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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

G-3
REPORT
ON
MASS REPATRIATION
IN THE
WESTERN PACIFIC

April 1947

12 C.B.

FOREWORD

In the transition from war to peace, the Japanese people, facing many complex problems were understandably worried over the fate of their loved ones overseas. Vast numbers were scattered over the former Empire, many in remote areas, all without communication with the homeland. The prospect for early re-union seemed hopeless. Thousands of petitions from organizations and individuals bore eloquent testimony of the depth of their feelings.

Possibly more than any other one accomplishment, the prompt repatriation of their people has convinced the Japanese nation of the sincerity of the Allied Nations in their championship of the dignity of the individual and of his rights under democratic ideals.

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR
General of the Armies
(Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSREPORT ^{24 7/12, F}
ON ²
MASS REPATRIATION ²⁴
IN THE ¹²
WESTERN PACIFIC ²⁴

S.P.
This report records the accomplishments of the program for the mass repatriation of Japanese nationals and other displaced persons of the Western Pacific to their homelands. Operations from the initiation of the program until its virtual completion on 31 December 1946 are included.

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1-2-1-17
24.7-770Introduction

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Six million Japanese to be repatriated from islands in the Western Pacific and from the Asiatic mainland! This was one of the problems confronting the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) immediately after the unconditional surrender of the Imperial Japanese Government.

While Japanese were scattered throughout the world, the mass of those to be repatriated were disposed on 15 August 1945 as shown in Chart No. 1 on the page opposite. Their early return to Japan was desirable for purely humanitarian reasons as well as for the purpose of easing the economic burden of the liberated communities.

In addition, there were approximately 1,170,000 non-Japanese nationals in Japan, many of whom had been forcibly moved from their homelands. Early in September 1945 a large number of these displaced persons flocked to ports in southern Honshu and Kyushu, hoping thereby to obtain preferential priorities in repatriation. Congestion resulted with attendant health and sanitation problems which threatened the public health in Japan.

Recognizing this urgent problem, SCAP promptly initiated a program for mass repatriation, placing it under the direct general staff supervision of Assistant Chief of Staff G-3.

The basic policy for the program was contained in that part of the Potsdam Declaration which states, "The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, should be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives." The return

(return)

(introduction continued) 6

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of Japanese civilian nationals to Japan and non-Japanese nationals from Japan were encompassed in the repatriation program in accordance with US policy and when their evacuation was desirable as a matter of military necessity.

Mass repatriation until 31 December 1946 can be considered in three phases, each of which is discussed more fully in Part II. The date, 31 December 1946, marked the completion of the program except for Japanese remaining in Soviet areas, those held in connection with war crimes, some few held for labor in Netherlands East Indies (NEI) and Southeast Asia (SEA), and stragglers.

First Phase: The initial period extended from 14 September 1945 to 28 February 1946. Throughout this period the only shipping available for repatriation was that which was recovered from the Japanese, and such US manned ships which could be utilized opportunely. Evacuation from US controlled areas in the Western Pacific was emphasized.

Second Phase: During the period from 1 March 1946 to 15 July 1946 when US owned ships were made available to the Japanese to augment their own meager resources in shipping, repatriation from overseas areas swung into high gear reaching a maximum rate of 193,000 per week. Emphasized during this period was evacuation from Chinese and British controlled areas. Approximately 1,600,000 Japanese were returned to Japan from these two areas alone.

Third Phase: The period from 16 July 1946 to ¹⁹31 December 1946 was marked by a decline in the numbers repatriated, caused by the diminishing supply of repatriates delivered to embarkation ports from areas outside of Japan.

Insert

(Japan.)

(Introduction continued)

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The outstanding features of the entire repatriation program were: the vast numbers moved; the fact that all repatriation had to be conducted over water, often over great distances; and the amount of coordination which was necessary between SCAP and the various area commanders. The detailed operations from each of the principal separate areas are discussed in Part III.

This report covers only the details of mass repatriation of orientals in the Western Pacific, defined for the purposes of this report as that portion of the Asiatic-Pacific Theater west of the 180th meridian. It excludes the repatriation of occidentals, of diplomats and other special categories as these were handled on their individual merits. It is not complete as repatriation is continuing on a very small scale and because of the magnitude of the task, will continue for years. It does, however, cover the period over which the great masses were moved and agreements reached under which the small remainder will be repatriated.

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THE TASK

In arriving at a feasible solution to the problem of transporting some seven and a half million people over water, a survey of means available to SCAP disclosed the following.

Shipping, not required to support the economy of Japan, was available for repatriation from the remnants of Japan's once powerful Navy and Merchant Marine. A variety of type ships were represented: aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, three masted sailing ships, escorts, troop transports, hospital ships and merchantmen. It was necessary that all naval ships be demilitarized before being placed in use. In addition, the majority of ships had to be converted to fit them for transporting personnel. All ships were in a very poor state of maintenance and repair, hence considerable work was necessary before they could be placed in suitable operable condition. The most suitable shipyards where this could be accomplished were located at Yokosuka, Kobe, Osaka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru and Ominato. While there was a lack of materials to be used in ship repair, many parts could be procured by cannibalism and by stripping beached and sunken Japanese ships for spare parts and scrap metal. It was estimated that about 167 Japanese ships with a total passenger carrying capacity of 87,600 spaces could be kept operational 50% of the time. Sailors, who had formerly crewed ships in the Merchant Marine and Navy, were immediately available for assignment to repatriation ships. Operational control and supervision of maintenance was exercised by the US naval representative of SCAP for merchant ships; and by the Commander of the US Fifth Fleet for Naval Ships.

It was recognized that the mass movement of people from one area to another, particularly in the Orient, carried with it the attendant

(attendant)

(The Task - continued)

H-1.2

threat of epidemics of contagious diseases. This risk had to be accepted, but any program adopted required provision for rigid quarantine procedures at points of entry and egress in Japan. Similarly, controls had to be established in Japan to prevent unauthorized traffic in goods, currency, financial instruments, and precious metals. To provide these controls, the flow of repatriates was channeled through designated focal points called reception centers. Responsibility for their operation and maintenance was charged to the Japanese Ministry of Welfare.

The necessary logistic support to the repatriation program was available from Japanese resources except for the furnishment of fuel oil for ships. In order to commence the program at an early date, oil used by repatriation ships was provided initially from US sources.

Since repatriation involved personnel in areas under the command of Commander-in-Chief Army Forces Pacific (CINCAFPAC), Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command (SACSEA), Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea (CG USAFIK), Commanding General of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, Generalissimo, China, General Officer Commanding, Australian Military Forces (GOC AMF) and Commanding Generals of the occupation armies, and was to be implemented by the Japanese, closely centralized control was a necessity.

Under the concept of the occupation, the machinery of the Imperial Japanese Government (IJG) could be utilized for implementation of the repatriation program. This indubitably was a great advantage; however, the system was not without certain definite disadvantages, one of which was the psychological attitude of the Japanese people. The people, having suffered a major military defeat, witnessed widespread destruction of their

(their)

(The Task - continued)

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homes, and been subjected to a military government superimposed upon their own, were bewildered and apathetic. It was apparent that orders had to be extremely simple and that constant pressure had to be exerted in order to obtain results.

The rail system in Japan was relatively intact and could be utilized with little dislocation of normal functions for the transportation of personnel to and from ports, although rolling stock was somewhat limited.

The ports and port areas, however, presented quite a different picture. Bombings by United States Forces had caused widespread destruction of port facilities. Mines in the harbors, channels and inland waters precluded the use of many fine ports and made the operation of shipping in others extremely hazardous.

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POLICIES

After a study of the pertinent facts, SCAP evolved certain basic policies which with minor modifications governed the planned repatriation program throughout its implementation. The original policies appear below.

1. Maximum utilization will be made of Japanese naval and merchant shipping allocated for repatriation of Japanese nationals.
2. Japanese naval vessels and those Japanese merchant vessels, designed primarily for the transport of personnel and not required for inter-island or coastal passenger service, will be utilized for the repatriation of Japanese nationals.
3. Personnel to be repatriated will be transported on cargo vessels only to the extent that the cargo carrying capacity of the vessel is not curtailed thereby.
4. The IJG will operate, man, victual and supply Japanese shipping used for repatriation to the maximum practicable extent.
5. First priority will be granted to the movement of Japanese military and naval personnel, and second priority to the movement of Japanese civilians.
6. All Japanese personnel will be disarmed prior to return to Japan proper.
7. In the evacuation of Japanese nationals from areas under the control of CINCPAC and CINCPAC, the former will prescribe the percentage of shipping, allocated for repatriation purposes, to be employed in servicing the respective areas. Priorities for the evacuation of specific areas will be established as necessary. Such naval shipping as is needed

(needed)

(Policies continued) 12

K-1.2
to perform necessary naval tasks incident to the occupation will not be considered in applying the percentages.

8. In the evacuation of Japanese nationals from areas under the control of the Generalissimo, Chinese Armies, SACSEA, GOC AMF and the Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Forces in the Far East, SCAP will make the necessary arrangements.

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THE PLAN

The plan, as finally conceived, provided for the division of responsibility as follows (see Charts No. 2 and 3 below):

(1) SCAP.

- (a) Completed the necessary arrangements with coordinate and subordinate commanders for the evacuation of repatriates.
- (b) Assumed responsibility for repatriates after they were embarked on SCAP controlled ships.
- (c) Retained control of the repatriation fleet to include the allocation of shipping to the several areas concerned.
- (d) Issued necessary directives to the IJG for: the reception, care, demobilization (of military and naval personnel) and transport to their homes of returning Japanese repatriates; transportation from their homes in Japan to the evacuation ports in the case of the repatriates from Japan.
- (e) Supervised the overall execution of the program.

(2) Responsibility for the operational control of repatriation shipping and the supervision of its maintenance was vested initially in Commander, US Fifth Fleet insofar as it concerned former Japanese naval ships, and in Fleet Liaison Officer, SCAP (FLTLOSCAP) for former merchant ships.

(3) The IJG was charged with the execution of the provisions of the repatriation directives published by SCAP. This included establishment, organization and operation of repatriation reception centers, (see Charts No. 4 and 5, pages 8 and 12), transporting repatriates to and from these centers, and providing crews and supplies for repatriation ships.

(ships.)

(The Plan-continued)

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At the reception centers the IJG was required to subject each repatriate to: (a) physical examinations and quarantine procedures as were necessary; (b) inoculations against cholera and typhus, vaccination against smallpox, and disinfestation by DDT of person and baggage; (c) screening for war criminals; (d) inspection of baggage and persons to prevent unauthorized traffic in goods, financial instruments and precious metals. In addition, the following functions were performed at reception centers: rail and ship movements were coordinated; food and clothing to be placed aboard repatriation ships or to be used at the centers were assembled and distributed; returning Japanese soldiers and sailors were demobilized and furnished free rail transportation to their homes.

24B. 24C.L.B.I. CC-1,2,3
FIRST PHASE. 17 September 1945 - 28 February 1946.

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In order to avoid loss of time, repatriation from US controlled areas was conducted concurrently with the preparation of the overall repatriation program. Short range shipping was allocated to Korea and the Ryukyus, while long range shipping serviced more distant islands in the Pacific. Korea, the Ryukyus and the Philippines were cleared expeditiously except for a small number of prisoners of war (POWs). For all practical purposes, mass repatriation from these areas was completed by 1 January 1946. Similarly, the islands in the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) were cleared by March 1946. The rapid rate at which the US Army Forces were redeployed to the Zone of the Interior created an acute shortage of labor in the Ryukyus, Philippine Islands (PI) and the POA. To compensate for this shortage, authority was granted to retain temporarily POWs and Japanese surrendered personnel (JSP) in areas under control of US Army Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC), US Army Forces Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC), and CINCPAC.

During this phase arrangements were concluded with the Chinese Government, GOC AMF and SACSEA for repatriation of Japanese nationals under their control. These arrangements were relatively simple, charging the several governments and commands evacuating Japanese nationals with the responsibility for: delivering repatriates to the port of embarkation; processing them for quarantinable disease; and inspecting for excesses in amount of authorized articles in their possession and for unauthorized articles. The overseas commanders were further charged with the responsibility of insuring that ships prior to departure were properly loaded, and furnishing necessary emergency supplies.

(supplies.)

(First Phase - continued) 16

CC-1,2,3

The basis for allocation of shipping to the several areas was: the original number to be returned from each area; and the distance from Japan of the particular area. This was considered the most equitable manner to allocate the shipping because theoretically repatriates would then arrive in Japan in proportion to the initial strengths in each area.

When reduced to passenger spaces, however, the amount of passenger spaces in shipping recovered in Japanese waters was pitifully small. Hence representations were made to the appropriate authorities representing Soviet Russia, China, SACSEA, and Australia to gain the control of Japanese shipping recovered in waters under their jurisdiction. This shipping was to be used under SCAP control to support a minimum economy of Japan and for repatriation. SACSEA responded by reporting 14 ships with a total carrying capacity of 23,000. These ships eventually were operated in repatriation under SCAP control. Repeated efforts to obtain this shipping from China and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were unproductive of results. Australia had recovered no shipping suitable for this purpose.

During this phase the repatriation of non-Japanese from Japan was exceedingly successful. Of those desiring repatriation, 58% of the Koreans, 63% of the Formosans, 97% of the Chinese and 12% of the Ryukyans (Japanese) were returned to their respective homelands.

The naval organization controlling repatriation shipping underwent considerable change during this period. A US naval organization, known as the Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP), was established on 12 October 1945 with headquarters at Tokyo. They took over duties formerly performed by FLTLOSCAP and the Commander, US Fifth Fleet, in that they exercised direct control over all ships,

(ships,)

(First Phase - continued) 17

CC-1.2.3
greater than 100 gross tons, operated by the Japanese. SCAP exercised operational control over SCAJAP in repatriation matters through the G-3 Repatriation Section. Coordination was necessarily extremely close. Later, on 6 March 1946 when the office of Commander, Naval Activities, Japan (COMNAVJAP), was instituted, SCAJAP was integrated into that office as an important subdivision, although it continued to perform the same functions. In dealings with the IJG, SCAJAP worked through the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Navy until the latter went out of existence on 31 December 1945. Thereafter in place of the Ministry of Navy, SCAJAP worked through successive offices established under the Japanese Naval demobilization program.

Early in January 1946, it was apparent that repatriation in the Western Pacific would take from five to six years unless the shipping resources of the Japanese were substantially augmented. A US policy, that all Japanese influence should be removed from China as soon as practicable, precipitated action to increase shipping assigned to repatriation.

Accordingly, 100 US Liberty type cargo ships, 100 US Landing Ships, Tank (LST) and sufficient US hospital shipping to move 25,000 patients before July 1946 were made available to SCAP for repatriation, beginning early in March 1946. These ships were operated under the SCAJAP flag and crewed by Japanese.

Early in January 1946, operational procedures were incorporated in a single paper entitled, "Agreements Reached at Conference on Repatriation, January 15-17 1946, Tokyo, Japan" (see Appendix C). Similarly, all directives to the Japanese were compiled in a single directive during March of the same year. Directives were kept current. A comprehensive compilation of

(of)

(First Phase - continued)

instructions published to the IJG, SCAPIN-927, appears in Appendix B.

Under the broad concept of the Occupation, the Sixth and Eighth US Armies established troops at each of the reception centers so that close supervision over the Japanese could be exercised. When the Sixth Army was inactivated in January 1946, the Eighth Army became the sole supervising agency.

As the phase neared completion the basic policies had been published, and operational procedures had been established and tested. A good beginning had been made, as approximately a million and a half Japanese had been returned to their homes and over 800,000 non-Japanese evacuated from Japan. SCAP was ready to move into high gear.

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SECOND PHASE. 1 March - 15 July 1946

During the second phase emphasis was placed on evacuating the two million Japanese in China proper and Formosa, and the three quarters of a million in British areas in the Pacific. The largest portion of this burden was borne by the US owned shipping made available early in 1946.

These ships began arriving in February: the liberties from War Shipping Administration (WSA) vessels released in the Philippines; and the Navy LSTs released in the Marianas. These ships were turned over to the IJG under an indemnity agreement on a bare-boat basis. Although the ships had been demilitarized prior to arrival in Japan, there was considerable refitting to be done to make them suitable for carrying passengers. As the Japanese were to crew the ships, all signs and instructions had to be changed from English to Japanese. SCAJAP was responsible for this work and in addition, was responsible for training the Japanese crews.

In the accomplishment of these tasks SCAJAP did an outstanding job. Of interest is the fact that these US ships flew the SCAJAP flag, which was the flag, Option, modified so that the red diagonal was above.

As this shipping became ready for sea in early March, it was initially assigned to shuttle between China, including Formosa, and Japan in accordance with the schedules agreed at the Tokyo Conference the preceding January (Appendix C). Except for minor departures, the original schedules were followed as planned. Formosa was cleared for all practical purposes by 12 April and China proper by 12 July 1946. These vast numbers were moved under oriental standards. Indicative is the fact the liberties and LSTs were rated as having carrying capacities of 3,500 and 1,200 passengers respectively.

(respectively.)

(Second Phase - continued)

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The problem of clearing China Theater was complicated by the fact that a cholera epidemic occurred among repatriates being returned from: Haiphong, French Indo-China; Canton, China; and Kiirun, Formosa. This situation caused considerable dislocation in the repatriation program inasmuch as infected ships were quarantined, and the passengers held aboard, examined and treated until medical authorities were sure they no longer constituted a hazard to the public health of Japan. Some of these ships were held in this quarantine as long as 30 days. The magnitude of the task involved is shown by the fact that at one time there were 22 ships with a total of 76,000 repatriates in quarantine at Uraga, Japan. A total of 438 persons died of cholera in this particular instance before the epidemic was brought under control. Testimonial to excellent work by the Public Health and Welfare Section of SCAP and port quarantine officers, the barrier against cholera prevented introduction of wide-spread epidemic into Japan.

During the peak of repatriation from China, great demands were made on the reception centers and the rail system in Japan. On two successive weeks reception centers in Japan handled loads of more than 185,000 per week! Effective prior planning by reception centers and transportation units permitted the housing, welfare, and ultimate absorption into Japan of these tremendous numbers of persons without incident.

In March when US owned ships were placed in service, long range Japanese ships, previously on the China shuttle, were diverted to evacuate the three quarters of a million Japanese in SEA and Australia. Later in April, when the requirements for shipping from China decreased appreciably,

(appreciably)

(Second Phase - continued) 21

authority was obtained from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to utilize US owned ships for repatriation from these areas. As a result, Australia was cleared, except for war criminals on 18 June 1946, and SEA, except for those retained for labor, in August 1946.

In addition to returning Japanese repatriates from China, Australia and SEA, repatriation shipping under the control of SCAP lifted about 65,000 Koreans from Chinese controlled areas direct to Korea. Movement of these nationals was an extension of the US policy of repatriation, as expressed in the Potsdam Declaration, and implemented instructions from the US War Department.

