, Suichung and Chengte

(c) those Japanese soldiers who had been living mixed with

(d) all the staff members of Kyowa-Kai

were assembled together and were organized into 60 battalions (about 1,000 in one battalion) and were sent toward Siberia on 5 November. According to the information received from a Soviet soldier, they were sent to Ukraine district as laborers for production and reconstruction works.

All member of the No. 60 Battalion of the said battalion which were composed of only old and sick persons, were released (report by a repatriate who belonged to the No. 60 Battalion and was released.)

7. (North Korea) A corporal of the Eiko Garrison Artillery, who escaped from Konan on 9 November reported as follows: 3,700 officers (the highest officer was colonel) and warrant officers of the Japanese garrisons in Heijo, Kanko and Rashin were sent to Vladvostok by ship from Konan on 1 October.

About 11,000 disarmed officers and soldiers in Genzan district were once interned at Fuhyo but were moved to Konan on 10 October and, after having been engaged in loading work at the harbour, were sent to Vladivostok, (Those who collapsed on account of intense heat at Fuhyo were all shot to death.)

Up to, 9 November 1945, about 18,000 Japanese soldiers

sailed

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sailed from Konan. At that time, about 13,000 in Konan, 3,000 in Hongu, 20,000 in Heijo district (informed by an officer returned from Heijo) were waiting embarkation.

Loading capacity of the ship was 3,000-4,000. The ship was making three trips each month and was transporting 10,000 Japanese. At the time of embarkation the Japanese soldiers were told that they were going to be repatriated to Japan. Japanese officers believed this and was trying to prevent his men from escaping. These Japanese were ordered to carry with them two blankets and a heavy overcoat (Reported by Mr. T. Suzuki, mentioned above).

8. (North Korea) Judging from various reports brought back by evacuees who escaped during last November and December, all Japanese connected with military service, who had been on the way southwards, were examined by the Peace Preservation Department of Kwokai Province and were transported to Kaishu. When their figures reached a considerable number, they further sent northwards. (Reported by Mr. T. Suzuki).

9. (North Korea) Nearly all superior officials of the Evacuation Headquarters for Japanese Residents in Manchuria at Heijo, who were military men on the active service or called to the colors, were detained and transported somewhere northwards according to repatriates from the above Headquarters. (Reported by Mr. T. Suzuki)

10. (North Korea) The evacuees who made escape from Chientao on 5 January, report that part of Japanese soldiers seemed to have been sent to Vladivostok by ship from Seishin; before departure, they were all employed as longshoremen. (Reported by Mr. T. Suzuki)

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11. (North Korea) It is said that 1,900 Japanese Army officers had been interned at Mirokudo, Heijo, and 35,000 Japanese privates (formed into 33 battalions) at Sangori, of whom all the officers and half the number of privates were sent on or about 22 October 1945 to Siberia. (Statement by Kinsaburo Ishino, who came back to Japan from Heijo in January).

12. (Sakhalin and Kuriles) Most of the Japanese troops in Sakhalin were sent to the Russian continent -- generals to Moscow and Colonels to Havalovsk, according to some Russians. At the present time there are 1,000 Japanese soldiers at To-yohara and 500 medical soldiers near Odomari. Some of those who have experienced in fishing have been sent back from Vladivostok to Sakhalin to engage in fishing work. Japanese soldiers in the Kurile Islands were also sent to the Continent via Odomari. (Statement by Takeshi Sato, Chief of a police station, who escaped from Sakhalin in March).

13. (Kuriles) There were 4,000 Japanese soldiers in Shikitan Island of the Kurile Islands, when the war came to an end, but they now number 300 only (Statement made on May 15 by Ishinori Ando, Mayor of Nemuro).

14. Japanese who came back to Japan on 31 May 1946 from Moscow reported as follows:

From Irkutsk on we saw at almost every station Japanese Prisoners of War being employed in construction works, wood cutting or transport. They were wearing uniforms without insignia and had gaiters on. They seemed to be interned in big barracks, and looked comparatively tidy and well fed. In

Vladivostok Japanese soldiers were seen since about October 1945 going out and coming in trucks.