In February 1946, after the initial rush to be repatriated had subsided, there was a marked decrease in numbers who wished to be repatriated from Japan. This was particularly noticeable among Koreans. Most commonly advanced reasons for this procrastination were the poor economic and political conditions reported as existing in Korea and the restrictions applied against carrying out goods and currency from Japan. To meet this apparent lack of interest in being returned to their homeland and to set a target date for the completion of SCAP's responsibilities to repatriate all non-Japanese, it was decided to register all Koreans, Formosan and Chinese nationals and Ryukyans (Japanese) in Japan, to determine those desirous of being repatriated. For those who indicated a desire to be repatriated, the privilege of review by US authorities of legal proceedings as ruled by Japanese courts was continued. Also the IJG was held responsible for their continued welfare, transportation to reception centers and ultimate embarkation on repatriation shipping. For those

(those)

(Second Phase - continued)

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who did not indicate a desire to be repatriated, the above privileges were withdrawn and, according to established policies, they were required to live on the indigenous resources of Japan. Further, the decision to remain in Japan once made was considered irrevocable and such persons were no longer entitled to the privilege of repatriation. This same policy was followed in respect to persons, who, having been duly scheduled to be repatriated, failed to move as ordered, unless such failure to move was due to circumstances over which they had no control.

In furtherance of this policy the mass return of Chinese nationals and Formosans was considered completed in May 1946. The repatriation of Koreans continued at a sluggish rate of about 6,000 per month during the period.

Efforts were again made to initiate repatriation from Soviet controlled areas on the local military level. In Korea in January, CG USAFIK conferred with the Commanding General of the Soviet Forces in the Far East, at Seoul in order to effect repatriation from North Korea to Japan. These negotiations came to nought because of certain demands by the Soviets, the chief of which was the furnishment of food and rail transportation through Korea for the repatriates. In Japan a plan for repatriation from North Korea was proposed to the member of the Allied Council for Japan from USSR. No agreement could be reached on matters concerning the supply of fuel oil for repatriation ships and the granting of preferential treatment to repatriates destined for Northern Korea.

Early in June it was realized that shipping available for repatriation far exceeded the number of repatriates that various area commanders could furnish to evacuation ports. The peak of mass repatriation had been reached and was now on the decline.

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THIRD PHASE. 16 July 1946 - 31 December 1946.

With China proper cleared and requirements of shipping desired by SACSEA established, there was a lull in repatriation activities beginning 15 July 1946. The supply of repatriates to evacuation ports dropped to negligible figures except in the case of Hulutao, Manchuria, from which repatriates were being evacuated at a rate of 7,500 a day. Repatriation from US controlled areas except for ineffective laborers had been temporarily suspended; the British announced their intention to retain 113,500 POWs in their areas until some time in 1947; Southern Korea had been cleared.

A review of the repatriation shipping requirements was made and at this time it was decided 55 US owned liberties could be returned to WSA. These ships were returned to the US by Japanese crews who were later returned to Japan in other SCAP liberties dispatched from Japan. The first of these ships sailed from Japan on 15 August 1946.

The lull was of short duration, however, as events proved. For some time SCAP had been faced with the question of retaining Japanese nationals in US controlled areas. Due to the rapid demobilization of our own forces and the difficulties of obtaining satisfactory labor from other sources, the major commanders were desperately in need of the services of Japanese POWs in order to perform the important task of rolling up our wartime bases.

The issue was squarely met, however, on 8 August 1946 when plans were announced by SCAP to return all Japanese POWs and displaced personnel in US controlled areas by the end of the year. This affected some 45,000 in PI, 5,000 in Hawaii, 7,000 in POA and 12,000 in Okinawa. These were

(were)

(Third Phase - continued)

KK-1.2

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duly evacuated in three equal increments from each of the above areas during the months of October, November and December.

Return of Okinawans was authorized during the latter part of July after the transfer of military government from CINCPAC to CINCAFPAC was effected on 1 July 1946. The plan involved the return of some 150,000 from Japan and Formosa during the period of 15 August to 31 December 1946. The plan was set up and implemented without undue difficulty.

Progressively the rate of evacuation from Hulutao, Manchuria, was increased until by the end of September over 10,000 were being evacuated daily. Because Hulutao was ridden with cholera, it was difficult to supply shipping to maintain this rate as all ships from cholera ports were held in quarantine until cleared by Public Health officials. With the advent of cold weather, the threat of cholera diminished and the critical shipping situation eased. Manchuria was cleared by 31 October 1946 except for stragglers and technicians retained by the Chinese. These are currently estimated to number about 48,000.

Noteworthy is the fact that while the Chinese Nationalist forces and the Chinese Communist forces were conducting a small scale civil war, the truce teams under General Marshall were instrumental in obtaining an agreement from the Communists to repatriate the Japanese under their control. Because of this, Japanese nationals in areas of Manchuria dominated by the Communists were evacuated through Hulutao which was under control of the Nationalist forces.

Of interest was the evacuation of many Japanese who had been stranded in North Korea, Siberia and Manchuria. Although unauthorized, almost 300,000 of these persons illegally crossed the 38th degree of north latitude and were repatriated through ports in Southern Korea.

(Korea)

(Third Phase - continued)

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With respect to British controlled areas SCAP evacuated some 89,000 Japanese nationals released by the British in SEA during the period. On various occasions, SCAP requested governmental action to induce the British to return all their Japanese nationals by 31 December 1946. These efforts were unavailing and some 80,000 remained in Malaya and Burma at the year's end.

On 26 September, the representative of the Soviet Government in Japan made a proposal to SCAP to the effect the Soviets were ready to repatriate Japanese POWs and other Japanese nationals from Soviet and Soviet-controlled areas. Action was immediately taken to conclude an agreement governing their repatriation. The negotiations moved slowly and it was not until 19 December 1946 that full agreement was reached. Under its terms the Soviets guaranteed to return to Japan all JSP and all Japanese civilian personnel who desired to return to Japan. SCAP on his part agreed to furnish the necessary shipping and to accept all responsibility for repatriates from time of embarkation. A rate of 50,000 per month was accepted by SCAP although an offer to evacuate up to 360,000 per month had been made to the Soviets. It was contemplated that Japanese coal burning ships fueled from Japanese resources would be utilized. A start had been made however and by year's end a total of approximately 28,000 had been returned over water from Northern Korea, Siberia, Dairen and Karafuto.

Repatriation from Japan continued slowly. By the end of 1946 all non-Japanese and Ryukyans who desired repatriation had either been repatriated or forfeited their privilege, except those destined for Korea north of 38° north latitude and some few others who could not move due to circumstances beyond their control. These latter cases would be

(be)

(Third Phase - continued)

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reviewed and each decided on its individual merits.

By 31 December 1946,[↓] repatriation as a major operation had been concluded. A total of 5,103,300 had been repatriated to Japan, 1,152,600 evacuated from Japan, and 187,600 repatriated directly from other areas in the Pacific (See Tables number 1, 2 and 3, pages 59, 61 and 62 respectively).

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MM-1, 2, 3, 4

KOREA, South of 38° North Latitude
EVACUATION OF JAPANESE

In the early days of the occupation a high priority was given to the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Korea, south of 38° north latitude. In that part of Korea there were some 600,000 Japanese nationals, the majority of whom were military, former administrators, and technicians. In accordance with US policy (the establishment of a self-governing Korea, independent of foreign control) it was necessary to clear the way for a democratic government, representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people, by removing at the earliest date practicable the influence exerted by the military and the officials of the former Japanese government.

Coincident with the surrender, the Japanese had resumed passenger ferry boat schedules between Korea and Japan. This shipping was promptly augmented by assigning short range Japanese vessels to assist in the repatriation of Japanese from Korea. By the end of September an average of 4,000 persons per day were being evacuated from South Korea. Additional shipping spaces were obtained by backloading Japanese from Korea in LSTs under control of CINCPAC that were engaged in moving the XXIV US Corps from Okinawa to Korea. A total of 20 LSTs were employed for this purpose and returned approximately 20,000 Japanese to Japan from Korea between the 12th and 16th of October 1945. Similarly, 50,000 Japanese were evacuated from Saishu Island, a large island off the southern tip of Korea, in LSTs.

Because of the importance of this operation, the Japanese nationals were cleared from southern Korea expeditiously. All Japanese military

(military)

(Korea - continued)

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MM-1.2.3.4.

and naval personnel except some 2,650 retained for labor were evacuated by 21 November 1945. These troops were held for the sole purpose of aiding in the repatriation of Japanese civilians. The final contingent of the Japanese army was repatriated on 28 April 1946. Japanese civilians, except for some 700 retained as key technical advisors, were evacuated by 21 March 1946. This number was further reduced to 260 by 1 August 1946 and to 127 by year's end.

An additional repatriation burden imposed upon the XXIV Corps, now functioning in the role of United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK), was the repatriation of Japanese nationals who filtered south across the border between north and south Korea. While this border was technically closed, many Japanese seeking repatriation evaded the road blocks and drifted south into the US zone as early as 1 September 1945. Initially, the rate was low. During the period 15 September 1945 to 21 May 1946, only 42,500 were evacuated via southern Korea. During the period 21 May to 30 June 1946, however, about 10,000 Japanese per week entered the US zone over the border, from locations in northern Korea, Manchuria and Siberia. This number was further increased to approximately 1,500 per day by the middle of August 1946. Efforts by the XXIV Corps to return them to the Soviet zone met with no success. As a matter of policy to protect the public health of Korea, collecting stations were established along all natural avenues of approach into southern Korea from the north. All Japanese were rounded up and brought to these collection centers where they were examined medically, immunized against smallpox, typhus and cholera and dusted with DDT to prevent the introduction of epidemic diseases into southern Korea. They were then evacuated through reception

(reception)

(Korea - continued)

29

MM-12.3.4

centers in Korea to Japan (see Chart No. 23, page 56).

The repatriation program from this area was handicapped by various incidents. In January 1946 all repatriation activities were suspended for a four-day period because of a threatened general strike. Flood conditions caused another suspension of repatriation for six weeks, from 26 June to 10 August 1946. A railroad strike in Korea necessitated a further suspension of repatriation from 26 September to 17 October 1946. A cholera epidemic in Korea necessitated placing all repatriates in quarantine prior to their evacuation. This quarantine for cholera was inaugurated on 10 August 1946 and continued until the middle of December 1946.

Prior to 10 August 1946 SCAP controlled shipping was placed on shuttle service to Korea; however, subsequent to that date ships were dispatched on request of XXIV Corps as processed repatriates became ready for shipment.

The clearance of the Japanese from Southern Korea was accomplished more expeditiously and completely than from any other area. A total of 591,765 were evacuated from the beginning of the program until 31 December 1946. The progress is shown in Chart No. 6, below.

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MM-1.2.3.4

RETURN OF KOREANS

In September 1945, the Japanese reported approximately 1,356,400 Koreans were located in Japan.

The policy concerning repatriation of Koreans provided that: they should be treated as liberated people insofar as military security permitted; those desirous of repatriation, who were not being held as war criminals or for security reasons, would be returned to their homeland as soon as practicable. However, since they had been Japanese subjects, they could, at SCAP's discretion, be treated as enemy nationals and, if circumstances so warranted, forcibly repatriated.

In essence, all Koreans in Japan were given the opportunity to be repatriated, provided they had not been in active support of the Fascist or Nazi Governments nor guilty of distributing propaganda. Those in the latter category were repatriated regardless of their desires.

Initially, Koreans flocked to repatriation ports in southern Honshu and in Kyushu in uncontrolled movements, thereby causing a serious health menace and congestion in these port areas. Since regularly scheduled ships were repatriating Japanese from Korea at the outset of the occupation, these ships were used to repatriate Koreans on the return voyage. During the period 15 September 1945 to 6 January 1946, approximately 630,000 Koreans were evacuated, averaging approximately 5,500 per day.

As the shipping assigned to repatriate Koreans could not evacuate them fast enough to alleviate the overcrowded conditions in reception centers in Japan, US manned and Japanese manned LSTs, repatriating from Northern China, were utilized to transport Koreans to Korea on their return trip to China.

(China.)

(Korea - continued) 31

MM-1.2.3.4

During the period 6 January to 17 February 1946, the daily average rate of Koreans being repatriated dropped to 3,000 and the IJG furnished information that it was meeting with increasing difficulty in getting Koreans to move to reception centers. The reasons underlying the deceleration of repatriation to South Korea were attributed to the following: the confused political situation which existed in Korea; housing shortages; widespread unemployment; general lack of organized agencies in Korea to aid repatriates; economic conditions, which were reportedly much poorer in comparison with those in Japan, to include supply of consumer goods and inflation of currency; the limitation on the amount of money and baggage that could be taken out of Japan, a matter of serious consideration, especially to those Koreans who had been established in Japan for an extended period of time.

In order to solve the problem so that SCAP could discharge his implied obligation to repatriate Koreans from Japan within a reasonable period of time, it was necessary to: determine the number of Koreans in Japan who were desirous of repatriation; establish a plan for their evacuation by a definite date; impose a forfeiture feature upon those who would not move according to plan.

As a result of this plan, on 17 February 1946, the IJG was directed to conduct a registration of all Koreans in Japan to determine their desires concerning repatriation. This registration, held on 17 March 1946 revealed that there remained approximately 508,100 Koreans in Japan who desired repatriation, of which 9,200 were formerly domiciled in North Korea and 498,900 in South Korea.

The Koreans were told at the time of registration that if they indicated they did not desire repatriation, they forfeited this privilege

(privilege)

(Korea - continued)

32

MM-1, 2, 3, 4

until regular commercial facilities were resumed between Japan and Korea. Similarly, those who indicated they desired repatriation, but refused to move according to plan set up by the IJG, also forfeited this privilege. A deadline date of 30 September 1946 for repatriation of Koreans from Japan was established. However, application of this forfeiture proviso was not arbitrarily enforced. In cases where movement was not accomplished because of circumstances beyond the control of the individual, provision was made for later repatriation.

The initial policy for repatriation had been to return Koreans from north of 38° via southern Korea. This became such a burden on the railroads and the economy of southern Korea that it was decided on 18 March 1946 to suspend movement of Koreans to north Korea until such time as these repatriates could be returned directly to their homes.

Heavy rains and attendant floods in Korea during June 1946, which disrupted rail and highway communications from the major ports to the interior, coupled with the damage caused to crops and buildings, caused a complete suspension of repatriation activities on 27 June 1946. Although CG USAFIK requested the suspension remain in effect until 30 November, SCAP, considering the political repercussion that could result if Koreans were prohibited from returning to their homeland, lifted the suspension on 10 August 1946, and repatriation was resumed. As a result of the suspension, the target date for completion of the program of repatriating Koreans destined for southern Korea was set at 15 November 1946. A further suspension of repatriation due to a strike of railway workers in Korea occurred during the period 26 September to 17 October which necessitated shifting the target date for completion of the program to 28 December 1946.

(28 December 1946).

(Korea - continued)

33

MM - 1.2.3.4

As an added incentive for Koreans in Japan to return to Korea, provision was made in September 1946 whereby each family could have shipped to Korea 500 lbs of household goods, and 4,000 lbs of tools and handicraft equipment, in addition to their personal belongings which they carried with them at the time of repatriation. Provision was also made for Koreans, already repatriated, to have tools and handicraft equipment, left in Japan, shipped to Korea.

Since September 1945, there had been illegal traffic between Korea and Japan by means of small unregistered ships. Until May 1946, movement of unauthorized persons, most of whom were Koreans, by this means was no serious threat to the health or economy of either country. However, late in May 1946, cholera broke out in south Korea. Thereafter, the entry into Japan of unauthorized persons constituted a grave danger of carrying cholera into Japan, since they were not processed through proper quarantine ports. To stop this traffic, vigorous patrol measures were taken by units of the US and British Navies, the Allied Occupation Force, and the IJG. The illegal ships which were apprehended, were impounded and the passengers and crews placed in quarantine. Upon completion of the quarantine, the Koreans were returned under guard to Korea.

During the period 1 August 1946 to 31 December 1946 some 15,000 Koreans, trying to gain illegal entrance into Japan, were apprehended and returned to Korea. It was found that the majority were former repatriates who were returning to resume residence in Japan.

As of 31 December 1946, a total of approximately 929,800 Koreans had been repatriated from Japan, excluding the illegal entrants. The rate of progress is shown in Chart No. 7 on the page opposite. There remained some 5,570 who were eligible for repatriation and whose return was scheduled during the early part of 1947.

24 B.

MM-1-2

34

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

Evacuation of the 171,000 Japanese and other nationals dispersed throughout the many islands of the Japanese defensive system in the Pacific, which were located within the boundaries of the POA (in general, the Bonin, Volcano, Marianas, Caroline, Marshall and Gilbert Islands), presented one of the more difficult problems of repatriation from US controlled areas. Personnel and shipping shortages delayed initiation of the operation, but within a month after V-J Day, movement of approximately 130,800 Japanese, 25,700 Ryukyans, 14,000 Koreans, 600 Formosans and 100 Chinese was well under way. Not included in the above totals are a few individuals who, because of past residence in that area for over ten years, had requested and obtained authority to remain.

By September 1945, Japanese shipping of a total passenger capacity of 18,000 was allocated to the clearance of these areas. This shipping was augmented by a number of small US manned ships which had been operating in POA waters. In February, 1946, such of these US ships as were designated for use as SCAJAP controlled, Japanese manned repatriation ships, were sailed to Japan with full loads of repatriates.

During the period 15 - 17 January 1946, a conference attended by representatives of all commanders interested in repatriation was held in Tokyo to establish standard repatriation procedures (see Appendix C). As a result of this conference, processing of repatriates was expedited,

(expedited)

(Pacific Ocean Areas - continued)

35

VV-1.2

operation of shipping facilitated, and additional passenger comforts made possible. Concentration of repatriates and refueling ports were decided upon; and the Commander of the Marianas Area at Guam was made responsible for onward routing and supply of repatriation vessels while within the limits of the POA. During the winter months, repatriation ships were stocked from US sources with blankets and warm clothing for passengers. This equipment, the cost of which is charged against reparations, was later collected at debarkation ports in Japan, and after dyeing and marking, was further distributed by the IJG for relief purposes. Eventually, financial processing procedures established at the conference were strictly applied when it was determined that many POWs were returning from the POA to Japan with large quantities of newly-purchased luxury items of US manufacture, such as wrist watches, fountain pens and silk stockings. All items in excess of amounts normally required by individuals were confiscated.

Though hampered by the low operational efficiency (about 50%) of the Japanese shipping and occasional supply shortages, repatriation schedules set in September were maintained with minor interruptions and negligible loss of life through mid-March 1946. Since by that time 163,000 had been repatriated and the remaining 7,000 were being utilized as labor, shipping schedules were curtailed except for evacuation of ineffectives.

On 8 August 1946, SCAP requested CINCPAC to return all remaining Japanese POWs and JSP in three monthly increments starting in October 1946, so that the target date of 31 December 1946 for the completion of the overall repatriation program could be met. CINCPAC agreed to the plan and, through its implementation, the task of repatriation from POA

(POA)

(Pacific Ocean Areas - continued)

36

VV-1.2.

was completed ahead of schedule on 24 December 1946, when the Japanese ex-destroyer Sugi arrived at Uraga, Japan.

Coincident with incoming shipments to Japan, some 160 pre-war residents of the Bonin, Caroline and Marianas Islands, whose return was approved by CINCPAC, were transported to their home islands.

By the conclusion of Phase Three
At the end of the repatriation program, a total of approximately 130,800 persons had been returned to Japan (see Chart No. 8, on the page opposite) and 40,700 returned direct to Formosa, Ryukyus, China and Korea.)

24.B.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS22-1.2.

Extensive US base installations existing in the PI facilitated control and evacuation of the 199,000 repatriates located in that area. Principal concentrations were on Luzon, Mindanao, and Leyte. The initial proportional share of Japanese repatriation shipping allotted to the PI of only 12,000 spaces was augmented by routing supply ships returning empty to the US from the PI via Japan. On 7 October 1945, the first Japanese ships, modified to transport repatriates, arrived in the PI.

Both US and Japanese ships were supplied with additional life saving equipment, overside latrines, and food and water stores. During cold weather, blankets and warm clothing from US sources were placed upon all ships engaged in repatriation. Repatriates were allowed to keep clothing, issued in this manner, after it had been dyed and marked.

Evacuation of Japanese proceeded according to plan until February 1946 with slight modifications. On 24 December 1945, SCAP directed CG AFWESPAC to route shipping on the Japan shuttle via Takao, Formosa, to permit return of approximately 12,000 Formosans from the Philippines and subsequent transport of Japanese in Formosa to Japan. Also, on the same date, movement of approximately 1,400 Koreans and 53,000 Chinese direct to their respective homelands was authorized.

On 15 - 17 January 1946 at the Tokyo conference establishing standard repatriation procedures, at which CG AFWESPAC was represented (see Appendix C), it was agreed that:

(that:)

(PI - continued)

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22-12

a. Repatriation of Japanese nationals would be suspended until 1 July 1946 except for ineffectives.

b. Repatriation of remaining Formosans, Koreans and Chinese would continue under existing arrangements.

c. Repatriation of other nationals (of Indonesia, Malaya, Manchuria and Celebes) would be handled separately in each case.

Suspension of repatriation in January affected approximately 43,600 Japanese POWs who were required for maintenance and repair of essential installations in the PI. Evacuation on US manned cargo ships of sick and other ineffectives of this group continued, however, until May 1946. At this time authority to utilize US manned shipping was withdrawn and limited SCAJAP Japanese shipping substituted.

When SCAP decided that all US controlled areas would be cleared by 31 December 1946, a plan was set up to clear the 43,600 Japanese from the PI. Shipping was set to lift the Japanese from camps located near Tacloban on Leyte, and San Fernando and Manila on Luzon. Approximately equal monthly increments were lifted during October, November and December 1946. On 31 December 1946, the only remaining Japanese in the PI were 665 detained as witnesses or suspected criminals in war crimes trials and an undetermined but fast dwindling number hiding in the mountains, probably not exceeding 500 in number. (See Chart 9 below).

24B.
RYUKYU ISLANDS

39

1-1.2.3.4

Although the Ryukyus, because of their proximity to Japan, should have presented an easy repatriation problem, such, however, was not the case. The Ryukyus, especially Okinawa Island, had been ravaged by the invasion and rehabilitation proceeded slowly. As late as the spring of 1946 there were still 130,000 residents homeless on Okinawa itself. Never self-supporting, the food situation in Okinawa was further aggravated by the loss of many acres of arable land taken over for base installations. This arable land had formerly supported a large population.

Initially military government in the Ryukyus south of 30° north latitude was exercised by CINCPAC. As such, he was responsible for the return of some 65,000 Japanese military personnel.

A ferry service was established to the Ryukyus in October 1945 to transport only the Japanese military being repatriated to Japan. This was supplemented almost immediately by the assignment of short range Japanese shipping, and further augmented utilizing US cargo ships returning empty to the US via Japan.

All Japanese military were returned to Japan by January 1946 except 14,000 whose return was temporarily suspended until October of 1946. During this period, their services were utilized as labor to repair war damaged facilities and to assist the native population in returning to their former places of residence. (See Chart 10, below)

The return of displaced Ryukyuans was not so easily achieved. There were some 160,000 Ryukyuans in Japan that had been hurriedly evacuated from their homes just prior to the US invasion. They had been permitted to carry with them little in the way of baggage, clothing or funds. Their

(Their)

(Ryukyu Islands - continued)

1-1.2.3.4 40
situation in Japan rapidly became deplorable from a social and economic standpoint. It was therefore to the interests of SCAP to return them to their former homes.

Agreements were reached early with CINCPAC under which he would accept repatriates from Japan destined for localities in the Ryukyus other than Okinawa. Consequently, Ryukyuans except Okinawans were outloaded on shuttle ships which were returning Japanese. Considerable progress was made (see Chart 12 on page 35) until 17 March 1946, at which time an epidemic of smallpox among returning Ryukyuans caused a cessation of this phase of repatriation. This suspension remained in effect until August of 1946, because of complications in addition to that caused by smallpox.

With respect to the return of Okinawans, the program moved slowly. Repeated representations to CINCPAC to initiate this program were unproductive. CINCPAC, with considerable justification, refused to accept the Okinawans on the grounds that food and shelter were not available locally to support the added increase in population.

With the transfer of responsibility for military government of the Ryukyus from the Navy to the Army on 1 July 1946, the matter was again considered. SCAP was most anxious to evacuate the Ryukyuans because they were a serious relief problem in Japan. Hence he directed that they be repatriated without further delay and that the necessary food and shelter be provided for them from Japanese and US resources.

A conference was called on 22 July 1946 in Tokyo, at which time representatives of CG AFWESPAC and SCAP agreed upon a repatriation plan for the evacuation of all Ryukyuans in Japan who were desirous of repatriation.

This plan, published late in July, was most involved because of conditions in the Ryukyus. It provided that: repatriation would begin on

(begin on)

(Ryukyu Islands - continued)

1-1.2.3.4

5 August 1946; repatriates would be segregated in Japan and outloaded according to destination i.e., Okinawa, Amami Oshima, Miyako and Ishigaki; further distribution in the Ryukyus would be made by small boats; and all repatriates would undergo a six day quarantine period in Japan. The rate of repatriation to Okinawa was established as 4,000 per week until 26 September, thereafter at 8,000 per week until the program was completed.

Incorporated in the plan were provisions for the return of approximately 140,000 Okinawans from Japan and 10,000 from Formosa.

Although involved, the plan which is shown on Chart 11, on the page opposite, worked out smoothly, due particularly to careful supervision.

The Military Government authorities in the Ryukyus were faced not only with the task of receiving the repatriates but of transporting them to their homes and providing shelter and food for them.

Inter-island transportation was provided in small native craft and small US craft, including 6 LSTs made available by SCAP. Over-land transportation was furnished from the meager resources of the military government authorities, in the Ryukyus.

Houses for the incoming repatriates were built from lumber, cement and nails furnished by SCAP. Over 17,000 simple dwellings were constructed. The frames for these houses were of wood while the roof and walls were constructed of thatch. Almost 10,000 Class C pyramidal tents were used to provide for immediate needs.

During the period 1 July to 31 December 1946, over 545,000 pounds of food were furnished repatriates from US resources.

In all, over 159,000 Ryukyuans were returned from Japan (see Chart No.

(No.)

(Ryukyus Islands - continued)

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7. 1, 2, 3, 4
12, below), and 45,000 from other areas in the Pacific. Of the latter, 26,000 were returned from islands in POA and 17,000 from Formosa.

All remaining Japanese POWs and JSP, retained in the Ryukyus for labor, were returned to Japan in three monthly increments starting in October 1946. The program was completed by 31 December 1946.

CHINA THEATER

43
7-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10

Because of the masses involved, repatriation of some 3,000,000 Japanese and other nationals from China and adjoining areas was one of the most difficult and pressing tasks confronting SCAP on V-J Day. On that date, this multitude consisting of approximately equal numbers of military and civilian personnel was reported to be situated as follows (see Chart No. 13 on opposite page):

<u>Area</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
North China	632,000
Central China	728,000
South China	147,000
Manchuria	1,059,000
Formosa	484,000
North Indo-China	32,000
Hong Kong	21,000

1,106,000
2,799,000
19,000

Two factors made necessary the assignment of a high priority to repatriation from Chinese and adjoining areas. In the first place, it was US policy to assist in the establishment of a sound central government in China. This objective could not be accomplished as long as the security of China was threatened by the presence of large numbers of Japanese troops. Secondly, large numbers of Japanese were located in areas of conflicting interests of the French Government, Viet Nam, Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists, making early evacuation of these groups imperative to prevent them from being used as pawns. These factors combined with extremely poor interior transportation and communication facilities in war-ravaged China made even the concentration of repatriates at evacuation ports a formidable task.

Full appreciation of the repatriation problem in Chinese areas is possible only through knowledge of the role played by the US Forces stationed in China. Upon the cessation of hostilities with Japan, the US

(US)

(China Theater - continued)

2-1-10

Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned the task of advising and assisting the Chinese in repatriation of Japanese to the Commanding General, US Army Forces China Theater (CG CHINA), later to Commanding General US Army Forces, China (CG USAF China). Subsequently this task was assumed by the Peiping Headquarters Group as a residual function upon the discontinuance of USAF, China. CG CHINA, CG USAF China, and Peiping Headquarters Group acted mainly in an advisory capacity to the Chinese Government and maintained liaison between the Chinese Government, SCAP, and the US Navy in China waters (including the US Marine forces in North China). Of the coordination tasks assigned to the various US Army forces in China, the maintenance of effective liaison with the Chinese authorities was the most difficult. Its successful accomplishment is attributable only to the untiring efforts of the US forces concerned.

No time was lost in getting the program under way. Under an interim plan implemented early in October 1945, the first shipping available, of 18,500 capacity, was applied to evacuation of Japanese situated near Shanghai and Tangku. Concurrently a more complete organization for repatriation was being developed by SCAP through a series of conferences, in which the Chinese, and US ground and naval commanders in China were integrated into the SCAP repatriation system.

Well before the first conference, it had become apparent that the greater part of the impetus and direction of repatriation in China would have to come from US sources. Consequently, about 10 October the use of 20 LSTs had been obtained from CINCPAC. Through further negotiations with CINCPAC completed 1 November, a total of 107 LSTs were secured for repatriation service. At the first conference on 25 October 1945 at Shanghai between representatives of SCAP, CG CHINA, US Seventh Fleet

(Fleet)

(China Theater - continued)

45

71-10

and the Chinese Nationalist Government, procedures governing the utilization of US shipping for repatriation from Chinese areas were established and general policies were defined. Overall evacuation plans were established in the conference and operational details were arranged with the Chinese Government through CG CHINA. The Chinese Government was responsible for the delivery of repatriates to the water edge, their medical and other processing and their correct loading aboard the SCAP controlled ships according to the monthly quotas scheduled. However, supervision of this loading and processing was made a responsibility of the US forces in China. This was accomplished by sending US liaison teams, which included communications and medical personnel, to the main evacuation ports in China. These teams solved the communication problem and greatly reduced the amount of epidemic diseases carried to Japan.

Agreements on general policies included: (1) utilization of US naval ships when available to augment Japanese shipping in removing Japanese from areas occupied by forces in China; (2) vessels could be backloaded with Chinese, Formosans or Koreans and Japanese civilians from Japan; (3) US cargo ships would be used for repatriation when space was available; (4) embarkation rates aggregating 154,000 monthly for Japanese were established for the Tientsin, Tsingtao, and Shanghai areas; (5) monthly rates of reception of Chinese from Japan were set at 10,000 for the Tientsin area and 2,000 for the Shanghai area.

Upon receipt of an offer from Washington of 100 liberties, and LSTs as needed, for use in repatriation, a second conference was held at Tokyo on 7 December 1945. This high policy conference, suggested by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to accelerate repatriation from China,

(China,)

(China Theater - continued)

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7-1-10

was attended by representatives of SCAP, CINCPAC and the CG CHINA. As a result of this conference, it was recommended that 100 liberties, 100 LSTs and 7 hospital ships be made available to SCAP for repatriation. The ships were to be converted in Japan so as to be suitable to carry repatriates and were to be crewed by the Japanese.

Upon approval on 19 December of recommendations of the second conference, a third conference was called in Tokyo on 15-17 January 1946. At this time, all US commands in the Pacific and Far East, except AFMIDPAC, were integrated into a theater-wide organization for repatriation. Operational procedures and schedules were discussed with major emphasis placed upon the plan for the evacuation of China. The result of this conference was published as, "Agreements Reached at Conference on Repatriation 15 - 17 January 1946, Tokyo, Japan" (see Appendix C). This document governed repatriation procedures from that time forward.

At the conference daily evacuation rates were set as follows: North China, 4,000; Central China and Formosa 16,000; South China and North French Indo-China 15,000; as aggregate of 1,050^m per month.

These rates were based upon use of US shipping for Chinese repatriation. Of the shipping requested, 106 liberties and 100 LSTs were received, but only 85 of the LSTs were retained for repatriation, the remaining 15 LSTs being utilized to support the economy of Korea. Upon arrival in Japan, under direction of SCAJAP these ships were modified to carry passengers, provided with trained Japanese crews, and placed in service at a rate of 25 a week. Six of the liberties were converted into hospital ships of about 1,200 beds each. Since, by the end of March 1946, total available passenger capacity of these SCAJAP vessels was about 400,000, all Seventh Fleet shipping was released from repatriation. Supplementing US shipping was

(was)

(China Theater - continued)

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21-10

over 50 percent of total Japanese repatriation fleet, with a capacity of 100,000 spaces. Consequently by 1 March, it became apparent that flow of passengers from the interior could not fill available shipping to capacity.

Within two months of the 17 January conference, repatriation from Chinese areas was limited only by the numbers made available at evacuation ports. With the exception of stragglers, war criminals and 28,000 civilian technicians retained by the Chinese Nationalist Government, the greater part of China was cleared by June 1946. The progress of repatriation to Japan is shown on Chart No. 14, page 40.

South China (repatriates being evacuated through the principal ports of Canton, Amoy and Swatow) was cleared by 25 April 1946. However the discovery, on 5 April, of cholera in the area greatly retarded operations and resulted in quarantine of 40,000 passengers on 14 ships until mid-June 1946. Hainan Island was cleared without incident in March. Also included in South China repatriation was that part of French Indo-China north of 16° north latitude. Though operational control of this area was being transferred from the Chinese Nationalists to the French Government concurrently with evacuation of Japanese, the area was cleared during May 1946 without incident other than a major dislocation of shipping due to presence of cholera aboard the repatriation ships.

The Hong Kong area of South China, under British control, was cleared early in May through combined use of Japanese manned US repatriation ships and British cargo vessels. However, the British retained about 1,300 Japanese for labor until December 1946, when this figure was reduced to 268.

(268.)

(China Theater - continued)

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21-10

Central China evacuation schedules were first interrupted by an outbreak of smallpox at Shanghai in April, a typhus epidemic in May, and in June, cholera. On the Shanghai-Sasebo shuttle, the only major shipping accident of the entire repatriation program occurred on 22 January 1946 when the Enoshima Maru, 50 miles out of Shanghai carrying 4,300 Japanese civilians, struck a free mine and sank slowly. Through the assistance of another repatriation vessel, all but 77 of the passengers and crew were saved. Central China was finally cleared in July 1946 except for stragglers.

Repatriation from Formosa was delayed until early December 1945, when the Chinese Government landed troops and took control of the island. When this was accomplished repatriation was inaugurated by the sailing of an ex-Japanese destroyer, Natsuzuki, for Kiirun on 13 December 1945. Control and supervision of repatriation from this area was particularly difficult because of the lack of supervisory personnel, adequate transportation and communications facilities.

The northern half of Formosa was cleared through Kiirun and the southern portion through Takao. The comparatively inaccessible strip on the east coast was cleared through Karenko by small draft vessels loaded by lighters. Cholera in Formosa slowed the program. However, except for some 24,000 technicians required for operation of essential public facilities, Formosa was cleared by 15 April 1946. By the end of 1946, those retained by the Chinese had been reduced to 11,000 through use of both Chinese and SCAJAP shipping (See Chart No. 15, page 41).

North China repatriation, though affected by the Chinese Communist and Nationalist military operations which occasionally blocked the ports of Tangku and Tsingtao, was completed late in May 1946. The

(The)

(China Theater - continued)

71-10

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efforts of the US Marines to expedite repatriation during periods of internal Chinese strife and strained relations in North China were outstanding.

By comparison with the rest of China, repatriation from Manchuria proved the most difficult. Though the Chinese Communists as well as the Nationalists had agreed upon the desirability of repatriation of Japanese, few efforts by the Communists to cooperate in the matter were apparent until the fall of 1946. Though never definitely ascertained, it was estimated that 612,000 Japanese were concentrated in the Mukden-Hulutao area, 387,000 near Changchun in central Manchuria, 310,000 in the vicinity of Harbin in north Manchuria and 250,000 in the Dairen-Port Arthur area.

After progress of Nationalist forces well beyond Mukden, repatriation began in April through the port of Hulutao. The initial evacuation rate of 3,000 daily was increased to 7,500 daily by 1 July. Peak loads were transported to Japan during the summer months except for minor interruptions because of flood conditions in the interior and a delay of three weeks during August because of a cholera epidemic. During this period every effort was made to push repatriation from this area in order to complete the Manchurian repatriation program before the port of Hulutao was frozen-in. By mid-August only 500,000 Japanese, mostly civilians, had been repatriated out of the 1,300,000 believed to be in the area (See Chart No. 16, page 44).

During the summer repeated attempts were made to secure evacuation of Japanese from central and north Manchuria under Chinese Communist control. Early in September, evacuation from Chinese Communist areas at last was secured with the outflow from Hulutao increased to 10,000 -

(10,000 -)

(China Theater - continued)

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21-10

15,000 daily during the next two months. By 31 October all Japanese had been evacuated from Manchuria except the 250,000 under Soviet control and some 100,000 unaccounted for in the interior. (Repatriation of those Japanese in Dairen-Port Arthur area is covered on page 56).

It is believed that retained technicians and labor and inaccurate initial estimates partially explain the 100,000 discrepancy.

A straggler program was set up in September 1946 to accomplish repatriation of scattered groups of Japanese at Canton, Hainan, Shanghai and Formosa. Included in this program were the 24,000 Japanese, technicians, and their dependents, held in Formosa, initially expected to be transported to Japan by Chinese ships. Of this group SCAP actually provided transportation for all but 3,000 of the 13,000 repatriated by the end of 1946. When in December 1946, repatriation shipping facilities were further reduced, SCAP established a policy to provide transportation for only those straggler groups exceeding 200 in size.

Concurrently with the main repatriation program, a total of 31,000 Chinese and 32,000 Formosans were repatriated from Japan (See Charts No. 17 and 18; pages 46 and 47, and Table No. 2, page 61) while 7,500 Chinese and 40,000 Formosans were repatriated from other areas in the Pacific (See Table No. 3, page 62). Also some 60,000 Koreans and 16,000 Ryukyans were removed from Chinese areas to their respective homelands (See Table No. 2, page 62). The British assumed responsibility for return of 269 Koreans in Hong Kong.