The food and clothing in Soviet has marked by improved since the termination of the war. Japanese Kimonos are on sale in Moscow, and in Siberia we have seen many Soviet women wearing cloths made from Japanese Kimonos.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500  
13 June 1946

## MEMORANDUM:

FOR : Mr Peter V. Anurov  
Deputy Political Advisor  
for the Soviet Section of the  
Allied Council for Japan from USSR.

General Derevyanko has informed the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in his letter of 22 May 1946 that you will represent the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the conference to conclude agreements on mutual repatriation between Korea north of 38° north latitude and Japan.

This conference will be held in the Conference Room, Sixth Floor, Dai Ichi Building, at 1400 hours, 19 June 1946. Acknowledgement of this communication is requested by telephone on or before 18 June (G-2 Foreign Liaison Section, Col Pash, dial 2-2668 or 2-2349).

C. A. RUSSELL,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

*For Russian Conf changed copy*  
*Make up outline*  
*showing controversial points + our objections*  
*opening statement should say that our original document is result of experience - that provisions therein have worked well for return of over 3 million repats over a period of 10 months + we see no reason for change.*  
*Stusley file*  
 (176)

**Request for Attendance of Mr. Anurov  
at SCAP Conference on Mutual Repatri-  
ation between Japan and N. Korea.**

G-3

G-2

12 June 1946

1. Forwarded herewith is letter to Mr. Peter Anurov, Deputy Political Advisor for the Soviet Section of the Allied Council for Japan.

2. It is requested that you deliver the above mentioned communication to the addressee.

----- C. A. R. -----

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

12 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

SUBJECT: Mutual Repatriation Between Japan and North Korea.

1. At Staff Conference held in the Conference Room, 6th Floor Dai Ichi Building at 1300, 11 June 1946, to crystallize SCAP policy on the above subject SCAP staff sections were represented as follows:

G-1	Lt Col Hudgins
G-2	Col Pash
	Lt Col Blake
G-3	Col Howell
	Lt Col Strauss
G-4	Col Breden
	Comdr Ryan
	Lt Col Lind
SCAJAP	Capt Weiss
	Comdr Duane
	Lt Comdr Shields
PH & W	Col Weaver
C Sig O	Maj Couch
Govt Sec	Comdr Stevens
BSS	1st Lt Beplat

2. The following controversial points were discussed:

- a. Classification of all repatriates as Japanese nationals.
- b. Currency and property restrictions for incoming Japanese repatriates.
- c. Currency and property restrictions for outgoing Korean repatriates.
- d. Use of Russian language in signal communications.
- e. Provision of fuel for repatriation ships.

3. At the conclusion of the discussions SCAP staff opinion was crystallized as follows:

a. That the provisions of the original proposal should be adhered to if possible.

b. That the following concessions would be made if necessary.

- (1) Concur in Soviet proposal to make no differentiation between Japanese civilian and military personnel. This will necessitate the screening and segregation of these repatriates at the port of entry in order that they may be processed in the same manner as other repatriates entering Japan.

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- (2) Retain SCAP provisions concerning, personal possessions and official documents allowed to be brought into Japan by returning Japanese repatriates but delete the provision requiring Soviet compliance with SCAP limitations. This concession is considered necessary in view of the fact that it is the prerogative of the USSR to establish what repatriates may carry out of Soviet controlled areas while SCAP can establish what they may bring into Japan.
- (3) Retain SCAP provisions concerning limitations on personal property and baggage allowances. However a statement has been inserted in the Agreements to the effect that a study of the feasibility of increasing these allowances to the limits desired by the Soviets will be the subject of early action by SCAP. This is necessary since, to avoid the possibility of preferential treatment to Koreans repatriating to Northern Korea, the whole question of baggage for outgoing repatriates must be taken under consideration.
- (4) Concur in use of Russian language in repatriation communication between headquarters only.

c. That no retreat from SCAP's position on the fueling of ships engaged in repatriation to and from North Korea be considered.

d. That there be included in the Agreements a provision allowing SCAP to suspend repatriation in case epidemics of contagious diseases in N. Korea make such action desirable.