Repatriation of Koreans from China to Korea was started late in January because of military expediency, medical considerations, and availability of surplus repatriation shipping from China shuttles. Because of the limited port facilities in Korea, the traffic was divided between the ports of Inchon and Fusan. To assist in this repatriation,

(repatriation,)

(China Theater - continued) 51

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four teams, each of 1 officer, 1 Chinese-speaking Korean and 1 English-speaking Korean, were sent to China from Korea to act as liaison officers.

The first official repatriation shipment of Koreans from China was completed 1 February 1946 when 2 LSTs brought 1,838 Koreans from Tsingtao to Inchon. Other shipments from Tangku and Shanghai soon followed. By mid-March 1946 the situation of remaining Koreans in North and Central China awaiting repatriation had so deteriorated that their early repatriation was imperative. Consequently schedules were advanced with the result that this repatriation was completed in June of 1946.

During the repatriation program from China, the effect of the cholera, typhus, and smallpox epidemics originating in China during the spring and summer of 1946 upon reception facilities in Japan was tremendous. Shipping and passengers tied up in the cholera quarantine ports of Uraga, Hakata, and Sasebo at times totalled over 80 vessels with more than 150,000 repatriates on board. Control of quarantine ports and maintenance of nearly normal evacuation rates from all areas during the spring and summer of 1946 required a high degree of rapid and effective coordination of all US and Japanese agencies in Japan. With the institution of adequate measures to limit the return of unauthorized Koreans to Japan in small craft, even minor outbreaks of these diseases in Japan were eliminated.

Mass repatriation from Chinese areas was announced completed on 31 December 1946 with the arrival at Sasebo of the last of some 3,101,700 Japanese. Except for war criminals, it is believed that negligible numbers of Japanese remain in Chinese areas. However, the problem of repatriation of Japanese stragglers in Manchuria still exists.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

In September 1945, approximately 720,000 Japanese awaited repatriation from areas under control of SACSEA, distributed as shown in Chart 19, below.

The immediate problem involved disarming the Japanese surrendered personnel (JSP) and assembling them in areas near appropriate ports of embarkation. British policies concerning civilians required the repatriation of those who entered British or other Allied areas after the outbreak of the war. Those individuals however, who had resided in such areas prior thereto, and in those cases where the territorial authorities had no objection, need not be returned to Japan.

It was agreed between SACSEA and SCAP that Japanese shipping recovered in SEA areas, capable of making the voyage to Japan, would be utilized in lifting repatriates from SEA ports directly to Japan and would operate under SCAP control. In addition, such other Japanese shipping, as could be made available would be allocated to SEA repatriation. It developed that initially about 14,000 passenger spaces in SEAC-recovered shipping were available, plus an additional 9,000 spaces from SCAP controlled shipping, making a total of 23,000 spaces allocated to service these areas. The first repatriation ship departed Singapore on 22 November 1945.

Because of the limited number of ships and the very long trip, by 21 April 1946, only 34,300 Japanese had been repatriated. Early in 1946 it was realized that some 4 or 5 years would be required to complete the SEA program with shipping then available. This situation was unacceptable to both British and US authorities, and various sources for procurement of additional shipping were investigated. Previously, some 106 liberties

(liberties)

(Southeast Asia - continued)

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and 85 LSTs had been made available to SCAP from US resources to accelerate repatriation from China. By the end of March 1946 it was foreseen that some of these ships would be excess to the repatriation requirements of China and could be used profitably in the evacuation of Japanese from the SEA. Authority was therefore obtained from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff early in April to employ US owned shipping in this manner on a charter free basis until 30 June 1946. On their part, the British agreed to make available operating supplies, such as fuel, emergency victuals and stores in kind, as required for SCAP shipping when used in repatriation service from SEA areas. After 30 June 1946, the British were required to pay charter hire for US owned ships used in repatriation from their areas. ✓

On 16 April 1946, the first of 48 liberties and 4 LSTs, in addition to 22 Japanese ships, departed Japan destined SEA ports. In late May, 40 liberties, 4 LSTs and 15 Japanese ships comprised the second major lift to SEA areas.

SACSEA established priorities for clearing areas in the following order: North Borneo; south French Indo-China; outer Netherlands East Indies; Siam; Malaya; Java; Sumatra and the inner Netherlands East Indies; Burma. The repatriation of Formosans and Koreans direct to their homelands had been integrated into the program. Similarly, provisions had been made for the movement of sick evacuees by SCAP controlled hospital shipping. Two British hospital ships, the Gerusalemme and the Amapoora, assisted by returning one shipment each of invalid Japanese.

In July of 1946, SCAP set 31 December 1946 as the target date for the completion of the repatriation program. British intentions, however, contemplated retaining some 90,000 Japanese POWs and JSP for labor through the calendar year of 1947.

(1947)

(Southeast Asia - continued)

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Representatives of SCAP and SACSEA conferred at Tokyo during 11 - 17 June 1946, consummating agreements which covered immediate shipping requirements, disposition of shipping recovered in SEA, and details of fuel supply and charter-hire. In short, it was agreed that SCAP would supply the necessary ships to repatriate such Japanese as the British would agree to release, to include August 1946, but would make no commitments of repatriation shipping after that date. The British on their part agreed to fuel all repatriation ships on a round trip basis and to pay charter hire for the use of US owned ships utilized. Agreements were further reached to the effect: that the three Japanese warships able to steam to Japan would be placed at disposal of SCAP on their last repatriation trip to Japan; that Japanese ships other than warships recovered in SEA would be returned to SEA upon completion of the program. These agreements were approved by SCAP and SACSEA. By mid-August, provision had been made for the return of virtually all repatriates, except those retained for labor, from SEA areas. Chart No. 20, below, indicates the progress.

SCAP did not subscribe to the postponement of repatriation and made appropriate representations to this effect to the US War Department and to SACSEA. The British continued to retain 82,000 Japanese in areas under their control and in addition turned over 13,500 to the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) Government.

In November 1946, SCAP made a final offer to SACSEA to evacuate all Japanese repatriates from their areas to Japan, and in a separate action endeavored to dispose of the ships in accordance with the June agreement. The British did not accept the final offer and in addition expressed a desire to retain all Japanese ships recovered in SEA with their Japanese

(Japanese)

(Southeast Asia - continued)

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crews. As the year closed these 2 problems were being negotiated.¹

In December 1946, the Netherlands Government approached SCAP with a view to early return in 1947 of the 13,500 Japanese held under their control. Prospects for early solution of repatriation from NEI appeared promising.²

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¹ Subsequent to the preparation of this report, agreements were reached whereby all Japanese merchant ships recovered in SEA were made available with Japanese crews to the British, for operation in repatriation service throughout 1947, under SCAP control. Under similar arrangements, passenger spaces equivalent to those of three Japanese warships, which had been withdrawn from repatriation service for disposal, were provided in SCAP shipping. Additional SCAP shipping of over 15,000 passenger spaces, was committed to lift JSP from Malaya and Burma in May 1947. During 1947, to 20 April, almost 9,000 repatriates had been returned to Japan from SEA, in SCAP and British shipping. The British had announced firm plans to repatriate an additional 38,000 by the end of June 1947 and the intention to complete the repatriation of remaining JSP held for labor, approximately 34,000, by the end of 1947.

² Since the preparation of this report, Japanese repatriation from NEI has been virtually completed. By 20 April 1947, over 11,000 JSP had been returned to Japan, with the remaining 2,000, exclusive of those being held in connection with war crimes activities, scheduled for imminent embarkation.

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24B.

AUSTRALIAN AREAS

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Following Japan's surrender, the respective areas of responsibility of Australian Military Forces (AMF) and SACSEA were not clearly delineated. During the fall of 1945 and prior to the actual inauguration of repatriation from AMF areas, successive phasing resulted in the establishment of AMF control of: (1) the Australian mainland; (2) New Guinea east of 142° east longitude; and (3) the Admiralty, Bismarck (New Britain, New Ireland) and Solomon Islands. In these areas, in the fall of 1945 approximately 140,000 Japanese awaited repatriation.

By agreement between AMF and SCAP, some Japanese shipping, including warships, capable of making the long voyage, was dispatched in the fall of 1945. The first repatriation ship departed Japan for AMF areas in mid-November and the first Japanese repatriates were debarked in Japan in December. Because many evacuees in AMF areas were sick, disabled or otherwise in poor physical condition, in comparison with other areas, a large amount of hospital shipping was provided by SCAP. By the end of February 1946, some 40,000 Japanese had been repatriated.

Early in April authority was obtained to utilize Japanese-manned US liberty ships to augment the 17 Japanese ships then engaged in repatriation from AMF areas. The Australian Government agreed to make available operating supplies in kind as required for SCAP shipping when used in such repatriation service. Consequently, 8 liberties were assigned to the clearance of AMF areas on 5 April. This number was eventually increased to 16. By early April, the Australian mainland had been cleared of Japanese save a handful held in connection with War Crimes activities.

The program in April and May was rolling toward completion in high

(high)

(Australian Areas - continued) 57

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gear. Shipping was kept flowing into Rabaul to the limit of the port's ability to process and load repatriates. By 13 June 1946, all areas controlled by AMF had been cleared of Japanese, Korea and Formosan repatriates except for those Japanese held for war crimes or judicial investigation. 800 of these were returned to Japan in November, leaving a balance of 816 as of 31 December 1946.¹ The progress of repatriation is shown in Chart No. 21, below.

1. Since the preparation of this report, 477 Japanese, of those held in connection with war crimes activities, have been released and returned to Japan, to 20 April 1947.

24B.

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SOVIET-CONTROLLED AREAS

From the incomplete reports available it was indicated that there were approximately 1,637,000 Japanese in areas controlled by the USSR at the conclusion of hostilities. Their estimated disposition in northern Korea, Karafuto, the Kuriles and the Dairen-Port Arthur area is indicated in Chart No. 22 below.

Pursuant to instructions from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, appropriate representations were made in October 1945 to the Soviet Government, requesting that it turn over to SCAP, ships recovered in areas under Soviet control, to be used for repatriation and to support a minimum economy in Japan. No replies to this or other radios of a similar nature were received until 12 April 1946, when the USSR Member of the Allied Council for Japan reported the amount of shipping recovered from the Japanese by the Soviet Government and stated that none was suitable for repatriation purposes.

On a local level the respective military commanders exercising authority in northern and southern Korea conferred in January 1946 with the view of repatriating Japanese nationals located in northern Korea to Japan via southern Korea. These conferences were unsuccessful, due primarily to difficulties involved in supplying fuel for rail transportation. As a matter of fact repatriation of Japanese from North Korea adjusted itself while these and later conferences were in progress. Although there was no legal repatriation traffic across the 38° border in Korea, a total of 292,000 Japanese filtered through and were repatriated to Japan through southern Korea, as shown in Chart No. 23, page 56. When negotiations were finally consummated it was found that there were less than 15,000 Japanese to be repatriated from North Korea.

(North Korea.)

(Soviet-controlled Areas - cont'd)

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During the period between October 1945 and April 1946 sporadic attempts to effect repatriation of isolated groups from restricted areas under Soviet control were made without results. On 23 April 1946, SCAP forwarded proposals for mutual repatriation between Japan and northern Korea to the Soviet authorities. The proposals contained in this document were patterned on the existing agreements made by SCAP with other Allied governments and commands. On 22 May 1946 the Soviet Government returned the proposals suggesting certain changes to the proposed agreements. As a result of this communication, a conference was held in Tokyo on 19 June 1946. No agreement was reached inasmuch as the Soviet Government requested preferential treatment be accorded Koreans in Japan to be repatriated to northern Korea, and the Soviets were not willing to furnish in kind any fuel and other supplies for repatriation ships.

A further conference was held in Tokyo on 11 July 1946 between representatives of SCAP and the Soviet Government. The agreements to be reached at this conference concerned repatriation from northern Korea and the Dalny-Port Arthur area, Manchuria. Because the Soviet representative was not authorized to discuss the return of Japanese POWs and JSP from these areas, the conference was adjourned. To support his position, SCAP used the basic authority contained in the Potsdam Declaration, wherein the Allied Powers announced their intention to permit the Japanese military to return to Japan; hence the repatriation of civilians was secondary, being conducted primarily for humanitarian reasons. The entire matter of repatriation from Soviet-controlled areas was then presented to the US War Department, requesting that arrangements be conducted on a governmental level.

On 22 August 1946 a radio was received stating that proposals, essentially the same as those proposed by SCAP at the Tokyo Conference,

(conference)

(Soviet-controlled Areas - continued)

71-4 60.
would be presented to the Soviet Government by the US Government. As the situation later developed, this action was not undertaken by the US Government.

In Tokyo on 26 September 1946, Soviet authorities informed SCAP that they were desirous of undertaking the repatriation of Japanese POWs and civilians from the territory of the USSR and territories under the control of the USSR; repatriation could begin in October 1946. On 3 October 1946, SCAP forwarded proposals for repatriation of Japanese nationals from Soviet and Soviet-controlled areas, and Koreans from Japan to Korea north of 38° north latitude. The proposals were similar to those sent to the Soviet authorities on 23 April 1946. In an attempt to overcome points of differences encountered in the conference on 19 June 1946, the plan contemplated the use of Japanese coal burning ships and stated Japanese oil burning ships and US owned ships would be used for repatriation only when payment for fuel and charter hire by USSR had been arranged on a governmental level.

From 14 October until 19 December 1946 a series of thirteen conferences were held in an attempt to reconcile points of difference. The main points of difference revolved around: the rate of repatriation; the payment of fuel oil for repatriation ships; and the furnishment of emergency supplies and services in the Soviet controlled ports.

In the end SCAP conceded all the major points and agreed to accept responsibility for the return of all Japanese nationals from Soviet ports up to 360,000 per month. The sole responsibility of the Soviets was to deliver them to the evacuation ports. The Soviets accepted and established the rate as 50,000 per month. An agreement was signed on 19 December 1946. It was further agreed that the Soviets would accept 10,000 Korean repatriates

(repatriates)

(Soviet-controlled Areas - continued)

from Japan.

As a result of this agreement, the first request for shipping was received shortly after the agreement was signed. The request was for 86,000 spaces during the month of January. The first ships to make this lift were enroute prior to 31 December 1946.

While the overall agreement was being negotiated, a conference was held at the request of the Soviet authorities on 18 November 1946. The Soviets proposed an interim agreement to repatriate 25,000 Japanese from Soviet areas (5,000 each from Karafuto, Siberia and Dairen, and 10,000 from North Korea) prior to 30 November 1946. The interim agreement was to be based on portions of the overall agreement that had been firmed. SCAP agreed to the proposal at once, but final approval was not received from Moscow until 26 November 1946.

Under the interim agreement, ships were dispatched to Soviet ports and a total of approximately 28,400 Japanese were repatriated (5,600 from Karafuto, 5,000 from Siberia, 6,100 from Dairen, and 11,700 from North Korea).¹

1. Subsequent to the preparation of this report, 278,704 Japanese have been repatriated from Soviet areas during 1947, to 20 April, as follows: 218,179 from Dairen-Port Arthur; 21,644 from Siberia; 14,574 from North Korea; and 24,307 from Karafuto. Unconfirmed information indicates that the initial estimate of 250,000 as the original strength in the Dairen-Port Arthur area, should be revised to 218,179, which number has been repatriated to 20 April 1947. A Soviet request to lift 50,000 (30,000 from Karafuto and 20,000 from Siberia) during May has been received. Of the 10,000 Koreans estimated for return from Japan to Korea north of 38° north latitude, only 233 have accepted repatriation; the remainder are considered to have forfeited their privilege of being returned to North Korea.

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REPATRIATION TO JAPAN

In the relatively short period from 1 October 1945 to 31 December 1946, mass repatriation in the Pacific as a major operation had been completed. A total of approximately 5,103,000 Japanese had been returned to their homeland. The bulk of Japanese nationals remaining to be repatriated, some 1,316,000 by the best estimate, are under the control of the USSR. A smaller group of 80,939 are being retained for labor by the United Kingdom in areas located in SEA, while NEI Government retains 13,500. The Chinese Government retains in China, Formosa, and Manchuria, a total of 70,000, the majority of whom are technicians and their dependents. In all areas some few individuals are being retained as war criminals or witnesses for the trial of war criminals.

Chart No. 24, on the page opposite, pictures the rate at which Japanese nationals from all areas were returned to the four main islands of Japan. Table No. 1, on this page, indicates the numbers repatriated from the various areas.

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REPATRIATION FROM JAPAN

A total of approximately 1,152,000 Koreans, Chinese, Chinese-Formosans and Ryukyans were returned to their respective homelands from Japan in repatriation shipping. All who so desired to be moved under the repatriation program were evacuated, as pictured in Chart No. 25, above. The few remaining are those who had forfeited their privilege to repatriation; Koreans destined for Korea north of 38° north latitude; and some few who ~~could~~ ^{could} not move due to circumstances beyond their control. Table No. 2, on this page, indicates the numbers, by nationality, repatriated from Japan.

(Japan)

REPATRIATION BETWEEN AREAS OUTSIDE OF JAPAN 13

In every area Koreans, Chinese, Chinese-Formosans, and Ryukyans were found. Rather than trans-ship these individuals to their respective homelands through Japan, it was more expeditious to repatriate large groups direct. The largest shipment moved in this manner were approximately 58,000 Koreans returned from China. Table No. 3, on this page, shows the breakdown of 187,000 repatriated from areas in the Western Pacific direct to their former domiciles.

SHIPPING 14

Chart No. 26, appearing below, depicts the availability of shipping used in repatriation. At the peak of the program 188 Japanese ships, with a carrying capacity of 200,000, and 191 US owned ships, with a carrying capacity of 334,000, were available for repatriation duties. These ships however, were not operable at all times. The chart shows repatriation shipping available and operable during the program from its inception until 31 December 1946.

RECEPTION CENTERS IN JAPAN 15

Reception centers in Japan, located as shown in Chart No. 4, pages 8-9, were in operation during the periods indicated in Table No. 4, below. All incoming and outgoing repatriates were processed through these centers. Their efficient operation was a vital factor in the successful accomplishment of the program. When cholera broke out among repatriates from South China, the Reception Center at Uraga was holding at one time over 80,000 repatriates in quarantine aboard ships in harbor while individuals were fed, examined and treated. At the peak of the program in

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E 1-2

May 1946, the centers did a magnificent job in arranging rail transportation for 550,000 repatriates returned from China during a three week period.

The numbers processed through each principal center is shown on Chart No. 4, pages 8 - 9.

24 B.
CONCLUSION

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The mass repatriation effected in the Western Pacific was a waterborne migration in scope without parallel in history. The smoothness of the operation by which almost six and one half million Orientals were repatriated from areas as far south as Melbourne, as far east as Hawaii, and as far west as Burma could only have resulted from the highest degree of cooperation by the responsible authorities. Careful planning and execution were reflected in the vast numbers moved, and the attendant negligible loss of life occasioned by accident or disease. This rapid and successful accomplishment has been a major factor in raising the morale of the Korean and Japanese peoples and has contributed materially to the success so far attained by the occupation of these areas of the Far East. A major mission of the occupation has been completed.

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APPENDIX A

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E 1-16

Glossary of Terms, Titles and Abbreviations

AFMIDPAC

US Army Forces, Middle Pacific. Includes forces in Hawaii and on islands in Pacific Ocean Areas.

AFWESPAC

US Army Forces, Western Pacific. Originally included forces in Philippine Islands. Later additionally took over control of Ryukyu Islands.

AMF

Australian Military Forces.

AMF areas

Includes Australian Mainland, New Guinea east of 142° east longitude, and the Admiralty, Bismarck and Solomon Islands.

China Theater

Includes China, Manchuria, Formosa, Hainan, Hong Kong, and French Indo-China north of 16° north latitude.

CINCAFPAC

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Forces Pacific (see US Army Forces Pacific below).

CINCPAC

Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (US).

CG AFWESPAC

Commanding General, US Army Forces, Western Pacific (See AFWESPAC above).

CG CHINA

Commanding General, US Army Forces, China Theater (See China Theater above).

(Appendix A - continued)

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E1-16

CG USAF China	Commanding General, US Army Forces, China.
CG USAFIK	Commanding General, US Army Forces in Korea (See USAFIK below).
CLO	Central Liaison Office, Imperial Japanese Government (for liaison with SCAP).
CMMC	Civilian Merchant Marine Committee (Japanese agency).
COMNAVJAP	Commander Naval Activities, Japan (US Navy).
DDT	Insecticide powder.
FLTLOSCAP	Fleet Liaison Officer, SCAP (US Navy).
GHQ	General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
GOC AMF	General Officer Commanding, Australian Military Force (see AMF areas above).
IJG	Imperial Japanese Government.
JSP	Japanese Surrendered Personnel.
Liberties	Liberty ships.
LST	Landing Ship, Tank

(Appendix A - continued) 67

NEI Netherlands East Indies E-1-16

Pacific Ocean Areas Includes Bonin, Volcano, Marianas, Caroline, Marshall and Gilbert Islands in addition to the Hawaiian group and the islands of the South Pacific.

PI Philippine Islands.

POA Pacific Ocean Areas (See Pacific Ocean Areas above).

POWs Prisoners of War.

SACSEA Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command (British) (See SEAC below).

SCAJAP Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (US Navy).

SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

SDB Second Demobilization Bureau (Naval agency of IJG).

SEA Southeast Asia (See SEAC below).

SEAC Southeast Asia Command. Includes French Indo-China south of 16° north latitude, Siam, Burma, Malaya, initially the Netherlands East Indies, and the British East Indies.

Soviet and Soviet-Controlled Areas Includes Karafuto, Kurile Islands, Siberia, Korea north of 38° north latitude, and the Dairen-Port Arthur Area.

(Appendix A - continued)

United States Army
Forces Pacific

Includes US Army Forces in Japan and in the areas of CG USAFIK (XXIV Corps), CG AFWESPAC and CG AFMIDPAC.

US

United States.

USAF China

US Army Forces, China.

USAFIK

US Army Forces in Korea (Korea south of 38° north latitude).

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Western Pacific

For the purposes of repatriation, that portion of the Asiatic-Pacific Theater west of 180th meridian and Hawaii (includes Australia, Bismarck Archipelago, Bonin Islands, Burma, Caroline Islands, China, Formosa, French Indo-China, Gilbert Islands, Hawaiian Islands, Japan, Karafuto, Korea, Kurile Islands, Malaya, Manchuria, Marianas Islands, Marshall Islands, Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, New Zealand, North Borneo, Philippine Islands, Ryukyu Islands, Sarawak, Siam, Solomon Islands, Timor, Volcano Islands, Wake Island, and other miscellaneous islands west of 180th meridian).

WSA

War Shipping Administration (US Agency).

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APPENDIX B69
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The following is the basic directive concerning repatriation, issued to the Imperial Japanese Government on 7 May 1946, as amended, which was a compilation of all general directives previously issued on this subject. As phases of repatriation were completed or new ones were initiated, appropriate changes were made to the directive. The following includes all portions of the directive which were in force during the various phases. However, at no one time did the directive contain all of the material included below.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSAG 370.05 (7 May 46)GC
(SCAPIN-927)APO 500
7 May 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.
SUBJECT : Repatriation

1. This memorandum is the basic directive governing repatriation of:
 - a. Japanese nationals from areas under the military control of:
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific; Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas; Generalissimo, Chinese Armies; Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command; General Officer Commanding, Australian Military Forces; Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Forces in the Far East.
 - b. Displaced persons in Japan formerly domiciled in China, Formosa, Korea and the Ryukyus.
2. In the future, insofar as practicable, all general directives concerning repatriation to and from the areas listed in paragraph 1 above, will

be issued to the Imperial Japanese Government in the form of additions or amendments to this memorandum.

3. The Imperial Japanese Government will carry out the instructions as contained in annexes to this memorandum, under the supervision of the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ B. M. Fitch
B. M. FITCH
Brigadier General, AGD,
Adjutant General.

ANNEX I

GENERAL POLICIES GOVERNING REPATRIATION OF JAPANESE NATIONALS IN FORMERLY JAPANESE OCCU- PIED TERRITORY, AND NON-JAPANESE FROM JAPAN. *

* The term "non-Japanese" as used in this annex and throughout this memorandum includes only Chinese, Formosans, Koreans, and Ryukyans.

1. Maximum utilization will be made of Japanese naval and merchant shipping allocated for repatriation of Japanese nationals.

2. Japanese naval vessels and those Japanese merchant vessels, designed primarily for the transport of personnel and not required for inter-island or coastal service, will be utilized for the repatriation of Japanese nationals.

3. Personnel to be repatriated will not be transported on cargo vessels to the extent that the essential cargo is displaced. Repatriates will be transported on cargo vessels destined only for authorized repatriation ports (see paragraph 2 a, Annex II).

4. The Imperial Japanese Government will operate, man, victual and supply Japanese-manned shipping used for repatriation to the maximum practicable extent. In case of emergency, fuel, food, medical supplies and material repairs may be obtained from U. S. Army or Navy sources, or at foreign ports from foreign government sources, by memorandum receipt signed by the master of the vessel concerned (see Annex IV).

5. First priority will be granted to the movement of Japanese military and naval personnel, and second priority to the movement of Japanese civilians. Exception may be made by the appropriate Allied area commanders as deemed necessary for areas under their control.

6. Only personnel being repatriated to and from Japan under the Japanese repatriation program or such others as may be authorized in special cases by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will be transported on repatriation vessels.

7. Non-Japanese nationals who have been repatriated to their homelands, will not be permitted to return to Japan until such time as commercial facilities are available, except as authorized by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

8. All Japanese personnel will be disarmed prior to return to Japan proper.

9. In the evacuation of Japanese nationals from areas under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will prescribe the percentage of shipping, allocated exclusively for repatriation purposes, to be employed in servicing the respective areas. Priorities for the evacuation of specific areas will be established as necessary.

10. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers retains control over, and will make such arrangements as may be required for, the transportation to and reception in Japan of Japanese nationals evacuated from areas under the control of: the Generalissimo, Chinese Armies; The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command; the General Officer Commanding, Australian Military Forces; and the Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Forces in the Far East.

ANNEX II

RECEPTION CENTERS IN JAPAN FOR PROCESSING REPATRIATES

1. The Ministry of Public Welfare, having been designated by the Japanese Government to handle repatriation matters, will:
 - a. Establish a central agency to effect coordination with other Japanese governmental agencies regarding supply, customs, transportation, physical inspections, quarantine and demobilization, and to effect liaison with the headquarters of the Eighth United States Army.
 - b. Establish and operate reception centers at designated ports (see paragraph 2 a) to:
 - (1) Receive, process, care for and evacuate all Japanese repatriates returning to Japan proper from overseas.
 - (2) Assemble, process, care for and load non-Japanese nationals, as outlined in Annex III.
 - c. Designate a resident director at each reception center responsible for its operation and for maintaining liaison with local Allied military authorities responsible for supervision of the reception center.
2. a. Reception centers: Location, character and capacity.

Reception centers will be located as indicated below, and

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only these centers will be used for repatriation purposes:

<u>Ports</u>	Capacity per day	
	<u>Incoming</u> (Par 1b)	<u>Outgoing</u> (Par 1b)
Hakata —	7,500	5,000
Hakodate	2,500	2,500
Karatsu	2,500	2,500
Kagoshima	3,000	1,500
Kure area *	8,000	3,000
Maizuru	2,500	2,500
Nagoya	5,000	1,000
Sasebo —	5,000	5,000
Senzaki	5,000	5,000
Shimonoseki **	2,500	2,500
Tanabe	3,000	1,000
Tobata (Moji) **	2,500	2,500
Uraga	5,000	1,500

* Includes Ninoshima, Otake, and Ujina.

** To be used as a staging area (an area to billet and process repatriates moving to and from other reception centers) until such time as port is mine free.

b. Facilities.

Adequate facilities will be established at each of the above designated ports to receive, process and evacuate repatriates in the numbers indicated above. They will include necessary storage space for food, clothing and medical supplies as well as space for administration, necessary medical examinations, quarantine stations and quarantine hospitals. The Ministry of Public Welfare will make arrangements with the Commanding General of the Eighth United States Army for assignment of necessary space for these facilities.

c. Medical procedures.

Adequate inspection and quarantine stations, established at the above designated ports, will be operated in accordance with the procedures prescribed in Annex V.

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3. The establishment, organization and operation of each reception center will be under the supervision of the Allied military commander who exercises control over the area in which the reception center is located.

ANNEX III

REPATRIATION TO AND FROM JAPAN

SECTION I - GENERAL PLAN

1. a. The following plan governing the repatriation to and from Japan, now in effect, will continue until otherwise directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

b. The entire plan revolves around the use of reception centers and the flow of persons to be repatriated through these centers in the numbers that can be accommodated by the available shipping and rail transportation.

c. Under this plan non-Japanese nationals who, having registered as being desirous of repatriation, fail to comply with the instructions of the Imperial Japanese Government for consummation of their repatriation, forfeit their privilege to repatriation and will not be considered in any future repatriation plans. A list of such persons by name will be maintained by the Japanese Government. The number of persons so listed as of 31 May 1946, will be reported to General Headquarters not later than 25 June 1946. Thereafter monthly reports will be furnished on or about the 10th day of the month following the month reported on.

d. Exception to paragraph 1 c above may be made in the case of families which cannot comply with plans of the Imperial Japanese Government for their repatriation, due to circumstances over which they have no

control. Insofar as practicable the immediate family group should be considered a unit, and should be repatriated as a unit, unless members thereof have forfeited their privilege of repatriation. Persons, who cannot comply with repatriation plans, due to circumstances beyond their control, will not be included in the reports directed in paragraph 1 c above.

2. The following reception centers will be used to process non-Japanese repatriates leaving Japan:

Hakata and Senzaki	Primarily to process Koreans.
Kagoshima	Primarily to process Ryukyans now domiciled on Kyushu.
Kure Area	Primarily to process Formosans, such Chinese as were formerly domiciled in South China, and Ryukyans in Japan not now domiciled on Kyushu.
Maizuru	Primarily to process Chinese who were formerly domiciled in Central China.
Nagoya	Primarily to process Ryukyans in Japan not now domiciled on Kyushu.
Sasebo	Primarily to process Chinese who were formerly domiciled in North China, and Ryukyans now domiciled on Kyushu.

3. The Japanese Ministry of Welfare will:

a. Make the necessary arrangements to insure that each of the reception centers mentioned in paragraph 2 above is kept filled, insofar as practicable, with outgoing repatriates as hereinafter prescribed.

b. Scrutinize carefully the shipping schedules furnished and take appropriate action to insure that:

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- (1) Reception centers do not become congested.
- (2) Repatriation vessels sailing for Korean, Formosan or Ryukyuan ports are filled to capacity with repatriates for those areas, insofar as practicable.

c. Arrange for the necessary transportation to move incoming repatriates, except for such personnel as may be designated by the local United States Army Commander supervising processing, from the reception centers within twenty-four (24) hours after completion of processing.

d. Establish controls to fix in their present abodes non-Japanese nationals desiring return to their homelands until such time as they are directed to move under the provisions of this plan.

e. Prohibit the use of active reception centers as housing except as required in the actual processing and quarantine of repatriates.

4. The Imperial Japanese Government will be furnished shipping schedules governing the movement of:

a. Japanese merchant and naval vessels, Japanese-manned Liberty ships and Landing Ships, Tank, by the Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine.

b. US-manned Landing Ships, Tank, and other Allied vessels, as they are established, by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

5. Guards aboard trains carrying non-Japanese repatriates.

a. Allied military authorities have been directed to provide on request of authorized officials of Imperial Japanese Government, a minimum of one Allied Force guard per train aboard all trains scheduled specifically to carry non-Japanese repatriates (excludes Ryukyans) for purpose of lending necessary support and prestige to Japanese police

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guards and coordinating their activities.

b. The Imperial Japanese Government will direct the local Japanese Government officials to:

- (1) Request local Allied military authorities to place Allied guards aboard trains scheduled specifically to carry non-Japanese repatriates to reception centers. Each request will contain information as follows:
 - (a) Number of non-Japanese repatriates being transported.
 - (b) Number of rail cars in the train scheduled specifically to carry non-Japanese repatriates.
 - (c) Schedule, route and destination of train.
- (2) Submit requests to local military authorities in sufficient time to permit orders to be issued and guards to be placed aboard the trains.
- (3) Provide suitable sleeping cars or first class coaches as quarters for Allied guards during entire trip, when possible to do so without using cars needed by other Allied personnel on official business. When, in exceptional cases, these accommodations are not available second class coaches may be furnished in lieu thereof. The cars will be clean.
- (4) Promptly forward complete and accurate information regarding changes in train movements to the appropriate local military authorities.

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c. The Imperial Japanese Government will also direct the local Japanese government officials to:

- (1) Organize outgoing non-Japanese repatriates into groups under selected group leaders prior to entraining.
- (2) Insure against overcrowding.
- (3) Insure orderly entraining and detraining of the groups.
- (4) Place an appropriate number of armed Japanese policemen to maintain order aboard all trains scheduled specifically to carry non-Japanese repatriates (excludes Ryukyans) to reception centers. (See paragraph 6 b below).

6. Control.

a. The Imperial Japanese Government will direct its representatives at reception centers to:

- (1) Organize outgoing non-Japanese repatriates into groups under selected group leaders prior to embarkation.
- (2) Thoroughly instruct these groups in shipboard routine and sanitary measures to be observed.
- (3) Insure orderly embarkation of groups.
- (4) Furnish the captain of Allied-manned vessels with a list of individuals and leaders in each group.

b. The local Japanese officials will utilize every legal means available to control repatriates, while in Japan and aboard Japanese-manned vessels.

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SECTION II - REPATRIATION TO AND FROM KOREA

7. The following plan governs the repatriation of Korean nationals.

8. Shipping.

a. Japan - Korea shuttles.

Short range Japanese repatriation shipping in the Japan-Korea shuttles is assigned so as to make available the following number of spaces daily (ships will return empty to Japan):

	<u>Initially</u>	<u>By 5 May 1946</u>
Hakata	1,500	3,000
Senzaki	500	1,000

b. Japan-Korea-China shuttles.

Certain Japanese shipping, shuttling between Shanghai and Hakata, may be loaded with Koreans at Hakata for debarkation at Pusan.

c. Shipping will be scheduled as necessary to lift Japanese from Korea to Sasebo.

9. Processing of Koreans through Japanese ports.

a. The repatriation of Koreans now in Japan who were formerly resident in Korea south of 38° north latitude will be completed on or before 15 December 1946, except as noted in paragraph 1 d above. A report will be submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers by 31 December 1946 showing:

(1) Names of Koreans, listed by family, who were not repatriated on or before 15 December 1946, but who have not forfeited their privilege of repatriation, as outlined in paragraph 1 d above.

(2) Approximate date each family, referred to in paragraph 9 a (1) above, will be able to move to repatriation ports.

b. Koreans will be outloaded to Pusan from the following ports at the daily rates indicated:

	<u>Initially</u>	<u>By 5 May 1946</u>
Hakata	1,500	3,000
Senzaki	500	1,000
TOTAL	2,000	4,000

Initial daily rates indicated above will be progressively increased to insure that the prescribed rates are reached by 5 May 1946. Thereafter the prescribed rates will be maintained until all Koreans desirous of repatriation are either cleared from Japan or have forfeited their privilege to repatriation. Sufficient Koreans will be backlogged in these reception centers to insure the above.

10. Japanese repatriates arriving in Japan from Korea will be processed as prescribed in paragraph 3 b (2), Annex V.

11. Koreans destined for Korea north of 38° north latitude will be processed and repatriated in accordance with the provisions of memorandum from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, file AG 014.33 (26 Dec 46), (SCAPIN-1421), dated 26 December 1946, subject: Repatriation of Japanese Nationals from Soviet and Soviet-Controlled Territories, and of Koreans from Japan to Korea North of 38° North Latitude.

12. Repatriation of Korean prisoners.

a. The Imperial Japanese Government will not repatriate Korean civil prisoners from Japan until they have served their terms of imprisonment and are duly released from confinement. This shall not be construed as in any way infringing upon the prerogative of the Imperial Japanese Government to remit or mitigate sentences.

b. The above is subject to the provisions of memorandum from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, file AG 015 (19 Feb 46)LS,

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(SCAPIN-757), dated 19 February 1946, subject: Review of Sentences Imposed upon Koreans and Certain Other Nationals.

13. Under this plan it is the responsibility of the Imperial Japanese Government to plan and implement the repatriation of Korean nationals from Japan to Korea. This responsibility will not be delegated wholly or in part to any of the various Korean associations or societies.

SECTION III - REPATRIATION OF FORMOSANS

14. The following plan governs the repatriation of Formosan nationals.

15. Shipping.

Empty spaces on certain vessels bound for the Philippine Islands, or areas under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, or Australian Military Forces, will be filled with Formosans who will be debarked in Formosa (See Paragraph 4 b above).

16. Processing of Formosans through Japanese Ports.

Formosans desiring repatriation from Japan will be assembled at the Kure area reception centers during the week 5 - 11 May 1946 for evacuation on Japanese-manned shipping.

SECTION IV - REPATRIATION TO AND FROM THE RYUKYUS

17. The following plan governs the repatriation of Ryukyuans from Japan to their home islands, and of Japanese from the Ryukyus to Japan.

18. Repatriation of Ryukyuans from Japan.

a. Repatriation of Ryukyuans from Japan, resumed on 15 August 1946, will be completed on or before 26 December 1946.

b. Ryukyuans will be assembled, processed and outloaded in the manner and at the rates prescribed in memorandum from the Supreme Commander

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for the Allied Powers, file AG 014.33 (24 Jul 46)GC, (SCAPIN-1081), dated 24 July 1946, subject: "Repatriation of Ryukyuans now in Japan," as amended.

c. Repatriates upon arriving at primary debarkation ports in the Ryukyu Islands, will be further distributed to their home islands.

d. Repatriates will be prohibited from transporting animals or birds aboard repatriation ships destined for the Ryukyu Islands.

19. Only such Japanese as were bonafide residents of the Ryukyu Islands will be repatriated to those islands.

20. Repatriation of Japanese from the Ryukyu Islands.

Japanese will be repatriated from the Ryukyu Islands at a rate of 150 persons per month until 1 October 1946; thereafter as prescribed in order to complete their repatriation by 31 December 1946.