4. Submitted herewith is revised draft of "Agreements Reached at Conference Concerning Repatriation of Japanese from Korea North of 38° North Latitude to Japan, and Korean Nationals From Japan to Korea North of 38° North Latitude" incorporating the revisions to which SCAP Staff Sections will agree. See Tab A. This will not be shown to the Soviet representatives.

5. Recommend:

a. That a conference with the Soviet representative and one representative from each of the interested SCAP Staff sections (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, ESS, PH & W, C Sig O, COMNAVJAP (SCAJAP), Govt Sec) be arranged for 19 June 1946 for the purpose of reaching an agreement in this matter.

b. That in event of approval of the above recommendation the attached check notes be returned to G-3 for dispatch.

6. Concurrences:

G-1	(Lt Col Hudgins)
G-2	(Col Fash)
G-4	(Comdr Ryan)
SCAJAP	(Capt Weiss)
PH & W	(Col Weaver)
C Sig O	(Maj Couch)
Govt Sec	(Comdr Stevens)
ESS	(Lt Replat)

- 4 Incls:
- Incl 1 - Tab A
- Incl 2 - Ltr to Mr Anurov
- Incl 3 - C/W to G-2
- Incl 4 - C/W to interested staff sections

CAR

Conference Concerning Mutual Repatriation  
Between Korea, North of 38° North Latitude  
and Japan.

G-3

G-1 PH&W  
G-2 C Sig O  
G-4 COMNAVJAP (SCAJAP)  
E&SS Govt Sec

12 June 1946

1. Attached hereto is revised draft of "Agreements Reached at Conference Concerning Repatriation of Japanese from Korea North of 38° North Latitude to Japan, and Korean Nationals from Japan to Korea North of 38° North Latitude", which incorporates changes to which SCAP will agree. This document is for the use of SCAP Staff sections only and is not to be shown to the Soviet representatives.
2. A conference with representatives of the Soviet Government concerning repatriation to and from Korea north of 38° north latitude will be held in the conference room on the sixth floor of the Dai Ichi Building at 1400 hours, 19 June 1946.
3. It is requested that one representative from each addressee Section be present, and that the G-3 Repatriation Section (Lt Col Strauss, dial 2-2776) be notified of their names prior to 18 June 1946.
4. G-2 representative is requested to bring an interpreter who can translate Russian.

1 Incl - as indicated above.

----- C. A. R. -----

D R A F T

*Restricted*  
D R A F T

D R A F T

Agreements Reached at Conference Concerning Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from Korea North of 38° North Latitude to Japan, and Korean Nationals from Japan to Korea North of 38° North Latitude.

All agreements contained herein have been concurred in by representatives of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, whose signatures appear at the end of this document.

Section I - General

I. Responsibilities and General Agreements:

A. Japanese nationals now located in Korea north of 38° north latitude, estimated number for planning purposes being \_\_\_\_\_ (No.), will be accepted in Japan by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. Koreans who were formerly resident of Korea north of 38° north latitude, estimated number for planning purposes being 10,000, will be accepted in northern Korea by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

C. Shipping for repatriation of personnel specified in paragraphs IA and IB above will be furnished by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Movement of individuals, as passengers, other than those in categories mentioned in paragraphs IA and IB is prohibited.

D. The responsibility of delivering repatriates to evacuation ports, processing them, and placing them aboard repatriation ships lies with the commander exercising control over the evacuation port. Each ship has a rated capacity. However, all details concerning selection of repatriates to be loaded on each ship, the loading plan, and the supervision of loading, including all matters related thereto, are the responsibility of the commander exercising control over the evacuation port.

E. Responsible commanders will be charged with furnishing repatriates to evacuation ports in numbers agreed upon herein so that insofar as practicable,

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