SECTION V - REPATRIATION TO AND FROM CHINA

21. The following plan governs the repatriation of Chinese from Japan to China, and of Japanese from China to Japan.

22. Repatriation of Japanese from China (including Formosa and north French Indo-China).

a. The allocation of Japanese repatriation shipping spaces (approximately 18,000) now assigned to the China-Japan shuttle remains unchanged.

b. US-manned Landing Ships, Tank (LSTs), formerly assigned to the China-Japan shuttle have been withdrawn from the repatriation service.

23. Repatriation of Chinese from Japan.

a. Prior to 13 May 1946 Chinese will be outloaded as follows:

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- (1) Those formerly domiciled in north China at Sasebo and Senzaki.
 - (2) Those formerly domiciled in central China at Hakata and Senzaki.

b. All Chinese remaining in Japan on 13 May 1946, desiring repatriation, will be assembled on that date for evacuation as follows:

- (1) Those whose destination is north China at Sasebo for shipment on Japanese or Japanese-manned shipping.
- (2) Those whose destination is central China at Maizuru for shipment on Japanese or Japanese-manned shipping.
- (3) Those whose destination is south China at Kure for shipment to Canton on Japanese-manned shipping servicing the Southeast Asia areas.

SECTION VI - REPATRIATION FROM SOVIET AND SOVIET-CONTROLLED
AREAS, BRITISH-CONTROLLED AREAS IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA, AND THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

24. Japanese repatriates arriving in Japan from Soviet and Soviet-controlled areas will be processed in accordance with the provisions of the memorandum mentioned in paragraph 11 above.

25. Japanese repatriates arriving in Japan from British-controlled areas in Southeast Asia, and the Netherlands East Indies will be processed in accordance with the provisions of this memorandum.

ANNEX IV

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION

1. The following govern the provision of food, clothing, and other supplies for repatriates.

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a. Adequate food, safe drinking water, clothing and medical supplies will be provided repatriates while enroute to and in the reception centers. Resupply will be arranged if trains are delayed while enroute to the reception centers.

b. All Japanese-manned vessels, including hospital ships, leaving designated ports in the home islands (paragraph 2 a, Annex II) will be provided by the reception centers with sufficient stocks of palatable food, safe fresh water, medical supplies, clothing and other items required for the ships' crews and repatriates on the outgoing and return voyages plus enough stocks to take care of unforeseen delays.

c. The Japanese Ministry of Welfare will furnish all non-Japanese repatriates outloaded on US-manned Landing Ships, Tank, with one (1) day's supply of pre-cooked rice and sufficient dry rice for the voyage plus one (1) day. The food will be palatable.

d. United States repatriation vessels leaving designated ports in the Japanese home islands and which will return to Japan with repatriates, will be provided by the reception centers with sufficient stocks of food, medical supplies, blankets and other items required for the repatriates on the return voyage. During periods of cold weather in Japan, the Imperial Japanese Government will place aboard vessels departing from Japan sufficient warm clothing for repatriates to be returned to Japan from warm climates.

e. The cost of supplies and facilities for repatriates will be borne by the Imperial Japanese Government.

f. Retention of American military equipment by Japanese evacuees in Japan.

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- (1) In order that maximum utility may be gained from American military clothing and equipment issued by competent authority to Japanese evacuees, the Imperial Japanese Government is directed to take the following actions:
- (a) Collect all American clothing and equipment in the possession of repatriates as they are processed through reception centers.
 - (b) Re-outfit such personnel when necessary with Japanese clothing and equipment.
 - (c) American clothing and equipment, collected as directed in paragraph 1 f (1) (a) above, may be used by the Japanese Government for relief purposes subject to the following:
 - 1. All clothing or equipment of textile or fabric material will be dyed a distinctive color prior to issue.
 - 2. All equipment such as shoes, canteens, etc, which cannot be dyed, will be marked or branded in the manner approved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
 - 3. Unless so dyed or marked, items will be confiscated by Allied authorities.
- (2) The Imperial Japanese Government will report to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as of the last day of each month the quantities of each item of American

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clothing and equipment dyed and marked and reissued to needy individuals during that month.

g. Supplies of food and clothing for the reception centers will be levied proportionally on all prefectures of Japan.

2. Transportation.

a. Water transportation will be provided without cost to repatriates.

b. Rail transportation will be provided without cost to authorized repatriates moving to reception centers under Japanese planned evacuation. This is retroactive to 15 October 1945. The following governs payment of refunds:

(1) When refunds are made they should be made to individuals unless an organization has legal proof that it is acting as an agent for such individuals under a proper power of attorney.

(2) The matter of refunds to employers for fares paid in behalf of non-Japanese employees is a matter for settlement between the Imperial Japanese Government and the employers concerned.

c. Vessels and trains will be clean, and adequate sanitary facilities therein will be provided.

d. Adequate fire fighting equipment and life rafts will be provided Japanese-manned repatriation vessels.

e. Quarters for US escort guards aboard vessels will be clean and the best available. Adequate sanitary facilities will be provided.

3. Emergency supplies furnished repatriation ships in foreign ports.

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a. Arrangements have been made with the authorities who control ports outside of Japan to accept receipts for necessary supplies issued to Japanese-manned ships servicing those ports.

b. Masters of Japanese-manned vessels engaged in repatriation will be instructed to furnish quantitative receipts for supplies obtained outside of Japan. Receipts will specify amount and kind of supplies and whether supplies will be used for Japanese troops or civilians.

c. The Imperial Japanese Government will:

(1) Provide fuel, fresh water, medical supplies and food for all Japanese-manned ships engaged in repatriation to the maximum extent practicable from Japanese sources.

✓ Accordingly Japanese-manned vessels will obtain supplies at overseas ports in minimum amounts necessary to complete their scheduled voyages.

(2) Take necessary measures to insure that the masters of repatriation ships do not request or accept supplies and/or repairs in Soviet or Soviet-controlled ports, except in dire emergency and unless the seaworthiness of the ships or the safety of the passengers and the crews is endangered by failure to accept such supplies and/or repairs.

4. Other Medical Supplies.

See Paragraph 7, Annex V.

ANNEX V

MEDICAL AND SANITARY PROCEDURES

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1. The Ministry of Public Welfare will carry out the following medical and sanitary procedures as minimum requirements incidental to repatriation of all nationals to and from Japan.

a. Procedures with respect to all repatriates will provide for:

- (1) Physical inspection for detection of louse infestation, and of cases and suspects of quarantinable diseases (cholera, plague, smallpox, louse-borne typhus, and yellow fever) or of communicable disease which might prejudice the health of subsequent contacts.
- (2) Hospitalization or other effective segregation of persons known or suspected to be infected with quarantinable or significant communicable diseases, until communicability has passed. Persons with the following diseases will not be placed aboard vessels or trains carrying repatriates: typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, plague, typhus, smallpox, cholera, relapsing fever, Japanese "B" encephalitis, pneumonia, influenza, diphtheria, scarlet fever, chicken pox, measles, pertussis, mumps, cerebrospinal meningitis, poliomyelitis, encephalitis "A", and epidemic hemorrhagic fever. All Ryukyuan repatriates will be held in quarantine for a six (6) day period prior to being placed aboard repatriation ships.
- (3) Persons with the following diseases may be placed aboard repatriation ships, provided the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is notified and proper surveillance is maintained enroute: amebic dysentery, bacillary dysentery, enteritis or diarrhea, malaria, kala azar, tuberculosis, pleurisy, undulant fever and venereal disease.

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- (4) Appropriate measures for continued observation of persons known to have had contact with a quarantinable disease of a type liable to convey infection. Observation will continue during the incubation period of the disease concerned, calculated from the day of last contact. The following incubation periods will be observed: smallpox - 14 days, louse-borne typhus - 12 days, plague - 6 days, yellow fever - 6 days, and cholera - 6 days (see paragraph 3).
- (a) In accordance with the risk involved, appropriate measures may vary from detention under observation to notification to the responsible control agency in the country of entry of the presence of passengers aboard ships that have been exposed to the diseases mentioned in paragraph 1a (4) above.
- (5) Disinfestation by DDT of all repatriates arriving in Japan. Disinfestation will include the clothing and baggage of such persons and other articles susceptible to infestation.
- (6) Immunization.
- (a) The following vaccinations will be given:
1. Smallpox vaccination will be given to all outgoing repatriates, and all incoming repatriates not vaccinated within one year.
 2. Typhus vaccine will be administered to all outgoing and incoming repatriates.
 3. Cholera vaccine will be given during spring and

summer to all incoming and outgoing repatriates.

4. Typhoid vaccine will be administered to all Korean repatriates destined for Korea north of 38° north latitude.

(b) Only the initial dose of a multi-dose vaccine need be administered at the reception centers if the flow of outgoing repatriates would be impeded otherwise, except that 2 inoculations against cholera will be administered to each Ryukyuan repatriate during the appropriate seasons.

(c) A certificate, in the English language, indicating which vaccinations have been administered, will be furnished each outgoing repatriate prior to embarkation on repatriation ships.

- (7) Maintenance of records required to comply with International Quarantine procedure.

b. Procedures with respect only to Japanese-manned vessels will provide for:

- (1) Inspection for rodent infestation aboard such vessels arriving from areas in which plague is known to be occurring or is considered endemic.
- (2) Fumigation by cyanide, sulfur dioxide, or other method submitted to and approved in advance by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, of vessels in which a case of rodent plague has been detected, or in which there is an excessive number of rats as determined by the amount of feces present. Where fumigation can not

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be arranged trapping or poisoning programs shall be carried out under the supervision of the port authorities.

- (3) Examination for infection with plague of all rats recovered after fumigation, or trapping. Monthly reports of such procedures will be submitted to the Commanding General, Eighth Army.
- (4) Vessels infected with or suspected to be infected with plague shall not be permitted to come alongside a wharf until freed of infection. Rat infested vessels coming to dock shall be fended off at least six feet, all lines shall be fitted with rat guards and all gangways and other connections with shore removed during the hours of darkness or kept well-lighted and under guard.
- (5) Disinfestation with DDT will be accomplished monthly on all vessels operating on shuttles where less than a month is required for a round trip. Vessels requiring more than a month for a round trip will be disinfested with DDT prior to departure from Japan on each voyage.
- (6) Other sanitary measures approved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as appropriate for control of diseases aboard vessels, including adequate provision for safe drinking water and proper disposal of wastes, and thorough cleaning of vessels at port of debarkation. In all cases ships will be thoroughly cleaned prior to their departure from Japan and in the shortest practicable time.

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- (7) Providing ships' masters with the necessary means and equipment to maintain a high degree of sanitation while at sea. The Imperial Japanese Government will require ships' masters to enforce the desired high standard of cleanliness and sanitation.

c. Procedures with respect to reception centers will provide for:

- (1) A continuing program of rat control and autopsies of captured rats in all reception centers with immediate notifications to appropriate Allied military and Japanese authorities whenever a plague rat is found. Monthly reports as provided in paragraph 1b (3).
- (2) All immunizations, processing and disinfection of ships, and personnel and their baggage being done at the reception center. A blanket certificate to the effect that all required procedures have been accomplished will be attached to the passenger manifest. In cases where any required procedures have been omitted, an appropriate notation will be made on the certificate.
- (3) Physical inspection being done during daylight hours, except in exceptional circumstances in which the flow of repatriates would be impeded otherwise.
- (4) Additional measures of port sanitary control, including in particular investigation of enteric infections, being carried out by the Ministry of Public Welfare as desirable and feasible provided that the flow of repatriates is not impeded thereby.

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d. Japanese crews of repatriation vessels will be vaccinated for the diseases enumerated in paragraph 1a (4) above. Immunization will be considered valid not to exceed the following periods: smallpox - 1 year, louse-borne typhus - 6 months, cholera - 4 months, yellow fever - 5 years, plague - 3 months. Each member of the crew will be issued an immunization register, indicating type of vaccination and the date the vaccine was administered. The crew members will carry these registers at all times. Loss of immunization registers will necessitate revaccination.

e. Members of crews of incoming repatriation ships carrying smallpox cases will be vaccinated, or revaccinated, and the responsible control agency notified that the ship can be dispatched when five days have elapsed subsequent to the vaccination. This will not apply to ships carrying quarantinable disease other than smallpox.

f. The Imperial Japanese Government will direct the captains of Japanese-manned repatriation vessels to notify the responsible control agency in the country of entry of the presence on board ship of any of the diseases listed in paragraph 1a (4) above or of exposed passengers traveling during incubation periods. Notification will also include cases of significant communicable disease, the institutionalization of which is not immediately practicable, i. e. tuberculosis, etc. When applicable, the ship's master will report the ship free from contagious disease.

2. Japanese medical personnel to be furnished for repatriation shipping.

a. Medical personnel aboard Japanese-manned Liberty ships and Landing Ships, Tank, repatriating Japanese from China, except for hospital ships, will be furnished by the Chinese authorities from Japanese medical personnel now in China. This personnel will be assigned for permanent duty

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aboard these vessels.

b. The Imperial Japanese Government will assign medical personnel for permanent duty aboard all Japanese-manned repatriation shipping, other than that mentioned in paragraph 2 a above, as follows:

- (1) On ships making voyages of less than four days duration, two medical orderlies, except as specified in paragraph 2 b (2) below.
- (2) On ships making voyages of four days or longer duration, and ships engaged in repatriating Ryukyans, a doctor and two medical orderlies.

c. The Imperial Japanese Government will obtain names and itineraries of shipping requiring Japanese medical personnel from the Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine.

3. Quarantine procedures for cholera among repatriates.

a. The Imperial Japanese Government will take the following measures immediately to prevent the introduction of cholera into Japan by individuals being repatriated from ports infected with cholera. Ports so infected will be designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as "cholera ports."

b. In the case of ships with repatriates from cholera ports which arrive without cases of cholera aboard:

- (1) Where the voyage has taken more than six (6) days, all personnel, except crew members who have been inoculated within the previous one month period (see paragraph 1 d above), will be inoculated with 1 cubic centimeter of cholera vaccine and debarked, and processing procedures will be performed as usual.

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- (2) Where the voyage from the cholera port has taken less than six (6) days, all personnel will be held aboard the ship until six (6) days have elapsed, the personnel physically examined for cholera, and if no cases are found they will be disembarked as described in paragraph 3b (1) above. In the event cholera is found, the procedure will be as prescribed in paragraph 3 c below.

c. Ships which arrive in Japan WITH CHOLERA ABOARD will use only the ports of Uraga, Sasebo or Hakata until directed otherwise by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

- (1) Ships will be anchored sufficiently far from shore to preclude the possibility of anyone swimming to shore or contamination from the vessel washing ashore.
- (2) All personnel will be held on board for fourteen (14) days after the development of the last case.
- (3) Cases of cholera will be removed from the ship to a hospital ship anchored off shore, which will receive and treat cholera cases among repatriates. Prior to the arrival of the hospital ships at the ports of Uraga and Sasebo, cholera patients will be removed to the isolation hospitals at the reception centers at the above mentioned ports, where strict isolation procedure will be maintained. Great care will be exercised in sterilizing all discharges from patients (using cresol solution in such strengths as to obtain a 2 per-cent effective concentration of disinfectant), screening to protect from flies and isolation of attendants.

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- (4) All personnel (except cholera patients, and crew members who have been inoculated within the previous one month period) will be inoculated with 1 cubic centimeter of cholera vaccine.
- (5) During the quarantine period the feces and urine of all personnel will be treated, using cresol solution in such strength as to obtain a 2 per-cent effective concentration of disinfectant before being discharged into the sea.
- (6) A stool examination will be performed on all personnel to detect carriers. All carriers discovered will be isolated in the same manner as cholera cases and kept until three negative stool specimens have been obtained at two day intervals.
- (7) The baggage and clothing of all personnel will be sterilized.

4. Quarantine procedures for incoming repatriation vessels infected or suspected of being infected with smallpox.

a. An infected vessel shall be held in quarantine until the personal effects of the sick and the quarters occupied by them, together with furnishings, shall have been disinfected. Measures to accomplish this disinfection will be instituted at once.

b. Persons:

- (1) Persons ill with, or suspected of being ill with, smallpox shall be isolated and kept under medical observation until known to be non-infectious.
- (2) All contacts shall be vaccinated and held under observation until the results of the vaccination indicate immunity.

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Persons refusing vaccination shall be held under observation until 14 days have elapsed from the time of their last contact.

5. Quarantine procedures for arriving vessels infected, or suspected of being infected, with typhus.

a. Vessels:

- (1) Infected vessels shall be detained in quarantine until vermin destruction has been completed. Measures to accomplish this vermin destruction will be instituted at once.
- (2) A louse-infested vessel shall be disinfected.
- (3) The personal effects and baggage of typhus cases, suspect typhus cases, louse-infested persons and suspect louse-infested persons shall be disinfected.

b. Persons:

- (1) Persons ill from and suspected to be ill from typhus shall be isolated and kept under medical observation until known to be non-infectious.
- (2) Contacts whose anti-typhus vaccinations are up to date may be released under 12-day surveillance.
- (3) Contacts whose anti-typhus vaccinations are not up to date shall be vaccinated and held under surveillance or observation for 12 days from date of last contact.
- (4) All persons infested or suspect-infested with vermin shall be disinfecting.
- (5) Vermin-free persons who had no contact with either typhus cases or vermin-infested persons may be released

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under 12 days' surveillance provided their anti-typhus vaccinations are up to date or provided vaccination is given upon arrival.

6. Quarantine for arriving vessels infected or suspected of being infected with plague.

a. Vessels:

- (1) A plague infected vessel shall be detained in quarantine and immediate measures instituted for the destruction of rodents and vermin aboard.
- (2) Disinfection of personal effects, baggage, bedding, quarters, kitchens, store rooms, etc., shall be accomplished as the quarantine officer may direct to insure that the vessel is freed of infection.

b. Persons:

- (1) Persons infected, or suspected of being infected, with plague shall be isolated and kept under medical observation until known to be non-infectious.
- (2) Contacts shall be held under observation or surveillance for a period of 6 days subsequent to last possible exposure.

7. The Japanese Government will furnish the vaccine necessary for medical processing at all repatriation ports in China, Manchuria and Japan. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will furnish the necessary instructions concerning amounts and types needed for China and Manchuria. Where it is not possible for the Japanese Government to furnish vaccines in the required amounts, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will be notified of deficiencies with reasons therefor.

ANNEX VI

CURRENCY, SECURITIES, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS AND POSSESSIONS

1. The Ministry of Public Welfare will carry out the following procedures in processing Japanese being repatriated to Japan, and Chinese, Formosans, Koreans, and Ryukyans to their respective homelands.

2. In processing Japanese nationals being repatriated to Japan, the Imperial Japanese Government will:

a. Permit the following currency and Japanese Government Bonds to be brought into Japan:

(1) Bank of Japan yen currency and supplemental "B" type currency in the following amounts:

(a) Commissioned officers - a maximum of ¥ 500.

(b) Non-commissioned officers and enlisted men - a maximum of ¥ 200.

(c) Civilians* - a maximum of ¥ 1000.

(2) Exchange certificates for Japanese yen, issued by demobilization directors at ports of embarkation in north China, exchange certificates for Manchu yuan, issued in Manchuria, and duly certified receipts for yen currency, issued in southern Korea, in lieu of yen currency up to the limits stipulated in paragraph 2 a (1) above.

(3) Japanese Government bonds expressed in yen, in lieu of yen currency and/or exchange certificates up to the limits stipulated in paragraph 2 a (1) above.

b. In addition to the amounts of yen currency, exchange certificates, or Japanese Government bonds which may be brought in by all repatriates, permit Japanese prisoners of war to bring in with them additional

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amounts equal to payments made to them or accumulated by them while interned as prisoners of war.

c. (1) Convert exchange certificates and certified receipts (see paragraph 2 a (2) above) into Bank of Japan currency on a one-to-one basis, retaining in safe custody exchange certificates so exchanged pending further directions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Bank of Japan and "B" type currency allowed to be brought in plus the proceeds of any exchange made at the port of debarkation will not exceed the limitations of paragraph 2 a (1) above.

(2) Effect no exchanges of any foreign currency brought into Japan including, but not by way of limitation, currency of the Bank of Chosen, the Bank of Taiwan, and the Central Bank of Manchuria. All such currency carried to Japan by repatriates will be taken up against individual receipt and held in safe custody pending further directions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The above will not be construed to amend or nullify paragraph 3 of Memorandum from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, file AG 123 (13 Dec 45)ESS/FI, dated 13 December 1945, subject: "Relief Payments to Japanese Repatriates".

d. Permit the following financial instruments to be brought into Japan as indicated below.

(1) Postal savings pass books of the Japanese Postal Savings System issued in Japanese yen.

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- (2) Post Office life insurance policies (includes post office annuity policies and certificates) and other insurance policies issued by Japanese companies.
 - (3) Bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan.
 - (4) Japanese Army and Navy field-postal savings pass books.
 - (5) Remittance receipts, payable in yen, issued to repatriates from China by the Yokohama Specie Bank in China against yen deposits, provided that the total yen amount of remittance receipts carried by any person, when added to the yen currency, exchange certificates and/or Japanese Government bonds does not exceed the amounts stipulated in paragraph 2a (1) above.
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e. Permit them to carry with them their clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner. This will be limited to the amount each person can carry at one time.

f. (1) Take up against individual receipt:

- (a) All currency or combinations of currency and/or exchange certificates, remittance receipts and Japanese Government bonds in excess of the limitations stipulated in paragraph 2a (1) above, and all foreign currencies (see paragraph 2c (2) above).
 - (b) Gold or silver coin.
 - (c) Gold, silver or platinum bullion or alloy thereof in bullion form.
 - (d) Checks, drafts, bills of exchange, securities, promissory notes, payment instructions, transfer
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orders, or other financial instruments, except as in paragraphs 2a through 2d above.

- (e) Powers of attorney, proxies, or other authorizations or instructions to effect financial or property transactions within or outside Japan.
 - (f) Any other evidence of indebtedness or evidence of ownership of property not specifically enumerated above.
 - (g) Art objects and personal property of value to others beside the possessor, and personal possessions in excess of limits prescribed in paragraph 2e above.
- (2) Hold those items taken up against individual receipt in safe custody pending further directions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
- g. (1) Permit the following to be brought into Japan by repatriating oversea forces.
- (a) Administrative documents relating to military personnel to include service records, data on promotions, awards, decorations, pay, allowances and allotments, and other official documents necessary for completing final records and discharge papers of military and auxiliary personnel. Administrative regulations and procedures covering personnel matters are included in this authorization.
 - (b) Tables of organization and equipment, strength returns, changes in command and military directories.
 - (c) Health regulations, hospital records and sick reports.

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- (d) Courts martial proceedings, records of arrests and confinements, and files of pending cases.
 - (e) Inventories, budgets, receipts, disbursements and settlements of purely military accounts.
 - (f) Demobilization and repatriation regulations.
 - (g) Census of Japanese nationals in various areas.
 - (h) Official documents necessary for settlement of accounts of the deceased who were formerly in the military or auxiliary service.
 - (i) Lists of missing personnel and deserters.
 - (j) Official organization seals.
- (2) Items listed in paragraphs 2g (1) (a) through 2g (1) (j) above will be subject to screening by appropriate authorities at ports of embarkation and debarkation. When cleared at the port of embarkation, the items will be placed aboard departing repatriation vessels in the custody of an individual designated by the Allied commander in that area. The appointed custodian of the documents will present his credentials and clearance certificate from the port of embarkation to the proper authority at the port of debarkation for final clearance to transfer these documents to the control of the Imperial Japanese Government. The provisions of paragraph 2g (1) above are not to be construed as a matter of policy and do not abrogate the prerogative of the local Allied commander to retain in his area such documents as he considers necessary.

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3. In processing Korean, Chinese, or Formosan nationals, or Ryukyuans being repatriated from Japan to their respective homelands, the Imperial Japanese Government will:

a. Permit them to take with them yen currency in an amount not to exceed ¥ 1000 per person. 123

(1) Chinese, Formosans and Ryukyuans will take Bank of Japan currency.

(2) The Imperial Japanese Government will exchange Bank of Chosen currency for Bank of Japan currency for Korean nationals, on a one-to-one basis.

b. Permit Koreans, Chinese and Ryukyuans to take with them in addition to currency: 124

(1) Postal savings pass books and bank pass books issued by financial institutions in Japan and in the country to which they are being repatriated.

(2) Insurance policies issued in Japan and in the country to which they are being repatriated.

(3) Checks, drafts and certificates of deposit drawn on and issued by financial institutions in Japan and payable in Japan. 125

c. (1) Effective 1 August 1946, permit Koreans destined for Korea south of 38° north latitude, Formosans and Chinese to take from Japan clothing, personal possessions and household effects of value only to the owner, limited to the amount that can be carried by the individual concerned. Application to the appropriate Eighth Army

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Military Government unit is authorized, in accordance with separate instructions, for desired unaccompanied shipment, as follows:

- (a) Clothing, personal possessions and household effects of value only to the owner which, including that accompanying the repatriate (paragraph 3c (1) above), does not exceed a total weight of 500 pounds per individual repatriate.
 - (b) Tools, light machinery and business equipment, not exceeding 4000 pounds in weight, owned outright by the repatriate on or prior to 2 September 1945, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, and used in the operation of their trade or individually operated business in Japan.
 - (c) Tools, light machinery and business equipment owned and held as indicated in paragraph 3c (1) (b) above, but in excess of 4000 pounds in weight.
- (2) Permit Ryukyans to take with them from Japan clothing and personal possessions of value only to the owner, limited in weight to 250 pounds per person.
- (3) Permit Koreans destined for Korea north of 38° north latitude to take with them from Japan:
- (a) Clothing, personal possessions and household effects of value only to the owner not to exceed 200 kilograms per individual repatriate.
 - (b) Tools, light machinery and business equipment, not exceeding 1,000 kilograms in weight, owned and held

as indicated in paragraph 3c (1) (b) above.

d. (1) Take up against individual receipt:

- (a) All other currency and yen currency in excess of the amount set forth in paragraph 3a above. All Bank of Japan currency carried by Korean repatriates will be collected and individual receipts will be issued for all that over and above the amount taken in exchange for Bank of Chosen currency (see Paragraph 3a (2) above, and memorandum from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, file AG 091.31 (30 Mar 46)ESS/FI, (SCAPIN-854-A), dated 30 March 1946, subject: "Conversion of Currency for Korea Repatriates.")
- (b) Gold, silver or platinum bullion or alloy thereof in bullion form.
- (c) Checks, drafts, bills of exchange, securities, promissory notes, payment instructions, transfer orders, or other financial instruments, except as specified in paragraph 3b above.
- (d) Powers of attorney, proxies, or other authorization or instructions to effect financial or property transactions within or outside Japan.
- (e) Any other evidence of indebtedness or evidence of ownership of property not specifically enumerated above, except as specified in paragraph 3b above.
- (f) Art objects and personal property of value to others beside the possessor, and personal possessions in excess of limits prescribed in paragraph 3c above.

(2) Hold those items taken up against individual receipt in

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safe custody pending further directions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

ANNEX VII

MISCELLANEOUS

1. Visits by Japanese Nationals to Korea.

a. All requests for permission for Japanese nationals to visit Korea will be disapproved unless, in the opinion of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, visit is for the purpose of conducting business essential to the occupation of Japan and Korea.

b. The settlement of private business matters by Japanese nationals and their assistance in welfare and relief work is not considered essential business as defined in a above.

2. Use of repatriation vessels for cargo.

a. Cargo space on regularly assigned repatriation ships may be allocated by the Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine for essential cargo under the following conditions:

- (1) When suitable cargo ships are not available.
- (2) When the amount of cargo is so small that the scheduling of a cargo ship therefor is not warranted.

b. The Imperial Japanese Government will continue to arrange with the Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine through the Civilian Merchant Marine Committee, for the assignment of the necessary space for shipping authorized cargoes.

ANNEX VIII

RESCISSIONS

(omitted)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MM 775009

By BT NARA Date 10-14-08

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APPENDIX C

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APD 500

AGREEMENTS REACHED

AT

CONFERENCE ON REPATRIATION

15 January - 17 January 1946

Tokyo, Japan

AS APPROVED BY
SCAP, CINCPAC, AND
CG CHINA

12 MARCH 1946

HEADQUARTERS REPRESENTED AT CONFERENCE

Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
Headquarters, United States Pacific Fleet.
Headquarters, United States Army Forces, China.
Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.
Headquarters, Fifth Fleet.
Headquarters, Seventh Fleet.
Headquarters, Eighth United States Army.
Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Korea.
Shipping Control Administrator for Japanese Merchant Shipping.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

12 March 1946

I. GENERAL.

A. Approval.

All agreements reached herein have been approved by SCAP, CINCPAC and Com Gen China.

B. * * * * *

C. Conferees.

A list of conferees appears in Annex I.

II. AGREEMENTS.

A. General Responsibilities.

Area commanders are responsible that:

1. A sufficient backlog of repatriates, and supplies as in Annex VII is maintained at each repatriation port to insure loading and sailing of repatriation vessels without delay.
2. The required processing of repatriates is completed prior to embarkation. See Annexes V and VI.
3. The screening of war criminals is completed prior to embarkation.
4. A proper sailing dispatch is sent immediately upon departure of each vessel engaged in repatriation. See Annex III.
5. Passenger Lists are furnished as follows:

An original and six copies to captains or masters of all repatriation ships whether Japanese or U.S. This list will be divided into Army, Navy, and civilians (men, women, and children under 12 years of age). The list will show port of embarkation and port of debarkation. It will also show by an

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overall statement that medical requirements have or have not been met. The captain or master will be instructed to keep one copy for his log and turn over the original and five copies to the repatriation officer at the debarkation port.

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6. Repatriation activities under his control will be conducted in accordance with policies enumerated in Annex IV.

B. AFWESPAC. Specific Responsibilities

Com Gen AFWESPAC, accepts responsibility for repatriation as concerns the Ryukyus south of 30 degrees north latitude in accordance with policies and plans as agreed upon between SCAP and CINCPAC. Employment for repatriation of CINCPAC's shipping remains under CINCPAC's control. In arranging details concerning repatriation from the Philippines and the Ryukyus, SCAP will deal directly with Com Gen AFWESPAC.

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C. Eighth Army. Specific Responsibilities.

Com Gen Eighth U.S. Army is authorized to use U.S. military personnel in supervising the execution of SCAP repatriation directives by the Japanese, in order to insure the orderly and expeditious movement of repatriates to and from reception centers and ports.

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D. Korean Repatriation.

1. Priority will be given to repatriation of Koreans from Japan.
 2. Repatriation of Koreans from China to Korea will be limited to those who must be evacuated as a matter of military necessity. Any other repatriation to Korea will be deferred until the War Department can clarify the extent of responsibility of Com Gen China in this matter.
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3. Korean repatriates from Japan will be accepted in Korean ports in such numbers as not to exceed the daily average rate of flow hereafter

indicated for each of the following ports:

<u>Korean Name</u>	<u>Japanese Name</u>	<u>Flow</u>
Pusan	Fusan	7,000
Kunsan	Gunzan	1,500
Mokpo	Moppo	1,000
Inchon	Jinsen	1,000

4. Koreans to be repatriated from Japan will be embarked on vessels destined for ports in Korea in accordance with the following routing:

<u>Destination In Korea</u>	<u>Port of Embarkation</u>	<u>Port of Debarkation</u>
Kyongsang Pukto	Senzaki, or Hakata	Pusan
Kyongsang Namdo	Senzaki, or Hakata	Pusan
Chungchong-Pukto	Senzaki, or Hakata	Pusan
Cholla Pukto	Sasebo	(Kunsan
Cholla Namdo	Sasebo	(
Kyonggi-Do	Sasebo	--(Mokpo
Kangwon-Do	Sasebo	(
Chungchong-Namdo	Sasebo	(Inchon
Northern Korea	Sasebo	(

5. In so far as is practicable Korean repatriates in Japan will be outloaded so that those destined for northern Korea will be placed on vessels bound for Inchon, and those destined for Cholla Pukto, Cholla Namdo and Chungchong-Namdo will be placed aboard vessels bound for Kunsan or Mokpo.

6. Proposed repatriation of Koreans from areas other than Japan, with certain exceptions, will be referred to Com Gen USAFIK for clearance and designation of a port of debarkation. Shipments of Korean repatriates from the Philippines, Ryukyus and Pacific Ocean Areas will be returned to Korea through Pusan with notification to Com Gen USAFIK of ETA and number of Koreans aboard.

7. Japanese nationals from Korea will be repatriated on shuttle vessels returning to Japan from Pusan.

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8. Authority is granted to Com Gen USAFIK to return Chinese nationals in Korea to China on any repatriation vessel on Japan - Korea - China shuttles. Chinese must be grouped so that Chinese formerly domiciled in northern, central and southern China are returned to ports in those areas respectively. Notification of ETA and number of Chinese aboard will be furnished Com Gen China by Com Gen USAFIK. 12-

9. Korean Liaison Teams will be established to facilitate handling of Koreans at Japanese repatriation ports, namely Sasebo, Hakata, and Senzaki. Teams will consist of from two to four Koreans representing the Military Government Section, Headquarters USAFIK. They will be attached to appropriate Eighth Army organizations for such duty as may be directed.

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E. Repatriation from the Philippines.

1. Effective at once the repatriation of Japanese nationals from the Philippines in SCAJAP controlled shipping is suspended until 1 July 1946.

2. Com Gen AFWESPAC will lift the following in US manned Liberty ships, to be turned over to SCAJAP in near future:

a. Approximately 3,500 Formosans and Japanese now in Tacloban to Takao and Uraga respectively. 14-

b. Approximately 14,000 Formosans, Koreans, and Japanese women and children from Manila to Takao, Pusan and Uraga respectively.

3. Authority is granted to Com Gen AFWESPAC to divert any SCAJAP controlled shipping now on the Kure - Manila shuttle to Takao or Pusan out-loading Formosans and Koreans respectively. Notifications of ETA and number repatriates aboard must be furnished interested agencies for each vessel so diverted. 15-

F. Ryukyuan Repatriation.

1. Effective at once SCAJAP shipping allocated for repatriation of

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Japanese nationals from the Ryukyus is suspended until 1 July 1946.

2. Evacuation of Ryukyuans from Japan will continue under existing agreements.

G. Pacific Ocean Areas Repatriation.

1. Present allocation of 25% of the Japanese long range repatriation shipping (approximately 15,000 passenger spaces) will continue to be allocated to Pacific Ocean areas for repatriation of Japanese nationals under existing agreements.

2. CINCPAC will provide SCAP and SCAJAP with timely advice concerning changes in his shipping requirements for repatriation from the Pacific Ocean Areas.

H. China Theater Repatriation.

See Annex II.

I. Sailing Dispatches.

See Annex III.

J. Policies Governing Repatriation.

See Annex IV.

K. Medical Procedures.

See Annex V.

L. Financial Controls in Repatriation.

See Annex VI.

M. Supply in Repatriation.

See Annex VII.

N. * * * * *

III. The agreements contained herein have been concurred in by representatives of SCAP, CINCPAC, Com Gen China, CG AFWESPAC, Com Fifth Fleet, Com Seventh Fleet, CG Eighth Army, CG USAFIK, and SCAJAP, whose signatures

appear below:

/s/ W. A. DUMAS
/t/ W. A. DUMAS, Brig Gen, G.S.C.
Representative for the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers.

/s/ C. B. MOMSEN
/t/ C. B. MOMSEN, Rear Admiral, USN
Representative of Commander-in-
Chief United States Pacific Fleet
and Shipping Control Adminis-
trator for Japanese Merchant
Shipping.

/s/ J. W. MIDDLETON
/t/ J. W. MIDDLETON, Brig Gen, USA
Representative of the Commanding
General China Theater.

/s/ R. M. GRIFFIN
/t/ R. M. GRIFFIN, Vice Admiral, USN
Representative of the Commander
Fifth Fleet, United States Navy.

/s/ E. H. NEWTON JR.
/t/ E. H. NEWTON JR, Captain, USN
Representative of the Commander
Seventh Fleet, United States Navy.

/s/ B. V. BRYANT
/t/ B. V. BRYANT, Lt Col, G.S.C.
Representative of Commanding
General, Army Forces in the
Western Pacific.

/s/ JOHN V. DUFF
/t/ J. V. DUFF, Major, FA
Representative of the Commanding
General, Eighth Army.

/s/ E. R. EDGERTON
/t/ E. R. EDGERTON, Major, Inf
Representative of Commanding
General, USAFIK.

Annexes:

- I - Roster of Conferees.
- II - Repatriation Procedures Pertaining to China Theater.
- III - Sailing Dispatches (omitted).
- IV - General Policies Governing Repatriation (omitted. See Annex I to Appendix B).
- V - Medical Procedures (omitted. See Annex V to Appendix B).
- VI - Financial Controls in Repatriation (omitted. See Annex VI to Appendix B).
- VII - Supply in Repatriation.
- VIII - * * * * *

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ANNEX I

to

AGREEMENTS REACHED AT CONFERENCE ON REPATRIATION
15 - 17 January 1946
Tokyo, Japan

ROSTER OF CONFEREES

United States Pacific Fleet
Rear Admiral C. B. Momsen

United States Army Forces
Western Pacific
Lieut. Colonel B. V. Bryant
Lieut. Colonel T. R. Palmerlee

Fifth Fleet
Vice Admiral R. M. Griffin
Rear Admiral C. L. Wellborn

Seventh Fleet
Captain F. H. Newton, Jr.
Lieut. T. V. Conroy

China Theater
Brigadier General J. W. Middleton
Colonel R. C. Wittmann
Lieut. Colonel P. A. Livesley
Major E. D. Connell

Eighth Army
Major J. V. Duff

USAFIK
Major E. R. Edgerton
Captain R. L. Beyer
Lieut. I. T. Patterson

SCAJAP
Rear Admiral C. B. Momsen
Captain N. O. Schwein
Captain D. F. Weiss
Commander R. C. Duane
Lieut. Commander C. J. Shields

General Headquarters
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

Brigadier General W. A. Dumas
Colonel J. F. Howell
Colonel A. Watson II
Lieut. Colonel O. J. McDiarmid
Major N. W. Stalheim
Major T. N. Stewart

Brigadier General H. E. Eastwood
Colonel C. F. Sams
Colonel W. C. Williams
Colonel V. B. Murray
Commander A. F. Ryan
Lieut. Colonel M. B. Gullion

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ANNEX II

To

AGREEMENTS REACHED AT CONFERENCE ON REPATRIATION
15 - 17 January 1946
Tokyo, Japan
REPATRIATION PROCEDURES PERTAINING TO THE CHINA THEATER

I GENERAL.

The agreements reached concerning repatriation procedures as specifically concerns China Theater follow.

II AGREEMENTS.

A. Ports and number to be lifted.

Priority of ports from which repatriates will be lifted, and the number of repatriates to be processed through each port:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Priority of Ports</u>	<u>Japanese</u>	<u>Koreans</u>	<u>Formosans</u>	<u>Total</u>
Formosa:		490,384	1,080	-	491,464
Kiirun..(301,464)	1				
Takao...(190,000)	1				
French Indo China:					
Haiphong or Hongay	3	30,958	29	15	31,002
South China:					
Canton	2	105,078	1,505	4,101	110,684
Ft Bayard..(3,650)	1)				
Haikow.....(30,857)	2)- - -	21,531	1,816	21,160	44,507
Sanya.....(10,000)	2)				
Swatow	1	4,795	126	1,424	6,345
Amoy	1	3,686	-	7,000	10,686
Central China:					
Shanghai	1	741,070	11,957	6,212	759,239
North China:					
Laoyao	1	107,733	7,028	23	114,784
Tsingtao	1	98,455	4,062	279	102,796
Taku	1	299,092	29,019	1,382	329,493
Manchuria:					
Hulutao	4	1,603,000	?	?	1,603,000
Total as of 1 Jan 46		3,505,782	56,622	41,596	3,604,000

B. Shipping to be Utilized.

1. Thirty percent of the passenger spaces (approximately 10,000) in long range repatriation shipping recovered from control of Japanese and now operated by SCAJAP will be continued in China Theater service.

2. Seventh Fleet LSTs will be continued in repatriation service until 7 April 1946 under existing agreements. By 7 April 1946 it is expected that all will be withdrawn. * * * * *

3. Eighth-three to one hundred Liberty ships and eighty-five LSTs, crewed by Japanese and operated under SCAJAP control, will be available for China Theater repatriation. The approximate arrival time in China for these vessels follows:

<u>Week Ending</u>	<u>No. of LSTs</u>	<u>No. of Liberty Ships</u>
2 February	4	0
9 February	7	7
16 February	7	12
23 February	9	12
2 March	14	12
9 March	14	13
16 March	14	13
23 March	16	13
30 March	0	18
	<u>85</u>	<u>100</u>

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C. Ports and Capacity

1. Ports in China Theater, projected daily lift, and ship capacities follows:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Daily Lift</u>	<u>Port Capacity</u>
Formosa		
Kiirun	6,500	9 Liberty ships
Takao	3,500	4 Liberty ships
China		
Shanghai	6,000	unlimited berthing
Tangku*	2,500	3 LSTs
Tsingtao	7,500 weekly	2 LSTs
Laoyao	10,000 weekly	2 to 3 LSTs
Amoy		unlimited small vessels
Swatow		unlimited small vessels
Ft. Bayard		unlimited small vessels
Canton**	4,000	2 Liberty ships
Hainan Island		
Haikow ***	4,000	unlimited small vessels
Sanya **		up to 4,000 persons per day
French Indo-China		
Haiphong	4,000	none
Hongay		unlimited small vessels

* Possible ice conditions between 15 January and 1 April, but expect to keep port open.

** Estimate will be mine free 15 February 1946.

*** Estimate will be mine free 1 February 1946.

2. a. Ports in Korea and daily capacities for reception of repatriates from Japan follow:

<u>Port</u>	<u>Daily Incoming Capacity</u>
Pusan	7,000
Kunsan	1,500
Inchon	1,000
Mokpo	1,000

b. Capacity for reception of Koreans from China is to be arranged between SCAP and Com Gen China based on advice of Com Gen USAFIK.

3. Ports in Japan and daily capacities follow: *

<u>Port</u>	<u>Daily Incoming Capacity</u>
Hakodate	2,500
Maizuru	2,500
Senzaki	5,000
Hakata	7,500
Sasebo	5,000
Kagoshima	3,000
Kure	8,000
Uraga	10,000

* Consideration is being given to increasing repatriation ports and port facilities in Japan.

D. Shuttles to be Established.

1. Shuttles to be established between Japanese and Chinese ports, and pertinent data appear below:

<u>Port In</u> <u>China Theater</u>	<u>Port in</u> <u>Japan</u>	<u>Vessels per</u> <u>Day in</u> <u>Japan</u>	<u>No. of</u> <u>Repatriates</u> <u>Carried</u>	<u>Total #</u> <u>Liberty</u> <u>Ships</u> <u>Required</u>	<u>Total #</u> <u>LSTs</u> <u>Required</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Kiirun	Kure	1 Lib	3,000	16		
Kiirun	Uraga	1 Lib	3,000	16		
Kiirun	Kagoshima	Variable	500			Jap escorts
Takao	Kure	1 Lib	3,000	19		
Takao	Kure	Variable	500			Jap escorts
Shanghai	Hakata	1 Lib	3,000	11		
Shanghai	Hakata	1 LST	1,200		15	
Shanghai	Hakata*	Variable	1,500			Various Jap Vessels
Tangku	Sasebo	2 LSTs	2,500		36	
Tsingtao or Laoyao**	Sasebo	2 LSTs	2,500		34	
Canton or Hainan	Uraga	1 or 2 Libs	3,000 6,000	21-38		
Amoy, Swatow Ft. Bayard	Kagoshima	Unknown				Jap small Vessels as available
				<u>83-100</u>	<u>85</u>	

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- * Includes Hakata - Pusan - Shanghai shuttles.
- ** Six (6) LSTs per week to Tsingtao; eight (8) LSTs per week to Laoyao.
- # Based on 80% of the Libertys and 60% of the Japanese manned LSTs being operational, and allowing two days at terminal port in Japan and China.

2. SCAP reserves the privilege of shifting terminal ports of shuttles in Japan if and when additional reception ports are established or facilities at existing ports are increased.

3. a. As Libertys become available for repatriation they will be assigned consecutively to shuttles operating from ports in China in the following order: Takao, Kiirun, Shanghai, Kiirun and repeat.

b. Similarly, LSTs will be assigned consecutively to shuttles operating from ports in China in the following order: Tangku, Tsingtao or Laoyao, Shanghai and repeat.

4. Ships recovered from Japanese, assigned to Chinese repatriation will be employed to evacuate Japanese nationals in the following priority:

1st priority to Amoy, Swatow and Ft. Bayard, to be in the order named.

2nd priority to Takao and Kiirun.

3d priority to Shanghai.

E. US Representatives at Ports in China Theater.

Com Gen China will provide US Army teams at each repatriation port in China Theater, to consist of approximately eight (8) officers and twenty-four (24) enlisted men (including signal, medical and overhead personnel). In addition Com Gen China will provide adequate Japanese interpreters. These

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liaison teams will maintain liaison between US and Chinese authorities.

F. Hospital Ships.

1. Two SCAJAP controlled hospital ships, with estimated combined capacity of 1,000 beds will be allocated to China Theater repatriation.

2. Request will be made to the War Department to provide approximately 5000 beds additional hospital ship capacity, preferably of the Liberty type trooper, for conversion to hospital ships, to be operated under SCAJAP control with Japanese crews and medical personnel.

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6

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ANNEX VII

to

AGREEMENTS REACHED AT CONFERENCE ON REPATRIATION
15 - 17 January 1946
Tokyo, Japan

SUPPLY IN REPATRIATION

I GENERAL.

The following agreements were reached concerning repatriation supply matters.

II AGREEMENTS.

A. The Japanese Government is responsible in general for furnishing supplies for vessels engaged in repatriation to or from Japan.

B. SCAP agrees to insure that the necessary supplies are furnished by the Japanese. Vessels will be loaded with the necessary blankets, food, and medical supplies in so far as practicable. During periods of cold weather in Japan, the Japanese will place aboard vessels departing from Japan sufficient warm clothing for repatriates to be returned to Japan from warm climates.

C. Com Gen Eighth Army agrees to insure that adequate storage facilities are available to Japanese authorities to maintain a ready reserve of supplies and avoid sailing delays. Notice of departure of US manned LST's leaving Japan will be furnished the Japanese by Com Gen Eighth Army sufficiently in advance of sailing date to permit loading of supplies without delaying sailing.

D. Com Gen USAFIK agrees to furnish food, blankets and medical

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supplies for Korean repatriates to be returned to Korea on US LST's shuttling between Pacific Ocean Areas and Korea. During periods of cold weather in Korea, warm clothing will be supplied for repatriates being transported in US manned LST's from Pacific Ocean Areas.

E. CINCPAC agrees to furnish the required supplies for vessels under his control making initial repatriation trips to Korea or Japan. CINCPAC will notify the appropriate addressees in Korea when US Army or Navy clothing or equipment has been issued to Korean repatriates departing from his area.

F. Com Gen China and SCAP agree to continue refueling and provisioning LST's operated by Seventh Fleet in accordance with agreements made at the Shanghai Conference, 25 - 27 October 1945.

G. Com Gen China and SCAP agree further that the vaccines necessary for medical processing at Chinese ports of Japanese repatriates will be furnished by Japanese at direction of SCAP, upon request by Com Gen China.

H. All area commanders agree that emergency issues will be made in accordance with established policy.

4-29/5 F

28 May 1947

MEMORANDUM TO : Chief of Staff.

SUBJECT : Report on Mass Repatriation.

1. G-3 has prepared a draft entitled "Report on Mass Repatriation in the Pacific", with a view to having it published as a printed booklet (660 copies).

2. The paper (8" x 10½") of a glossy type, is in stock in QM and will not effect the paper shortage. Estimated cost of this paper is \$50.00.

3. Cost of publishing is estimated to be 56,000 yen which G-3 proposes to charge to cost of occupation since Japanese people are the principal beneficiaries of the activity covered by this report.

4. The report covers a most outstanding and completed project of the CINC which as far as is known is without parallel in history from an efficient and humanitarian aspect.

5. It is believed that the publication will be of interest not only to those closely connected with the mass repatriation but to many people and institutions both military and civil.

6. The proposed number of copies while apparently large does not materially increase the cost over that of a few copies since the largest expense is the setting of type and preparation of plates.

7. G-3 has prepared two proposed forewords. Suggest using one with CINC's signature as it will lend dignity to a great humanitarian project which has been so ably completed.

8. G-4 concurs with the publication of this report. G-2 concurs in the report as written and will use an abbreviated form of the report in history he is preparing.

9. Recommend approval of report and request for publication.


E. M. A.

INCL
1
-
MEMO
AND
APPROVALGENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
G-3 Section

19 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff.

SUBJECT: Report on Mass Repatriation.

1. Attached hereto, as Inclosure No. 2, is draft of "Report on Mass Repatriation in the Pacific." This document covers mass repatriation from the inception of the program until 31 December 1946 and has been prepared with a view toward its publication as a printed booklet.

2. To assist in visualizing the appearance of the completed publication, as well as to permit studying the content thereof, the material has been organized as indicated in inclosures hereto.

3. Because of the probable interest in this publication on the part of higher, coordinate and subordinate headquarters and service schools, and the stated interest of individuals in units of all echelons which have participated in or been associated with the program, distribution as indicated in Inclosure No. 1 has been planned, a total printing of some 660 copies.

4. Reproduction.

a. Specifications: Illustrated, two-color, 8 x 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch page size, about 80 pages.

b. Paper. Similar in weight, texture and finish to that used in the format guide, booklet "Impact", Inclosure No. 5. A sufficient quantity of suitable glazed book paper is available and its use will not affect the paper shortage in Japan.

c. Cost, Estimates.

(1) Paper, \$50.00

(2) Publishing (less paper), ¥56,000.

(3) Yen cost, chargeable to "Cost of Occupation", cannot be estimated in dollars at this time.

5. It is recommended that:

a. The "Report on Mass Repatriation in the Pacific" be approved for publication.

b. A foreword, prepared for the Commander-in-Chief's facsimile

signature (see Text, Inclosure No. 2, and page b, Dummy, Inclosure No. 4) be utilized as the necessary authentication.

c. In the event recommendation b above is not favorably considered, authentication in lieu thereof, as in Text (Inclosure No. 2) and alternate page b of Dummy (Inclosure No. 4) be used.

d. This report be reproduced by the printing and engraving method on paper stock similar in weight, texture and finish to that used in format guide, booklet "Impact" (Inclosure No. 5).

e. Upon approval, complete file be returned to G-3 for transmission to the Adjutant General.

6. Concurrence: G-4 (Col Eastwood).

for *C. A. Russell*
C. A. RUSSELL,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

6 Inclosures:

Incl 1 - Distribution
Incl 2 - Text
Incl 3 - Photo File
Incl 4 - Dummy
Incl 5 - Format Guide ("Impact")
Incl 6 - Chart File

2 June 1947

Publication of this document approved as recommended. In view of suggestions by G-2, minor additions may be required. CinC has approved the foreword as written. The official statement, Page B of Dummy, will also be used. Signatures of CinC and CofS can be placed on draft prepared for multilith.

PJM
Chief of Staff

10 June 47
Suggestions of G-2 considered by Gen Willoughby and the undersigned. Appropriate minor changes were made. G-2 concurs in the document as amended.
W.H.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MM 775-007

By BT NARA Date 10-14-08

Scan

*file This
with the
History
Report BT*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MM 775-007
By BT NARA Date 10-14-08

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED POWERS

8/7

1947

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF

TO : G-3

There are other papers
connected with the
publication of the
Report on Repatriation,
currently suspended

PM

PAUL J. MUELLER
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

Incl 2
Memo
fr C/S
7 Aug
47

SUSPENSE SHEET

DATE	TO	DATE	TO
30 JUNE	ANDERSON		
SUBJECT:			
FROM:			
TO:			
FILE:			
ACTION REQUIRED			

REMARKS

Contacted ~~#~~ G-2, Historical (Miss Corrigan)
 this date (20 May). G-2 has not yet
 finished chapter on Repatriation History
 and therefore requests retention on
 use of G-3 charts. OK — we
 don't need, but follow up again
 about 1 July. BH

Chart returned by
Miss Courgon
o/about 7 June 49
BB

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *MM 995009*By *BT* NARA Date *10-14-08*

G-3 Repatriation Section

SUSPENSE SHEET*1 Nov 48*

DATE	TO	DATE	TO
<i>1 Dec</i>	<i>ANDERSON</i>		
<i>15 DEC</i>	<i>"</i>		
<i>15 JAN</i>	<i>"</i>		
<i>1 Feb</i>	<i>"</i>		
<i>1 MAR</i>	<i>"</i>		
<i>15 MAR</i>	<i>"</i>		
<i>3 May</i>	<i>"</i>		
<i>20 "</i>	<i>"</i>		

SUBJECT:

FROM:

TO:

FILE:

ACTION REQUIRED:

REMARKS:

*G-2 Historical Section**has again borrowed G-3**"Repatriation History" for use in**preparation of Theater History**— follow-up.**Followed up 1 Feb 49**Miss Corrigan still using**will return it**BB*

History returned
capture copy
made by G-2
CHARTS NOT

yet returned
BB

Followed up
on 2 Mar 49
C. Corrigan
Miss Corrigan
she is returning
15

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MM 995009

By BT NARA Date 10-14-08

R E C E I P T

Received this date from G-3 Repatriation the dummy
copy of "Report on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pacific."

DESCRIPTION: Looseleaf volume of 123 pages to be returned
"as is".

Signed

J. CORRIGAN

G-2 HISTORICAL Sect

Date

1 NOV '48

26-7541

EXT 98

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MM 795009

By BT NARA Date 10-14-08

R E C E I P T

Received this date from G-3 Repatriation the dummy
copy of "Report on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pacific."

DESCRIPTION: Looseleaf volume of 123 pages to be returned
"as is".

Signed

J. Corrigan
G-2 Historical Section

Date

1 Nov. 48.

Telephone 267541

Oct 98
/ 132

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MM 775007

By BT NARA Date 10-14-08

G HQ
SCAP & FEC
G-3 Section

8 November 1948

Rec'd this date from Capt M. J. Young, G-3
one (1) booklet "Charts and Tables, Mass
Repatriation in the Pacific"

Corrigan
G-2 Historical Section

~~File with receipt (signed by
same) for G-2 Repat History.~~
PS

20 Sep 49

NUMBER OF REPATRIATES (INCOMING)

	URAGA	MAIZUMI	HAKATA	KAGOSHIMA	UJINA	SASEBO	SENZAKI	OTAKE	TANABE	NAGOYA	HAKODATE	YOKOHAMA	TOTAL
Sept., 1945.			53,071				78,134						131,205
Oct.	13,750	10,571	100,733	806	4,791	41,093	57,313						122,948 ^{229,057}
Nov.	48,356	2,217	119,883	18,566	1,512	59,581	65,573	2,159					317,847
Dec.	70,248		47,487	25,325	3,770	72,229	7,685	20,838					247,582
Jan., 1946.	63,230		14,539	32,837	971	100,207	2,248	7,682					221,714
Feb.	31,439	6	24,635	77,998	3,232	77,315	3,334	23,125	6,924				248,008
March	20,192	46	131,616	54,194	32,112	97,274	24,509	147,123	61,760				568,826
April	70,601	14,149	89,752	38,447	10,780	120,139	52,447	56,851	39,892	23,442			516,500
May	55,347	3,134	108,948	35,988	5,948	101,411	49,170	54,876	39,901	124,834			579,557
June	95,761	23,595	157,480	51,606	21,280	81,970	36,230	27,132	71,855	56,573			623,482
July	47,850	85,331	100,552	24,387	23,143	29,536	20,293	37,344		5,947			374,383
Aug.	24,125	2,503	58,518	16	9,315	69,601	969	11,739					176,786
Sept.	19		131,207	304		74,105	7	3,743					209,385
Oct.	4,755		178,504	108		124,887	3	14,861		12,070			335,188
Nov.	11,229		26,705	342	138	22,506		450		10,692			72,062
Dec.	7,404	5,000	10,803		928	33,157		2,860		25,357	5,703		91,212
Jan., 1947.	308	5,009	78		2,274	73,558				674	6,103		88,004
Feb.	6	19,215			4,315	43,726							67,262
March	5		34,397		4,101	62,234							100,737
April		22,233	3,521		8,446	7,851				27,108			69,159
May		27,277			10,723	9,399				30,129	29		77,557
June		21,260			6,422	11,329				28,682	23		67,716
Total	564,625	241,546	1,392,429	360,924	154,201	1,313,108	^{397,915} 413,961	410,783	220,332	259,589	97,725	52	5,429,275 ^{5,413,229}

Note: Out of ^{5,413,229} 5,429,275 Army 2,383,361; Navy 322,522; Civilian ^{2,707,346} 2,723,392. (Authenticity of breakdown questionable)

Info. obtained from PHAW, 24 Sept 49

Forwarded to G-3 Report By SRS for Info -
PRD